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On understanding psychoanalysis 
II A chance observation": Freud's introduction to 
psychoanalysis 
"Anna 0" had problems. Not the least of her problems was that the 
medical sciences of her day could neither cure her, nor explain what 
was causing her suffering. Anna 0 (real name Bertha Pappenheim) 
developed a number of troubling symptoms between July 1880 and 
June 1882. Many of these seemed to be physical in nature. Anna suf-
fered rigid paralysis on the right side of her body, then her left arm. Her 
vision was impaired. The posture of her head was disturbed, and she 
had a nervous cough. Anna suffered from a kind of eating disorder - or, 
more precisely, a "drinking problem". For six weeks, she could not 
drink water, despite suffering tormenting thirst. Anna's capacity to 
speak was severely disturbeq. She could speak only English for eighteen 
months, although her mother tongue was German, and she could 
understand others' speech. Finally, Anna would lapse into periods 
of delirium or "absences': during which she would abuse and throw 
cushions at her carers (AO: 21-33). Yet medical examinations could 
reveal no physical causes for these symptoms. 
European medicine in the nineteenth century had a word to describe 
the condition of women suffering from such strange symptoms as 
Anna O's: "hysteria". Yet, as French philosopher Michel Foucault (and 
others) has documented (Foucault 1990), the understandings and treat-
ments for mental illnesses such as hysteria available at that time were 
scientifically - and ethically - very questionable. Hysteria's uncertain 
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physical basis meant that patients would often receive unsympathetic 
treatment, as if their symptoms and suffering were unreal. It was 
Annas good fortune, however, to come to the attention of Doctor 
Joseph Breuer, a colleague and a friend of another young Viennese 
physician named Sigmund Freud. Breuer initially had no more idea 
about how to treat Anna 0 than anyone else. Yet "a chance observation" 
was to change all this, and to give birth to one of the most influential 
movements of thought of the next century (PMH: 3). 
Breuer did not dismiss Anna O's symptoms, and what Anna had to 
say, as so much ('feminine theatre". Indeed, when Breuer learnt that in 
Anna's absences she would repeat certain words (such as "tormenting, 
tormenting ... "), Breuer tried something different. Breuer's idea was 
to repeat Anna's delirious words back to her under hypnosis, encour-
aging Anna to "speak her mind" as fully as she could about them. In 
this way, Breuer hoped to become aware of the ideas in Anna's head that 
accompanied her absences. Anna - by all accounts an intelligent and 
sensitive woman - began in this way to speak again, albeit at first only 
under hypnosis. Responding to Breuer's promptings, over time she 
came to recount a sequence of poetic stories and episodes from her life 
(AO: 29-34). Moreover, to Breuer's lasting surprise, this act of speaking 
her mind had unmistakable therapeutic effects. After each session, 
Anna would rest more peacefully, although on the following day her 
absences would recur, and the process would need to be repeated. 
Grateful for this much relief, Anna 0 christened the novel therapeutic 
procedure the "talking cure" (ibid.: 30). It was, she joked, like "chimney 
sweeping" - as if talking under hypnosis somehow cleansed her mind 
of what ailed her. 
Breuer came to learn a good deal about Anna O's life and history by 
carrying out this talking treatment. Anna's stories would as a rule turn 
on the evocation of a young girl at her sick father's bedside. And when, 
encouraged by the successes of the talking cure, Breuer asked Anna 
to recall under hypnosis the first time her symptoms had appeared, 
another surprise lay in store. Anna's symptoms, without exception, all 
seemed to have first appeared during one, deeply traumatic time in 
Anna's own life. In July 1880, Anna's beloved father had fallen ill with a 
condition that would claim his life early the following year. During the 
first months of her father's illness, the 21-year-old Anna devoted her-
self to nursing her father. It was while she undertook this melancholy 
vigil that Anna's own symptoms appeared. By December 1880 she was 
consigned to a sickbed of her own. 
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Let us give two examples of what Anna's reminiscences revealed to 
Breuer about the origins of her symptoms. 
KEY POINT Where did Anna G's symptoms originate? 
• Anna's disturbed vision and squint: when Breuer asked Anna to recollect 
when the problems with her vision had begun, she recounted an experi-
ence at her father's sickbed. Anna had been crying in grief, when her 
father asked the time. Anna tried to look at her watch. However, tears 
obscured her vision. Accordingly, she brought the watch very close to her 
eyes, squinting to see through her tears . 
• Anna's paralysis of the right side of her body: when Breuer asked Anna to 
recall when her paralysis appeared, Anna recounted how one night, 
attending her father, she lapsed into a vivid dream. In this dream she 
envisaged a snake leaping at her father from out of the wall. Anna wished 
she could defend him. However, her right arm, draped over the back of 
her chair, was paralysed. And when Anna looked at this right arm, the 
fingers turned, terrifyingly, into snakes before her eyes, each bearing a tiny 
death's head. 
Once again, Anna's act of recollecting when her symptoms first 
appeared had unexpected effects. What Breuer found "to our great sur-
prise at first" (PMH: 7) was this: Anna's recollection of the incidents 
when her symptoms first emerged seemed to dissolve these symptoms. 
By June 1882, Breuer tells us, he was able to cure Anna of all her hyster-
ical symptoms. Freud's 1909 recollection of these occurrences captures 
the wonder Breuer's unpredicted therapeutic success produced in him: 
"never before had anyone removed a hysterical symptom by such a 
method or had thus gained such a deep insight into its causation" 
(FL: 10). 
Freud would spend his life pursuing the implications of Breuer's 
(and Anna O's) chance discovery. In his own clinical work, Freud 
would soon discard Breuer's method of hypnosis as "a temperamental 
and, one might say, a mystical ally" (FL: 26-7). Not only was Freud, by 
his own admission, not particularly good at hypnotizing patients. 
Because of the traumatic, emotionally charged content of what Anna 
o and others recollected under hypnosis, Freud came to hypothesize 
that hypnosis, by momentarily suspending the patients' resistances 
to recalling these painful memories, also prevented the doctor from 
confronting these resistances. Hence these resistances would return in 
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patients after a period of time, sometimes more strongly than before 
(e.g. FL: 29-30; see Chapter 8, under the section "The Ends of 
Psychoanalysis") . 
Yet Breuer's treatment of Anna 0 had opened the path to psycho-
analysis that Freud was to travel down. It was Anna O's case that intro-
duced Freud to the remarkable possibility that hysterics - and, by 
implication, the sufferers of other neuroses - «suffer mainly from rem-
iniscences" (PMH: 7). Moreover, Anna O's case alerted Freud to the 
possibility on which all psychoanalytic theory would be based: namely, 
that there may be thoughts and processes in people's minds which, 
despite being unknown to them, have a decisive say in their behaviour. 
Psychoanalysis proper was born when Freud came to propose, after 
1895, that Anna O's "talking cure" should be undertaken without 
hypnotizing the patient. The doctor should do two "non-mystical" 
things. First, he should assure the patient that they know more about 
what has caused their symptoms than they might consciously think. 
Second, in what is known as «free association': the patient should say 
the first things that come into their heads, no matter how fair or foul. 
In this manner, Freud advocated, a type of recollection can be engen-
dered in the mentally ill that is lastingly curative. 
Introducing meta psychology 
Psychoanalysis is first and foremost this clinical practice of the talking 
cure. It is based on the idea that a person's - the analysand's - recollec-
tion of the original cause of their illness, in the presence of their doctor 
- the analyst - is somehow therapeutic. Given that this is so, we might 
well ask: what can psychoanalysis have to do with philosophy and other 
modern movements of thought, if it can have anything to do with them 
at all? The German novelist Thomas Mann noted Freud's own profes-
sional opinion on the matter. In truth, Mann observed, Freud 
did not esteem philosophy very highly ... He reproaches it 
with imagining that it can present a continuous and consistent 
picture of the world; with overestimating the objective value of 
logical operations; with believing in intuitions as a source 
of knowledge and with indulging in positively animistic 
tendencies, in that it believes in the magic of words and the 
influence of thought upon reality. 
(Mann, in Lear 1990: 1; cf. (e.g.) ON: 77-9) 
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Nevertheless, perhaps the decisive challenge psychoanalysis was 
to pose to other Western movements of thought came from Freud's 
insights into the ways in which the meaning of individuals' words 
and actions exceed their conscious self-perceptions. Freud's discovery 
of the unconscious intrinsically puts into question a central conceit 
of Western philosophy: the possibility of individuals' achieving total 
theoretical mastery (and self-mastery) in their attempts to under-
stand themselves and the world. The effects of this blow to Western 
man's narcissism (which Freud famously aligns with Copernicus's and 
Darwin's discoveries) continue to reverberate through contemporary 
thought. As we shall see, some philosophers (such as Derrida) and 
other critics (including feminists such as Juliet Mitchell or Luce 
Irigaray) took Freud's challenge to heart, turning to an auto critical (or 
deconstructive) art of reading previous Western philosophy for its 
inconsistencies, slippages and hidden biases in ways that directly reflect 
a psychoanalytic heritage. Other twentieth-century thinkers berated 
psychoanalysis for insufficient scientific or philosophical rigour, or 
for leading us into an interpretive night where all paths lead to Freud's 
predetermined conclusions. Yet, ironically, as with so many of the 
philosophers Freud would accuse of overvaluing their theoretical sys-
tems, the movement of thought Freud himself founded would very 
soon come to aspire to a more or less total account of human existence 
and civilization. Psychoanalysis began in the clinical practice of treat-
ing analysands such as Anna O. Yet it quickly became an international 
institution, and a movement of thought that has affected almost all 
walks of modern culture, from avant-garde art to popular expressions 
such as "Freudian slip", "anal retentive" and others. In this way, psycho-
analysis came to be not only philosophy's critic, but its competitor in 
giving a total account of human life and meaning. This competition of 
psychoanalysis with the philosophers surely goes some way towards 
explaining twentieth-century philosophy's continuously ambivalent 
relations with psychoanalysis. Whatever Freud wished, however, from 
shortly after p~ychoanalysis's conception thinkers from almost all 
of the major schools of thought in the last century took it up (or on» 
challenged, weighe,d and debated it: analytic philosophers of language 
and science, existentialists and phenomenologists, hermeneuticians, 
Marxists and critical theorists, feminists and poststructuralists. 
Despite the distance Freud attempted to underscore between psycho-
analysis and previous Western thought, commentators on his work 
soon noted the debt his thinking about the psychoanalytic clinic owes 
to philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In later essays, 
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for example "Beyond the Pleasure Principle': Freud indulges in the 
same type of "speculations" he typically condemns in philosophers, 
even resurrecting the gnomic Presocratic Empedocles on a suggested 
biological footing (e.g. Derrida 1987). Given philosophy's epochal cen-
trality to Western ideas, Freud's new discipline could hardly help but 
intervene in many of the fields philosophers had previously assumed 
that they were uniquely licensed to pronounce upon. Rather than 
accepting Freud's many dismissive statements concerning psychoanal-
ysis's relations to philosophy, accordingly, it is more accurate to adapt 
what Freud has to say in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life about its 
relationship to religious belief-namely, Freud's ambition was that one 
day metapsychology, the theory of psychoanalysis, should supplant 
metaphysics, and the thought of the philosophers (PEL: 259). 
So what philosophical and other movements of thought does psycho-
analysis intervene in, and what does it say within these fields? Or, 
from the side of these movements of thought: what questions have 
philosophers and others posed to psychoanalysis about its findings and 
procedures? 
There are nearly as many conceptions of philosophy as there have 
been great philosophers. In his magnum opus, The Critique of Pure 
Reason, the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that 
all philosophy turns on three questions: first, the question of what 
humans can know; secondly, what it is right for them to do; and, 
thirdly, what humans can hope for. In his book on Logic, however, Kant 
added a fourth question, as if this question might "take all" - what is a 
human being? This is the question of "philosophical anthropology", 
from the Greek word for the human being, 6 anthropos. It is a question 
central to Western philosophy ever since its inception with Socrates' 
famous ((second sailing", recounted in Plato's Phaedo, away from what 
today is called «natural science". Interestingly enough, it is also the 
question that the Theban Sphinx is reputed to have asked Oedipus in 
the myth that inspired Sophocles' tragedy, Oedipus Tyrannis. For the 
metapsychology developed by Freud to comprehend the talking cure -
a theory in which the Oedipus tale was to playa very central role (see 
Chapter 2) - can be understood in this way. Freud's theoretical writings 
develop a new, psychoanalytic anthropology. 
The prevalent self-image of humanity in Anna O's time was that 
human beings (or men at least) are the ('masters and possessors of 
nature" (Descartes). This modern anthropology develops a much older 
philosophical tradition paradigmatically expressed in the first book 
of Aristotle's Politics. In this book, Aristotle offers two, coordinate 
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definitions of 6 anthropos. Men are zoon politikon: political or social 
animals, who can only flourish when they live in company with others. 
But men are also tes zoas who have logos: men can speak, or as the 
Romans came to translate it, they have ((rationality': 
As the poststructuralist philosophers were to emphasize in the 
charged intellectual climate of the 1960s and 1970s, Freud's psycho-
analytic understanding of the human being strikingly qualifies this 
confident Western self-conception, if it does not overturn it com-
pletely. For Freud, as for the philosophers, human beings are speaking, 
social animals capable of rationality. The talking cure could hardly have 
got off the ground if we were not. Yet, unlike the philosophical accounts 
of human nature, Freud lays emphasis on how individual human 
beings become such rational beings. A newborn child who cannot even 
control its bowel movements is not a fully rational, social being. As 
every parent, nurse or carer knows, there are many wishes, impulses 
and thoughts an infant must "grow out of" if it is to become a func-
tioning member of society. Freud's most basic supposition is this: no 
human being makes it from infancy to a fully "civilized" state without 
lingering "discontents" that date first from their initial socialization. 
The mentally ill, far from being somehow sub- or inhuman, are in the 
psychoanalytic picture only those of us who have made it with more 
"baggage" than others. And the unconscious, first of all, is Freud's term 
for that part of individuals' psyches that bears witness to these linger-
ing resistances to the civilizing process. Never a closed box, the un-
conscious is attested in their irrational inhibitions, symptoms and 
anxieties, not to mention the dreams and "slips of the tongue" we all 
make all the time. For Freud, human beings are the political animals 
who have an unconscious. When they speak, they make jokes and 
blunders, through which are ip.timated how the unconscious works. 
And when human beings sleep, they dream - typically of the most 
bizarre or immoral things, foreign to the dreamers' waking selves. 
Freud's postulation of the unconscious is the sine qua non of Freud's 
metapsychology, and of any psychoanalytic account of the human 
being. But it is neither the only, nor the most controversial, of Freud's 
hypotheses about human nature. Probably the idea Freud is best 
known for is the centrality he assigned to sexuality in his understand-
ing of the human psyche, and of mental illness. With the possible 
exceptions of Plato and Nietzsche - to both of whom Freud refers - no 
previous secular Western thinker had accorded such importance to 
human beings' erotic life. When we make a list of all their inborn drives 
- to breathe, eat, drink, sleep ... have sex - Freud argues that the last 
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one on this list "sticks out". To be sure) as the old song goes: "the birds 
do it, the bees do if~ and so do we. Yet, strange as this sounds, Freud 
insists that there is something particularly problematic for human 
beings about doing "if: If sexuality were the most natural thing in the 
world for us, Freud asks, why are human beings the only animals not to 
have any mating season? And if sexuality were not decisive in individu-
als, personal make-up, why do the sufferers of mental illness so often 
report disturbances in their sexual lives? Many philosophers would be 
quick to draw a line between serious, philosophical thought - pertinent 
only to essential questions of being and rationality - and questions 
concerning the place of sexuality in our lives. Yet Freud again chal-
lenges philosophy by placing the inessential- the rudely impertinent 
and unruly body - at the centre of thought and culture. It is in fact the 
manner in which we negotiate (and avoid) the thorny question of sex-
uality that orients what human beings are, according to Freud; and this 
includes the philosopher. However unhappy many feminists have been 
about Freud's answer to his famous question "What does woman 
want?': psychoanalysis's questions about the importance of sexuality, 
and the constructed nature of our sexual identities, would make it a 
pivotal reference for twentieth-century feminisms. 
We shall return to Freud's views on sexuality in Chapter 2. The intro-
ductory point is this: if Freud is right, in contrast to the philosophers, 
human beings are the animals (first) with an unconscious, for whom 
(secondly) sexuality is as central as it is potentially problematic. There 
are two further dimensions to his position that we shall confront as we 
proceed in Understanding Psychoanalysis. 
Thirdly, for Freud, it is not just that we all have an unconscious) now. 
As we saw in the case of Anna 0, the symptoms that trouble individuals, 
and that Freud argues bear witness to the unconscious, originate in 
episodes in individuals' histories. As for many modern philosophers, 
if in a completely different way, we are for Freud historical animals. 
Neurotics' symptoms, Freud says, "are residues and mnemic symbols 
of particular (traumatic) experiences': In his 1909 Clark Lectures 
introducing an American audience to psychoanalysis ("they do not 
suspect we are bringing the plague': Freud supposedly joked), Freud 
compares neurotic symptoms with the monuments that adorn the 
cities of the world, commemorating their peoples' past struggles and 
sacrifices (FL: 15 -17). The unconscious, far from being simply a store-
house of wild drives, is accordingly also a distinctive "mnemic" or 
memory system, Freud contends (see Chapter 3). If sexual disturbances 
are so prominent in the symptomatology of the mentally ill, it is 
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because individuals' "oral fixations': "masochistic impulses» and so on 
somehow symbolically "commemorate" episodes from their own sex-
ual development - in the now-infamous terms of Freud's Three Essays 
on Sexuality, the oral, anal and Oedipal phases of their personal pre-
histories (see Chapter 2), 
Fourthly - and most ambitiously or "philosophically" - Freud 
argued that psychoanalytic theory allows us novel insights into more 
than the instinctual development of individuals. The "ontogenesis» 
(birth and socialization) of individuals, Freud argued, mirrors or 
reproduces the "phylogenesis" or historical evolution of the human 
species as a whole. Joining Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, 
Hegel and many of his contemporaries, Freud contended that, just as 
an individual develops from infancy into rational adulthood, so the 
history of human civilization has seen the species mature from the 
"infancy" of primitive beliefs and civilizations to modern, scientific 
society. Drawing on contemporary anthropologists (and Charles 
Darwin) in "Totem and Taboo" CTT) Freud in this vein presents a con-
troversial hypothesis concerning the founding event of human civil-
ization - the murder of the "father of the primal horde" - allegedly 
every bit as pivotal to human development as the infamous "Oedipus 
complex" in individuals' maturation. Freud's views on civilization, 
art and religion will form the subject of Chapter 7. 
Psychoanalysis, (and) the symptom 
Sigmund Freud introduced into Western ideas a radical new answer 
to the question of the nature of human being. Psychoanalysis took an 
idea - that of the unconscious mind - which before Freud had at most 
been intimated in literature and some vit~ist philosophers. It made 
of this idea the basis for a comprehensive «metapsychological" anthro-
pology, and a clinical procedure for treating the mentally ill. We noted 
above that several poststructuralists (thinkers such as Derrida or 
Deleuze) drew on Freud's challenge to inherited Western ideas for their 
own criticisms of previous occidental philosophy. Yet the poststruc-
turalists were by no means the only twentieth-century philosophers 
who responded to the challenges posed to philosophy by psychoanaly-
sis. As we shall see in Chapter 8, other philosophers responded differ-
endy, and more sceptically, to the bold new movement of thought. 
Philosophers such as Karl Popper and Jurgen Habermas, and social 
theorists such as Michel Foucault or Philip Rieff, were less quick to take 
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up Freud's metapsychology on its own terms. Instead, they asked of 
Freud's ideas variants of the first two of Kant's philosophical questions 
listed above: epistemologically, how can psychoanalysis verify the 
remarkable things it claims about individuals' fates, and the human 
psyche, society, art and religion? And, thinking about what makes for 
good human conduct and societies, are not the practices and ideas 
of psychoanalysis themselves a kind of "symptom" of wider modern 
malaises ~ either the individual and social malaises caused by the 
breakdown of traditional religion (for conservative critics) or, for more 
left -leaning critics, by the continuing, restrictive hold of such tradi-
tional conceits upon us? 
Although this is an introductory text, one of Understanding Psycho-
analysis's aims - as a contribution to the Acumen series Understanding 
Movements in Modern Thought - is to prompt readers to further 
explorations of the question of psychoanalysis's relations to philoso-
phy, and to other modern movements of thought such as feminism, 
critical theory, aesthetics and the theory of culture. In the later chapters 
of the book, examples of engagements of leading thinkers from these 
disciplines and fields will be introduced and analysed. These accounts 
are for the most part uncritical on their own terms, given the primarily 
exegetical calling of Understanding Psychoanalysis. Yet readers who 
look can discern an ethical defence of psychoanalysis developed at the 
book's end, one that reinforces what we think a dear exposition of key 
psychoanalytic ideas and their limits also makes evident: if psycho-
analysis is supposedly long dead today (see Chapter 8), its challenge 
to us remains, and should do, for some time yet. 
Understanding Psychoanalysis has three parts) culminating in the 
encounter of psychoanalysis with the critics and the philosophers. Part 
I examines the thinking of Sigmund Freud, the "father" of psycho-
analysis, in detail. Starting with his earlier "dynamic': "economic" or 
biological account of the mind (Chapter 1), we proceed via his theory 
of sexuality and the drives (Chapter 2) to the "topograp hicar' theory of 
the unconscious as a memory system, and Freud's magnum opus, The 
Interpretation o/Dreams (Chapter 3). Our understanding of Freud pro-
vides the basis for Part II's chapters on Freud's two great successors, 
Melanie Klein (Chapter 4) and Jacques Lacan (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 
examines the critical engagements of feminists with psychoanalysis, 
from Deutsch to Irigaray, centring on Freud's patent confusion about 
(( h " w at women want. 
Part III then returns to the questions we have posed in this introduc-
tion, about psychoanalysis's ambivalent relations with the philosophers 
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and other modern movements of thought. Chapter 7 examines Freud's 
claims concerning art, religion and civilization, and how they have 
been received by later psychoanalysts, philosophers and cultural theor-
ists. Chapter 8 turns to philosophers' and social theorists' challenges 
to psychoanalysis, asking how it can justify its claims to truth in the age 
of advanced neuroscience and psychopharmacological medications, 
whether psychoanalysis is in terminal decline or crisis, and what its 
ethical and sociopolitical significance today might be. It is in this con-
text that our closing defence of psychoanalysis emerges: a defence that 
among other things recommends a rethinking of the terms and need 
for today's ritualized (re-?) "killings" and "bashings" of the man long 
physically dead named Sigmund Freud. 
If we were to summarize the attitude that animates Understanding 
Psychoanalysis, we would point to a wonderful phrase of the twentieth-
century Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis once 
commented that all great thinkers "think beyond their means': They 
may not have all the answers, however ardently the acolytes that 
inevitably besmirch their names wish. Their greatness consists in open-
ing up new fields of enquiry, or reopening old questions in new ways. It 
is the animating conviction of the authors of this book that Freud was, 
in this sense, a great thinker. It is our task here to indicate the paths that 
have emerged from Freud's «excessive" thought. The psychoanalytic 
attempt to rationally comprehend the unconscious opened up a new 
field of theoretical enquiry, one that surprised its very proponents, let 
alone the hosts of critics who were duly to appear. One need only look 
at the history of The Interpretation of Dreams, which Freud considered 
his greatest work, to see living testimony to a thinker thinking beyond 
his means. Freud could never finish his magnum opus. He returned to it 
throughout his life, adding new examples, and revi~ng_'lnd qualifying 
earlier formulations. 
For us, then, dogmatic Freudians - no less than dogmatic followers 
of anyone else - betray Freud's scientific aspirations. They also miss 
the greatest challenge Freud posed to other movements of thought in 
the twentieth century. Klein, Lacan and feminist critics form the sub-
ject matter of Part II because they did not stick slavishly to the Freudian 
orthodoxies of their times. Instead, they addressed the many questions 
and shortcomings Freud's oeuvre bequeathed to people interested in 
human psychology, mental illness, and the wide-ranging areas Freud 
wrote about. Part II highlights how Klein, Lacan and feminists respec-
tively drew upon, developed but also criticized Freud's oeuvre in the 
light oflater clinical research, and theoretical and social developments. 
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Part III of the book, finally, aims not only to introduce students to 
psychoanalysis's contributions to theoretical debates about art, religion 
and civilization. Our emphasis is on the questions philosophers and 
critics have posed to psychoanalysis, and the «issue" philosophers and 
later psychoanalytic thinkers have taken with Freud's ideas. 
In "The Future of an Illusion'~ Freud puts into the mouth of an exas-
perated interlocutor a response that well expresses the anxieties Freud's 
attempt to bring reason to the most irrational parts of the human soul 
continues to provoke: 
On the one hand, you admit that men cannot be guided by 
their intelligence, they are ruled by their passions and their 
instinctual demands. But on the other hand, you propose to 
replace the affective basis of their obedience to civilisation 
with a rational one. Let he who can understand this. To me, it 
seems that it must be either the one thing or the other ... 
(FI: 46) 
One thing Freud's thinking indicated, as Lacan formulated it, is that 
anxiety is the one affect that does not deceive. In this context, we can 
understand part of Lacan's meaning by saying that the anxiety Freud 
provoked in his contemporaries, and ours, indicates that psychoanaly-
sis ('touches a nerve" or two in modern Western culture, threatening to 
upset many of the sanctified "either-ors" ("to me ... it must be either 
the one thing or the other ... ") that our civilization had set up to 
explain the world. 
We began this introduction with Anna 0, in whose mantic utter-
ances ("tormenting, tormenting ... ") Joseph Breuer heard a stifled 
attempt to communicate, and a plea for help. Psychoanalysis begins 
with the confrontation of such symptoms, whose very existence, when 
we think about them, confounds many of the ways we have inherited to 
think about the world. At the beginning of the scientific age, Descartes 
had agued that for a thing to exist, it must be capable of being known, 
ideally with clarity and distinctness. What Breuer and Freud came to 
find, with the symptoms of the unconscious, was that there are more 
things existing in heaven and earth than were dreamed of in Descartes's 
philosophy. Anna O's symptoms, and the symptoms of the cast of 
female hysterics Freud would treat in the ensuing years, only repeated 
in so far as their cause was not known. If Anna could remember - and 
communicate - the traumatic episodes in which the symptoms first 
appeared, they would cease. Of all the things that the twentieth-century 
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"ordinary-language philosophers" were to discover people could "do 
with words" (J. 1. Austin), none tops this act of dissolving psycholo-
gical symptoms. Indeed, its centrality to Freud's breakthrough brings 
psychoanalysis very close - too close, for many - to a professional faith 
"in the magic of words and the influence of thought upon reality .. :' 
(Thomas Mann) which puts the philosophers' (m)antics to shame. 
So let us close this introduction by proposing a hypothesis that can 
stand at the metaphorical gates of Understanding Psychoanalysis. If 
Freud is right, philosophers' difficulties in accounting for psycho-
analysis reflect the attempts of psychoanalysis to account rationally for 
an objectively perplexing «thing". This is a field of Hobjects': like Anna 
O's symptoms, subjects' knowledge of which changes these very sub-
jects. As we shall see in Chapter 8, this claim by itself arguably means 
that psychoanalysis eludes classification in either of the two types of 
intellectual enquiry sanctified by the modern world, which still divide 
university faculties today. It is not a natural science, as Popper, Nagel, 
Ricoeur or Grunbaum agree. Yet nor is it, for this reason, a discipline 
that can be safely embosomed within the interpretive or «human sci-
ences" such as criminology, sociology and economics, as neuropsycho-
analysts such as Mark Solms or Eric Kandel rightly protest. Like Anna's 
symptoms which called psychoanalysis into being, that is, psycho-
analysis itself has something like a "symptomatic" status in the modern 
world's self-understandings. And like the proverbial symptom the 
neurotic wishes ardently he might ignore, so we can surmise that it will 
not cease troubling us until we come to terms with it, which means 
working through both its shortcomings and its truths. Put more 
strongly, psychoanalysis, if anything, poses an ethical challenge to sub-
jects, and to modern civilization. It represents in the bosom of modern 
medicine and our "therapeutic" culture an unlikely refiguring of the 
Greeks' injunction to gnothi seauton (know thyself) that continues to 
address itself to us as individuals, and as a discontented civilization. 
It is with the aim of heeding this injunction, and so of making a small 
contribution to coming to terms with the modern «symptom" called 
psychoanalysis, that we offer this introductory text. 
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part. 
Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis 

one 
Where it was: Freud's biology of the mind 
From the pleasure principle to the reality principle 
In the decade following Breuer's treatment of Anna, Freud confirmed 
for himself Breuer's claim about the ~urative value of analysands' recol-
lections in a number of other cases of female hysteria (Emmy von N, 
Lucy R, Katherina -, Elizabeth von R) (CH). Eschewing Breuer's 
reliance on hypnosis, it was in these cases that Freud developed the 
method of free association and, a fortiori, clinical psychoanalysis. But 
why might the spoken expression of forgotten traumatic incidents 
be a therapeutic experience for individuals? It is one thing to do some-
thing; another to know what you have done. Such an unexpected clin-
ical finding, Freud saw, could be made sense of only by a far- reaching 
account of the mind. Yet the categories of Freud's metapsychology did 
not come to him all at once, by the time of his first theoretical writings 
in the early 1890s. Freud would continue to revise them until well after 
the traumas of World War I. 
Sigmund Freud was born in 1856, the youngest son of a pious Jewish 
wool-merchant, and the only son of his father's second wife. At the 
time of Breuer's treatment of Anna 0 (1880-82), Freud was beginning 
his professional life as a physician in Vienna. Freud's training as a 
physician, as well as the unquestioned cultural prestige the natural 
sciences enjoyed in late nineteenth-century Europe, pointed him in 
the direction of his earliest writings. In these texts, as throughout the 
ensuing decades, Freud proposed that what the psychoanalytic clinic 
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revealed about the human psyche could be theorized in the terms of a 
biological account of the mind. 
Recall that Anna 0 described the effect of the talking cure as like 
chimney sweeping. Implied in Anna's description is the idea that some-
how mental energy, held in by restrictive forces, is released by the 
spoken recollection of earlier trauma(s). As Jonathan Lear comments, 
Anna's idea, however flippantly intended, influenced the theoretical 
formulations of the young Freud, and thereby psychoanalytic meta-
psychology (Lear 1990: 35-6). 
KEY POINT A precis of the 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology 
Here the young Freud postulates that observable psychological pheno-
mena depend on the neural structure of the brain. The Project posits three 
"systems" of "neurones", separated by "contact barriers" (which restrict 
the passage of energy (Q) from each neurone to those adjacent to it in the 
neural network): 
• The ItlJ-system": neurones involved in perception of the external world, 
through which the Q involved in receiving external stimuli flows without 
resistance. 
• The lItp-system": neurones which resist, and retain permanent traces of, Q 
as it flows through them. The tf-system is the part of the brain involved 
in memory. (Interestingly, Freud locates what he will call the ego here 
(see below).) 
• The IJ.Q-system": a much more enigmatic postulate, the a-system contains 
no Q, but by registering the workings of the other systems, supplies the 
qualitative dimension of conscious experience (what it is like to be con-
scious): what philosophers of mind today call qualia. 
In everyday speech, we call people who are angry or anxious "pent 
up". When they express themselves in angry words, gestures or actions, 
we say they are "blowing off steam': The young Freud's founding 
metapsychological wager draws on the mechanistic sciences of his day 
which argued that, at base, the behaviours of all living organisms can be 
understood according to a kind of universal principle of "blowing off 
steam" (PMH: 8). 
In several key texts, Freud asks us to consider the case of "an almost 
entirely helpless living organism" (IV: 119). Such organisms have only 
the most basic abilities to respond to their environment. The stimuli 
the organism receives from the external world activate its nervous 
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system, and generate reflex responses. However, if at any time these 
stimuli become too great, the organism must either remove (itself 
from) the source of stimulation, or perish. The nervous system of even 
such an organism, claims Freud, "is an apparatus having the function 
of abolishing stimuli which reach it, or of reducing excitation to the 
lowest possible level ... " (IV: 120). This function of reducing nervous 
"excitation" is what Fechner named the biological "principle of con-
stanci' (EPM: 159). What we call the pain of any organism, Freud 
adds, is the qualitative affect of a quantitative overstimulation of its 
nervous system. This overstimulation produces a heightened tension 
inside it, and the reflex impulse to reduce the offending stimulation. 
Fechner's principle of constancy, Freud for this reason argues, can be 
renamed "the pleasure principle». Pleasure involves at this very basic 
level the release of painfut pent-up tension within the organism. 
All this mechanistic biology has the most telling relevance for 
human psychology, Freud maintains. The reason is that the newborn 
human infant is evidently almost entirely under the sway of the plea-
sure principle, very like our "almost entirely helpless living organism". 
Attended to nearly constantly by its carers, it at first has no sense of the 
distinction between itself and the outside world. When needs do arise 
for it, as Freud intriguingly posits in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
infants seem capable from very early on of "hallucinating» their satis-
faction (ID: 565-6). Infants do this by recalling the ('mnemic images" 
of earlier satisfaction(s), whenever a new source of pain arises. Freud's 
newborn, like a Leibnizian monad, thus has no doors and windows - its 
wishful thoughts, coupled with the instantaneous attendance of its 
carers, omnipotently sate its instinctual needs. 
Yet all good things must come to an end. The child is forced to dis-
cover that the external world does exist. The external world imposes 
itself upon the child as the sum total of things which the child cannot 
"dream up". If the child is chafed by its clothing, for example, no 
amount of wishing will remove this somatic source of pain. Something 
in the child's environment must be altered. In a "realist" refrain central 
to Freud's thought up to such later texts as "Civilization and Its 
Discontents" (see Chapter 7), growing up for Freud involves learning 
to cope with our constitutive inability to instantly get everything we 
want. Due to the recalcitrance of the external world to its every whim, 
the child must develop what Freud calls the "reality principle", a princi-
ple that significantly modifies (although it does not negate) the impul-
sive demands of the pleasure principle. 
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KEY POI NT The development of the "reality principleH 
(TPM: 219-25) 
• Faced with this "other world", the perceptual system develops, charged 
with the need to register the child's external environment: "the ego peri-
odically sends out small amounts of cathexis into the perceptual system, 
by means of which it samples the external stimuli, and then after every 
such tentative advance it draws back again" (N: 239). 
• Alongside perception, the child's faculty of memory develops as a further 
function of the need to avoid painful experiences in a world obstinate to 
being controlled by wishful thought alone. If the presence of a certain 
object has overstimulated it, the child retains its "mnemic image", so it 
may avoid this source of pain next time. 
• Memory would avail the infant of nothing if it did not also develop 
muscular control: control over its body, 50 it might fight or flee from the 
threatening, overstimulating things. 
External things place demands upon the nervous system of the 
infant. But by developing perception, memory and motility, it becomes 
capable of recognizing, fleeing or fighting these demands. However, in 
an absolutely basic principle of psychoanalysis, Freud's realism about 
the harsh intractability of the external world is matched by an even 
harsher view about the potential dangers to the human being of their 
own, internal drives. If psychoanalysts are popularly depicted as tire-
somely asking analysands about how they "feel" about things, rather 
than events, the basic reason is this. According to Freud's biological 
understanding of the mind, our drives, like external objects, place a 
"demand for work" upon our nervous system: when we feel hunger, 
there is a rise in internal tension which, if it becomes keen enough, is 
painful. Our first ideas, Freud maintains, are the "representations" 
(Vorstellungen) of these instinctual needs. However, like Oedipus, who 
can only try and fail to flee the words of the oracle that has stated his 
destiny, so each of us can only fail if we try to fight or flee from our own 
drives. If we flee, we take them with us. If we snuff them out, we dam-
age our own selves ~hereby (IV: 119-21). 
The child can sate its internal needs by obtaining appropriate 
objects, or its first others might get them for it. Yet satisfying objects 
can be scarce. And children are capable of experiencing more than one 
instinctual demand at a time. The insistence of internal demands in 
potential contradiction with what the child can readily obtain, for 
Freud, underlies the development of a further, higher capacity. 
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KEY POINT What is called thinking? 
• When needs persist, and objects cannot be obtained, the infant must 
develop the capacity for the "binding of psychical energy". It cannot 
achieve pleasure by instantly jumping to conclusions, or actions. On top 
of the capacity for action, it needs now to learn to hold back action, "toler-
ating an increased tension of stimuli while the process of discharge is 
postponed" (TPM: 221). 
• Thinking, then, is "an experimental kind of action" made possible by this 
new capacity. "00 my ideas match anything in the external world?", the 
child begins to ask. Or, more precisely - drawing on its stock of memories 
- "do my remembered ideas about how the world is correspond to what 
I can perceive now?" (see Chapter 5). 
• Secondly, the child learns to make elementary hypotheses. "If I do x," it 
wonders, "what then?" And, considering the options, "what if I instead 
acted in ways y or z? Which outcome might be more satisfying in the long 
run ?" 
With the development of thinking, our little child has become a 
strategist. It can now playoff different drives, and defer impulses to act 
on the basis of calculations as to where greater satisfactions lie in the 
medium to longer terms. From monadic immersion in the "pleasure 
principle", it has become capable of what our economists call "rational 
choice", aiming to maximize pleasure, over time, in the conditions of a 
world it did not create. 
Can a psychical agency serve three masters? 
Alas, Freud does not preach good news for our reality-testing child. For 
what happens, he asks, if the satisfying of one of its instinctual wishes, 
for whatever reason, involves courting other dangers? As every fairytale 
depicts, the hero cannot save the princess without slipping by the 
guards and humbling the villain. Likewise, becoming a civilized adult 
means restraining or renouncing many of the drives with which we are 
born. As we shall examine in Chapter 2, many infantile drives are 
deemed distasteful or immoral by our societies, and so are incapable of 
satisfaction without censure: from unrestrained bowel movements to 
unchecked displays of affection towards siblings. In Freud's under-
standing, then, the human psyche always stands under the threat of 
becoming overburdened. We are all torn from very early in our lives 
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between at least two masters. On one side, there are the demands of our 
drives or "libidd: which would ideally brook no dissatisfactions. On 
the other, there are the demands of social reality, which check the aban-
do ned acting out of all our fondest wishes. 
The ego is Freud's name for the part of the psyche that takes on the 
difficult profession of trying to keep both these '(masters" content. The 
ego "occupies an intermediate position between the external world and 
the [individuals' drives] and ... attempts to humour all its masters at 
once ... " (NP: 147). In developmental terms, the ego is "that part of 
the psyche which has been modified by the direct influence of the exter-
nal world acting through perception-consciousness" (EI: 25). It is the 
psychical bearer and agency of perception, memory and motility, re-
presenting «what we call reason and sanity" (ibid.) against the imperi-
ous, inconsistent demands of our libido. In common parlance, Freud's 
ego is the "self" we all think of ourselves as being: in control of who we 
are, what we say and do, and who or what we do it with. 
But what, Freud asks, will the good little ego do when it comes to 
those libidinal drives whose satisfaction would involve conduct pro-
hibited by its elders, and accordingly court punishments or the loss of 
love? 
KEY POINT Repression and its relation to the unconscious 
Freud's answer is that the offending instincts will effectively be struck from 
the conscious record. The child's developing ego wants to know nothing 
about them. The problem is that: 
• at this point of its development, it knows only how to respond to threat-
ening external things - by fight or flight. Accordingly, it makes what 
philosophers call a "category mistake", responding to its own prohibited 
wishes as if they were threatening objects in the external world. Unable to 
fight, it tries to flee them. This is the psychological process that Freud calls 
"repression" (R: 146-7); 
• and, as we have reflected, to flee one's drives is as impossible as Oedipus' 
flight from his own destiny. Repression in Freud's understanding is thus 
always failed repression; 
• the repressed Wishes do not disappear, as the good little child hopes. 
These wishes remain "in the back of its mind", or, to (re)introduce Freud's 
paradigmatic term, these repressed wishes become unconscious. 
The unconscious wishes are from this point kept at a distance from 
the demands of external reality. Accordingly they revert back to the 
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exclusive sway of the pleasure principle and of fantasies that, like the 
infant's earliest hallucinations, stage their fulfilment without need to 
change the external world. Freud calls the repressed unconscious drives 
of individuals the id.When rendered in English, this looks innocuous 
enough. But in German, what Strachey translates as the id is the neuter 
pronoun "iC (Es). Having repressed its illicit drives, these drives appear 
to the ego like an "it", Freud is indicating. From the perspective of the 
ego they seem a "foreign body" (PMH: 7) - or, as Lacan will capitalize 
it, some alien Thing. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the origin of psycho-
analytic understandings of the "uncanny" in literature, and of our 
enjoyment of horror films, lies here. Reflecting the key psychoanalytic 
principle we cited above - that first our own internal demands are 
potentially most disturbing - for such psychoanalytic criticism, what 
we see in the monstrous Things of horror films are our own repressed 
it or «id" impulses returning from the screen to overwhelm us. 
However, Freud's account of the ego and its relation to the id was 
never wholly unequivocal (see Chapter 5). As the important 1914 
article "On Narcissism" shows, after 1910 Freud qualified his account 
(presented so far) of the ego as the psychological agency of reason and 
sanity. In our introduction, we saw that psychoanalysis began with the 
clinic of hysteria. By the 1910s, Freud had treated analysands suffering 
from phobias (like Little Hans) and obsessional neurosis (like the 
Ratman) (see below). He had also confronted the apparently untreat-
able symptoms of psychotics (as in the Memoirs of Judge Schreber). 
Alongside Jung, Freud was struck by the evident megalomania of psy-
chotics, in whose delusions they would become literally the centre of 
the universe. How could such symptoms occur, Freud came to ask, if 
the ego were not only the agency adapting the child's wishes to external 
reality, but also itself a possible object of such wishes and psychical 
"cathexes"? Recalling the myth of Narcissus, who fell in love with his 
own image in the waters of the fountain, Freud began to argue that the 
ego is a very early, perhaps even primary, love-object. Recalling the 
child's initial inability to distinguish between itself and the world, 
Freud in some papers posits a "primary narcissism)' (ON: 100; IV: 136; 
EI: 28) that preceded the child's attachments to others and to external 
things. 
In Freud's second, post -1914 account, the ego is not simply a psychi-
cal agency that uses the body's perceptual organs to orient the individ-
ual in relation to objects. Freud now adds that "it is seen in the same 
way as any other object ... it is not merely a surface entity, but also the 
projection of a surface" (El: 26). The individual comes to distinguish 
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this body-object from all other objects because it is the only object that 
hurts when it is struck, cut and so on. The child comes to identify its 
"self" with it, and in this way to shape its sense of individual identity. As 
the child is made to renounce pursuit of certain of its now-prohibited 
drives, the decisive question is how it can bear up to these necessary 
renunciations. We have seen one side of Freud's answer - infants 
repress the offending drives. The other side, which Freud's second 
account of the ego develops, is this: individuals identify with the objects 
for which they have been made to renounce desire. Forced by external, 
social reality to renounce our desire to have these objects, we instead 
model how we look, behave, speak and so on upon them. The little boy 
will now "be all grown up like Daddy". This, if Freud is right, is why 
brothers and sisters often share so many mannerisms, or sons often 
have similar postures, gaits and so on to their fathers. It also casts an 
interesting light on the old saying about figures such as James Bond: 
women want to have them, and men want to be them. In a series of 
beautiful formulations, Freud writes: "The character of the ego is a pre-
cipitate of abandoned object cathexes, and ... it contains the record of 
past object choices ... " (EI: 29). And "[in mourning] the shadow of the 
object falls upon the ego ... " (MO: 249). 
Ironically enough, given the title "The Ego and the Id", the most 
important development this essay introduces into Freudian metapsy-
chology is a third psychical agency, the superego. The superego is closely 
aligned with the conscience of individuals. Yet it is not identical with it, 
despite some of Freud's own formulations. The superego is that part of 
the ego which is shaped by the child's identification with its first love-
objects - usually its parents or carers. At the most decisive point of its 
socialization (what Freud calls the Oedipus complex (see Chapter 2)), 
the child must renounce its dearest wishes concerning these figures. 
In order to cope with this heaviest libidinal burden, it accordingly 
identifies with one or other of them, coming to see itself as if "through 
their eyes" - or as it imagines they see it. The superego is that critical 
voice we continue to hear throughout our lives, particularly in times of 
strain, and which says such generally unhelpful, aggressive things such 
as what Freud's father once said to him: "That boy will never amount to 
anything!" The superego is also that critical gaze that people very often 
adopt when they look at themselves in a mirror: one in which they are 
always too fat, unattractive and so on. As Freud argues in "The Ego and 
the Id", the superego is effectively a third master, alongside external 
reality and the id, that the unfortunate ego must try to humour (El: 
28-39; ON: 93-6; MO: 247-8). 
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The onset and nature of mental illness 
psychoanalysis is the impossible profession, Freud once joked. We have 
seen how the task of each of our egos is difficult enough, if Freud's 
metapsychology is true. It is Htde wonder, given the terms of Freud's 
theory of the mind, that individuals so often develop forms of mental 
illness. The enigmatic symptoms of mental illness are where psycho-
analysis began. Unlike other philosophies of mind, for psychoanalytic 
theory the orienting goal is to generate a set of categories exacting 
enough to diagnose and respond clinically to the diverse mental ill-
nesses from which human beings suffer. So how does Freud explain the 
nature of mental illnesses, given the meta psychological framework we 
have so far developed? 
First of all (and this is worth underscoring, since people still accuse 
Freud of "blaming the parents"), Freud holds that the onset of mental 
illness always involves the individual's internal reality: their own 
unconscious drives. As we have emphasized, for psychoanalysis, it is 
one's internal wishes that are most potentially disturbing for one's 
mental health. In the case of the onset of a mental illness, this insight is 
easy enough to confirm - because not everyone who, for example, 
attends at the bedside of their dying father develops symptoms like 
Anna O's. What does Freud think happens when someone like Anna 
falls ill? 
"Mental health'~ for Freud (although his more famous description is 
"ordinary unhappiness"), is that state of psychical affairs wherein an 
individual's ego has succeeded in "mediating" relations between the id, 
the superego and the external world. The individual gleans enough 
satisfaction from his relations with the external world that the level of 
nervous stimulation in his psyche does not reach too high a level. The 
superego's aggressively critical judgements are kept at bay because the 
individual is achieving enough, and the id's imperious urges are not 
troubling her overly (because she, for example, is content in her love 
and family lives). To adapt Kipling, the healthy person is changing what 
can be changed, living with what she cannot, and her ego has wisdom 
enough (mostly) to tell the difference. 
Illness will befall this "balanced" individual, Freud postulates, if 
or when something upsets this happy state of affairs. There may be 
some change in the person's external circumstances: the loss of a job 
or a loved one, or the end of an affair. However, to emphasize again the 
key psychoanalytic postulate, it is the effect of this loss on his "inner 
life" that matters. Freud indicates this by using the word Vorsagung 
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(forsaking) to describe this external loss (which Strachey somewhat 
misleadingly renders as '<frustration") (NP: 151). Secondly, there may 
be an internal change in the individual's libidinal make-up, as for 
example with the onset of puberty, or menopause in women. 
In either type of case, Freud says, a "damming up of libido" occurs. 
And the illness is the disturbance in the individual's relation to the 
external world that this "damming up" produces: 
Every neurosis disturbs the patient's relation to reality in some 
way ... it serves him as a means of withdrawal from reality 
and ... in its severest forms, it ... signifies a flight from real 
life. (LR: 181) 
As we say today, the individual at this point of Vorsagung threatens 
to become "dysfunctional". Yet Freud's diagnostic categories are more 
subtle than this. For him, there are not only mental illnesses of varying 
severity. There are three qualitatively different types of mental illness: 
the neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis); the psychoses; and 
the perversions. Freud understands the manifest differences between 
these illnesses in terms of the framework his biological account of the 
mind provides: 
The pathogenic effect [in different illnesses] depends on 
whether, in a conflictual tension of this kind, the ego remains 
true to its dependence on the external world and silences the id 
or whether it lets itself be overcome by the id and therefore 
turns away from reality. (NP: 151) 
In the first case, there is a neurosis, and in the second, the individual 
will have become psychotic. Freud's claims about the onset of mental 
illnesses can hence be formulated as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 The onset of illness 
Illness Neuroses Psychoses 
Impoverishment of. .. The id Individuals' sense of 
external reality 
By means of. . . Repression (Verneinung) "Disavowal" (Verleugnung) 
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The difference between the mechanisms involved in the onset of ill-
ness in neurosis and psychosis can be illustrated by referring to the case 
of Elizabeth von R. Elizabeth was a hysteric who suffered a variety of 
symptoms. Free association revealed that one of the sources for her suf-
fering concerned Elizabeth's illicit admiration for her sister's husband. 
When this sister unexpectedly died, Elizabeth found herself thinking at 
the funeral, despite herself: "Now he is free to be with me" (CH: 15; LR: 
184). Because this wishful thought so deeply shamed her, her mem-
ories of the situation which had provoked them (her sister's funeral) 
were repressed: 
Neuroses originate from the ego's refusing to accept a power-
ful instinctual impulse from the id or to help it find a motor 
outlet, or from the ego's forbidding an impulse the object at 
which it is aiming. (NP: 150) 
A psychotic in Elizabeth's situation, Freud by contrast explains, might 
have "disavowed" the very fact that her sister had died, since it is this 
event that led her into temptation. In psychosis, that is, the conflict 
between the id and reality leads to the disavowal of parts of the world 
whose confrontation, because of the wishes they provoke, would be 
too traumatic. Freud puts this point by saying that psychotics suffer a 
failure of "object cathexes': If "paying attention" to the outside world 
involves the expenditure of psychic energy, as we saw, with the onset of 
psychosis, the individual's ego ceases paying the toll. This is why psy-
chotics so regularly suffer delusions such as Judge Schreber's, that the 
world has ended (ON: 76; see Chapter 5). Characteristically, Freud 
maintains that there is truth to these metaphysical delusions. The psy-
chotic's individual relation to the external world has indeed ended. The 
delusion is a psychological truth misrepresenting itself as a truth in 
metaphysics, in a way that goes towards explaining Freud's hesitations 
about philosophy (see introduction; PEL: 258-9). 
The onset of neurosis and psychosis accordingly involves a distur-
bance in the individual's relation with reality. Yet, Freud specifies, each 
mental illness has two phases. It is only in the second phase of mental 
illnesses that the individual's symptoms become manifest. As strange as 
this sounds, Freud contends that the symptoms of the mentally ill are 
the individual's attempts at a cure (NP: 151). They function to main-
tain (in the neuroses) or to restore (in the psychoses) the individual's 
relations to external reality, under the changed conditions of the illness. 
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Table 1.2 The onset and the manifestation of the mental illnesses 
Illness Neuroses Psychoses 
Impoverishment of. .. The id Individuals' sense of 
external reality 
By means of ... 
Damming up of ... 
Symptoms! attempts 
at (self- ) cure 
Repression (Verneinung) «Disavowal" (Verleugnung) 
Object libido Ego libido 
Return of the repressed Delusional formations 
The full table of Freud's diagnostic understanding of neurosis and 
psychosis is as shown in Table 1.2. 
To take the psychoses first: with the onset of illness there is a 
"damming up" of psychical energy. Yet in the neuroses, this "dammed-
up" energy finds substitute outlets in unconscious fantasy - like the 
"hallucinated satisfactions" of the young infant. In the psychoses even 
this mechanism fails, and the tenuous link unconscious fantasies' 
"mnemic images" maintain with the object-world cannot hold. The 
libido dammed up by the precipitating Vorsagung is instead "cathected" 
to the individual's ego as a narcissistic love-object. This is how Freud 
explains the hypochondria so often symptomatic before a full-blown 
psychosis - anxieties that the person's body has been poisoned, vio-
lated, or is extremely vulnerable to physical corruption. The psychotic's 
bizarre delusions, Freud maintains, represent her best attempt to 
rebuild or "recathect" her relations to the world, given this complete 
collapse of her object cathexes. The manifest problem is that "this fresh 
libidinal cathexis takes place on another level and on other conditions 
than the primary one" (ON: 86-7). 
The most striking feature of these delusions is their paranoid con-
tent. The psychotic's ego is elevated within their delusions to the centre 
of their universe, albeit as a kind of universal victim: the object of the 
intrusive surveillance and malign intentions of one, or a host, of per-
secutors - whether God, the CIA, aliens, or one's doctor. For the 
psychotic, it is as if the superegoic voice and gaze which all subjects 
experience internally (see above) has become part of the external 
world, from whence it confronts the individual with hateful omni-
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science. In Chapters 4 and 5, we shall examine in detail the principal 
mechanism that Freud argues is involved in the formation of these 
persecutory delusions: projection. 
In Chapter 7 of "The Unconscious': finally, Freud contrasts how 
neurotics and psychotics stand with regard to language. One typical 
manifestation of psychosis is the attribution of "magic powers" to 
words. Just as the newborn cannot distinguish between what it hallu-
cinates and external reality, so psychotics typically treat words like 
things, and ('treat concrete things as if they were abstract ideas" (Ucs: 
199). Words can and do, metaphorically, transmit ideas «(between 
people's minds". But few of us maintain that others can physically 
put ideas in our heads. Yet exactly such "delusions of influence" are a 
common psychotic fear. Similarly, a hysteric wrestling with her wish 
to reproach her lover with "looking askew" at other women might 
develop a symptomatic compulsion to roll her own eyes. Yet a psychotic 
in this very situation, Freud recounts, complained that her lover had 
physically "twisted her eyes~: as if this metaphor had "become flesh" in 
her hypochondriac symptom: 
She could not understand him t1;! all, he looked different every 
time ... ; he had twisted her~ eyes, now they were not her eyes 
any more, now she saw herself through different eyes 
(Ues: 197-8) 
KEY POINT On the psychoses 
• The psychotic denies a part of reality that provokes forbidden wishes. 
Then he sets about reconstructing, through deluSions, his relation to the 
external world of objects and others. What we see as the psychotics' 
symptoms are lience their best attempt at a psychological "cure". 
• Butthe means the psychotic has at his disposal are "patently infantile" (CD: 
86). He is unable to anchor his sense of reality in anything outside his own 
ego. 
• His delusions for this reason invariably turn upon the axis of his own rela-
tions with (a) more or less all-seeing and all-knowing double, devoted to 
persecuting him, onto whom he has in truth 'lprojected" his own fore-
closed impulses, as a film projector projects images on to a screen. 
• Unable to accurately stabilize the distinction between his thoughts and 
wishes and external reality, he treats words as things/ and comes painfully 
to embody the "figures of speech" that might have mediated his relations 
with others. 
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The neuroses: anxiety, inhibitions and symptoms 
Unlike the psychotic, the neurotic sides with reality against the id at 
the onset of his illness. Accordingly, the manifestations of neurotics' 
illnesses (at the second stage of their development) are remarkably 
different from psychotics: In the words of the title of an important late 
essay, neurotics are subject to "inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety" 
(ISA) - but not to delusions. 
Freud's hypotheses concerning the role of anxiety in the neuroses 
are probably the least controversial among these three. Many non-
psychoanalytic clinicians today diagnose patients with "anxiety dis-
orders". Freud would find such a diagnosis of no help at all. The reason 
is that anxiety, according to Freud, is present in all mental illnesses. At 
base, anxiety functions psychologically as a signal that the individual's 
psyche is in some danger - or, in the terms of his biological account of 
mind, that there is heightened tension within the psychical apparatus 
(ISA: ch. VII). Neurotics are often only too aware that they are anxious: 
it is this "free-floating anxiety" that has led them to see a doctor. Their 
problem is that they do not know what is causing their anxiety, and this 
is what the «anxiety disorder" diagnosis misses. We shall say more on 
anxiety in Chapter 2, when we consider hysterical attacks. 
The role of inhibitions in neuroses, Freud argues, can equally be 
explained in terms of the psyche's elementary function in service of 
the pleasure principle. Inhibitions are, as we say today, "places" where 
neurotics "don't go": from physical places to topics of conversation or 
painful memories. Hysterics such as Elizabeth von R avoid with disgust 
certain topics (for example, sexuality), because confronting them stirs 
up illicit or competing wishes their ego would rather not confront. 
Neurotic inhibition is clearly manifest in cases of phobia, as we shall see 
in a moment. It is also apparent in a variety of sexual maladies: from 
impotence in men or frigidity in women, to the inability to enjoy the 
act (ISA: ch. I). 
Freud argues that neurotics' symptoms, finally, are "compromise 
formations': attempting to resolve conflict between the superego, the 
ego and the id (e.g. SN: 78). We saw above how, confronted with a pro-
hibited wish, the child represses this wish and "identifies with the 
prohibitor": usually its parents, teachers, siblings and so on. But the 
repressed id-wishes do not disappear, Freud maintains. Abiding by 
the pleasure principle, they continue to demand satisfaction, in any 
way they can. VVhile, then, neurotic symptoms are the results of com-
promise between the ego's censorship and this insistence of the id (e.g. 
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ISA: 98), the "compromise" takes the form of "substitutive satisfac-
tions" (R: 154). The ego maintains its censorship on the direct expres-
sion of the wish: Elizabeth did not leap at her dead sister's newly free 
husband. But the id must have its satisfaction, too. The result is that 
neurotic symptoms are both sufficiently unlike the original wish-
fulfilment that the ego cannot recognize it as threatening any longer, 
and sufficiently like it that the psyche gets a return of pleasure from the 
symptom's repetitions. For this reason, Freud argues that symptoms 
involve "the return of the repressed" (esp. R; Ves: ch. III). 
To illustrate these theoretical propositions more concretely, let us 
look at one of Freud's famous case studies, the case of the young child, 
Little Hans. . 
KEY POINT Understanding Little Hans (LH; ISA:ch./Vj 
What were Hans'symptoms? 
• A phobia of horses, especially of being bitten by them. 
• A resulting fear of going into public places. 
What was "free association" able to reveal about the cause of the phobia? 
• Hans had seen a horse fall in public, and he had also seen his friend fall 
down while playing with a horse. 
• At the time the symptom appeared, Hans had "mixed feelings" - what 
Freud will call "ambivalence" - towards his father. On the one hand, he 
loved him very much. On the other hand, he saw his father as a rival for the 
affections of his mother. 
How did Freud interpret Hans' phobia? 
• Hans' rivalrous Wishes concerning his father jeopardized his familial rela-
tions, risking the loss of his parents' love, and punishments. 
• Accordingly, Hans displaced his prohibited hateful feelings for his father 
on to horses: as if he wished his father would fall down, like the horse he 
had seen fall. 
• In this way, a "compromise formation" was achieved which allowed Hans 
to continue relations with his father (whom he could not avoid), at the 
cost of his inhibition about going anywhere near horses (which he could 
usually avoid). 
Besides phobia, the two major categories of neurosis Freud system-
atically examines are hysteria and obsessional neurosis. We encountered 
hysteria in Anna 0 and Elizabeth von R, and shall look at it further 
in Chapter 2. In order to understand Freud's claims that neurotic 
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symptoms are compromise formations involving substitute satisfac-
tions for repressed id-wishes, let us look now at obsessional neurosis. 
The classical case of obsessional neurosis in Freud's oeuvre is that of 
"the Ratman': an educated young man who came to Freud in 1907 (see 
Chapter 3). The Ratman suffered from a host of disturbing thoughts 
and symptoms. He was plagued by the irrational fear that bad things 
might happen to his father (who was already dead), or that his lover 
might die or become terminally ill. He experienced compulsive aggres-
sive impulses, such as the suicidal wish to cut his throat, or - contrast-
ingly - equally compelling "protective" impulses, such as the need to 
put his cap, protectively, on his lover's head. Sometimes these opposed 
aggressive and protective wishes would alternate: he would actively 
undo some protective action (like removing a stone from the road 
where he knew his beloved's carriage would pass) only moments after. 
he had undertaken it, or be plagued with doubts that he had performed 
such well-meaning acts. Finally, the Ratman became preoccupied with 
understanding every word anyone said to him, goaded (again) by an 
equally intrusive doubt whether he had succeeded in this endeavour 
(esp. RM: 187-91,222-3). 
How does Freud understand these obsessional symptoms? First of 
all, as with little Hans, Freud argues that what is at stake in the Ratman's 
neurosis is his own violent and aggressive wishes towards his father and 
his beloved, however much he initially resisted this interpretation. The 
Ratman's strange compulsions, Freud argues, represented "reaction 
formations" that functioned to protect his conscious self from con-
fronting these infantile, anti-social wishes. Such wishes would present 
themselves to him as if from nowhere, in the form of dispassionate, 
"scientific" hypotheticals, isolated from all his other thoughts: as when 
people wonder about something like "what if ... (say) it didn't rain 
tomorrow ... ?" To cite the Ratman's own suicidal impulses when his 
beloved went away: "what if one were visited by the command to cut 
one's throat with a razor blade ... f' (RM: 187). What indeed! If one 
were psychologically visited by such masochistic commands, Freud 
proposes, they might well disturb one's conduct in various ways. As 
one tried to pray for the well-being ofloved ones, one might find one-
self repeatedly interrupted by these terrible "commands" (RM: 191-2) 
241) -like the raven in Poe's poem who knocks so insistently upon the 
hero's chamber door. A similar fate might befall you as you tried to 
understand others' words, so like the Ratman you would momentarily 
lose concentration, and be troubled by the compulsive doubt that you 
had misunderstood. 
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Or consider the compulsive nature of the prohibitions from which 
obsessionals like the Ratman suffer. The obsessional who, like Lady 
Macbeth, cannot sleep unless she repeatedly washes her hands (or 
opens and re-shuts the bedroom door ... ) might well be performing a 
hygienic or necessary action. What is irrational is when she feels herself 
compelled to do it again and again, plagued by doubts that - although 
she secured the tap for the nth time only an instant before - the tap 
might nevertheless have come loose, so she must check it again. The 
only way obsessionals' compulsion to repeat their symptomatic activ-
ities can be comprehended, Freud contends, is if we see these actions 
as responding to a danger to the individual's psyche - witness Lady 
Macbeth's heightened anxiety as she frantically attends to her imagined 
"damned spot". The point to stress again is that the danger is an 
internal danger, since there was after all literally "no blood on Lady 
Macbeth's hands», however things stood for her metaphorically. 
Freud's interpretation of obsessionals' symptoms as "compromise 
formations': then, at the very least, is striking and elegant. In what 
Freud calls the "tempo" of their compulsive repetitions, obsessionals 
play out the conflict between the person's prohibited, hateful wishes 
and the reaction formations against these (RM: 191,238-41). But how 
does this account stand with Freud's formulation that symptoms are 
"substitutive gratifications"? Lady Macbeth hardly appears happy. It is 
the unhappiness of obsessionals such as the Ratman that brings them 
to analysis. In order to understand this Freudian idea, we need to 
emphasize the "substitutive" component in Freud's idea of "substitut-
ive satisfaction". Since the direct expression of the obsessionals' hateful 
wishes is prohibited py the ego, these wishes adopt indirect or meta-
phoric forms. More than this, in cases like the Ratman, the ritual-like 
repetitions of the symptomatic defences against the prohibited wishes 
in particular start to resemble what they repress. Remember that 
unconscious id-wishes are freed by repression from any need to be 
tested against external reality, hence remaining subject exclusively to 
the pleasure principle. Remember also that for Freud the pleasure prin-
ciple is at base a mindless, reflex-like principle whose demands compel 
the organism under its sway, until such time as it develops higher 
capabilities. The compUlsive tenor of the protective rituals of obses-
sionals, Freud argues, reflects the compulsive character of the infantile 
impulses they are pitted against. Moreover, these symptoms, when suc-
cessfully completed (as when, for instance, the Ratman was able to say 
his prayers so quickly that no evil thought could intrude), provide the 
individual with a satisfaction oddly reminiscent of the quiescence one 
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achieves after sexual enjoyment - so they can now sleep, relax, or go on 
living as normal. As we might say, in the obsessionals' symptoms, the 
repression of (sexual or aggressive) enjoyment has, uncannily, given 
way to the eroticized enjoyment of repression. 
Summary 
• Far from a wilful obscurantism, Freud's metapsychology is based 
on the most advanced natural sciences of his day. 
• Freud contends that the psyche operates according to the 
"pleasure principle" with the function of keeping excitation from 
external sources, or internal drives, as low as possible. 
• Initially, the infant is wholly under sway of the pleasure principle, 
insured by its parents' love against the need to develop a sense 
of the external world, and temper its wishes in response to it. 
Instead, it hallucinates its own satisfactions, based on its first 
memories of satisfaction. 
• This '(Edenic" scenario is unsustainable. The external world 
imposes itself as everything the child cannot "dream up". The 
ego is the psychical agency that develops to mediate between 
the infant's libidinal demands and external reality, although in 
Freud's later work it also becomes its own love-object. 
• Since the child has many, competing drives, many of which are 
aesthetically or morally prohibited in its community, it must 
renounce certain of these wishes. Repression is the device that 
answers to this need, by treating its own drives (falsely) as if they 
presented external threats, and fleeing them. The result is that 
these repressed drives repeat, seeking according to the pleasure 
principle to "return" to find means of satisfaction. 
• Mental illness is that state which occurs when the individual's ego 
becomes unable to mediate the conflicting demands of its illicit 
wishes and the external social world. In psychosis, the ego sides 
with the wishes of the id, disavowing parts of reality that provoke 
unacceptable wishes within it, before reshaping its sense of the 
world in its "ego-centric" delusions. In neurosis, the ego sides 
with reality, at the price that its repressed wishes, nurtured by 
unconscious fantasies, return to trouble it in symptoms. 
• Symptoms are "compromise formations" between the ego and the 
repressed drives, embodying forms of satisfaction of repressed 
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wishes that are sufficiently unlike the original, repressed wish to 
avoid provoking anxiety, and evade censorship by the ego . 
• The compulsion to repeat these symptoms) particularly evident 
in obsessional rituals, reveals the infantile origin of the motives 
that underlie them, which are "regressively" prey to the pleasure 
principle. 
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two 
Sexuality and its vicissitudes 
Introduction: why sexuality? 
If psychoanalysis had a dime for every time someone asked "why is sex-
uality so central to your metapsychology?", the "impossible profession" 
(Freud) might be as lucrative as many critics imply it is. Freud knew 
his 1905 Three Essays on Sexuality would provoke outrage. Attitudes 
towards sexuality were much more austere in the "Victorian" era than 
they now are, however much ink Victorians spilt upon it. Yet the spon-
taneous disgust Freud's hypotheses about sexuality provoke remains. 
There is something comforting and "commonsensical" about Jung's 
break with Freud, which turned centrally around this issue. Jung 
thought psychoanalysis should not accord primacy to the sexual drives. 
Why should sexuality be singled out, given the panoply of symptoms 
exhibited by the mentally ill (cf. ON: 79-81)? Others have raised dif-
ferent questions: does not Freud's focus on sexuality reflect his own 
fixations? Was not the "Oedipus complex" discovered in Freud's self-
analysis, a circumstance Freud is otherwise dubious about? If Freud is 
the "father" of psychoanalysis, did he not bequeath to the movement of 
ideas he spawned many of his own neuroses? 
In this chapter we shall examine Freud's controversial views on 
sexuality. Freud held on to these views until at least 1919, when he 
introduced the hypothesis of the death drive (Chapters 4 and 7). In this 
chapter we shall see that, whether we finally agree with them or not, 
Freud's views on sexuality are neither simplistic nor simply vulgar. 
Indeed, these views are arguably so challenging less because they cyni-
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cally reduce everything spiritual to sexuality than because they show 
the many ways "a person's sexuality reaches up to the highest peaks of 
their spirituality'), as Nietzsche once opined. 
Evidences, clinical and metapsychological 
However far-ranging Freud's metapsychology is, its clinical starting-
point remains paramount. Psychoanalysis is always applied - inciden-
tally its principal difference from philosophy. So when we ask "why 
sexuality?" concerning Freud's theory of the drives, we should not 
be surprised that the chief reasons Freud gives come from the free 
associations of analysands. The theory follows what this clinical basis 
of psychoanalysis brought to light. What the testimony of analysands 
attested, Freud reports, was that a key feature of the neuroses is distur-
bances in individuals' sexual functioning. Indeed, these observations 
led him to "this thesis: if the vita sexualis [sexual life] is normal, there 
can be no neurosis" (SN: 274). 
The centrality Freud attributes to sexuality appears very early on, 
in his writings on female hysterics such as Anna 0, Elizabeth von R 
and Dora (see Chapter 6). "If the psychical traumas from which the 
hysterical symptoms arose were pursued ... by means of the treat-
ment developed by Breuer and me", Freud later reflected on these cases, 
"experiences were eventually reached which belonged to the patient's 
childhood and related to his sexual life", These experiences invariably 
involved a traumatic component (PM_H: 3-9). More than this, if these 
sexual experiences were not recalled by analysands, Freud claimed that 
it was impossible "either to elucidate ... the way in which [their symp-
toms] were determined, or to prevent their recurrence" (SN: 273). 
Principal among these symptoms were hysterical attacks, like Anna 
O's delirious absences (see Introduction). As meaningless as such 
"hysterics» seem, Freud argues, analysands' free associations show 
how they are intelligible as the "actings out" of unconscious fantasies 
staging the fulfilment of repressed sexual wishes. As Freud begins his 
"General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks': hysterical attacks are "noth-
ing else but fantasies translated [or converted] into the motor sphere, 
projected onto motility, and portrayed in pantomime" (GRH: 229). 
One woman Freud introduces suffered attacks during which one hand 
would tear at her clothing, while the other would press her clothing 
against her side. Her associations revealed that, in this hysterical attack, 
she was acting out both parts of an unconscious fantasy wherein she 
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struggled against a man trying violently to undress her. Another 
analysand suffered from attacks that would begin with being shaken by 
convulsive movements, including rubbing her thighs together. She 
would then get up, move into another room, sit down and begin read-
ing, before responding to some imaginary remark. Her associations, 
Freud confides, revealed she was acting out in reverse her repressed fan-
tasy of being approached by a gentleman who would proposition her as 
she sat reading on a park bench, then lead her away to make love. 
On the basis of such clinical evidence, Freud hypothesized that 
the somatic (bodily) "conversion symptoms') of hysterics represent a 
kind of continuation of hysterics' sexuality by other means - in line 
with his definition of symptoms as substitute satisfactions in Chapter 1 
(SN: 278). 
KEY POINT Stages in the formation of con version symptoms 
(adapted from HPR: 232-3) 
1. Children's earliest instinctual satisfactions are "autoeroticll, reflecting their 
initial "monadic" inability to distinguish between their own bodies and 
the external world (see Chapter 1). 
2. Next, this autoerotic satisfaction becomes attached to one or several 
fantasies. 
3. The autoerotic act is then renounced because of social prohibitions 
(which make its performance likely to lead to painful consequences), but 
the fantasies are repressed. 
4. With a Vorsagung (Chapter 1), the repressed fantaSies return, either 
unchanged or reshaped in response to the indiVidual's changed 
environment. 
5. The acting out of the symptom may then (through, for example, the rub-
bing together of the thighs) reinstate the original autoerotic satisfaction. 
Freud's position allowed him to explain the heightened anxiety 
evident in hysterical attacks, with their disturbed breathing, sweating, 
tremors and so on. Hysterical attacks, Freud contends, are the indirect 
actings out of a" sexual act. The sexual act has long been compared to a 
"minor epilepsy" in many cultures (GRH: 234). Just so: 
in further support of this view, I may point out that in normal 
copulation ... the excitation expends itself, among other 
things, in accelerated breathing, palpitation, sweating, conges-
tion, and so on. In the corresponding anxiety attacks of our 
38 understanding psychoanalysis 
neurosis we have before us the dyspnoea, palpitations, etc. of 
copulation in an isolated and exaggerated form ... 
(AN: 111) 
In time, Freud claimed that other forms of neurosis, such as Little 
Hans' and the Ratman's (see Chapter 1), confirmed his hypotheses 
concerning the role of sexuality in the neuroses. Yet Freud's claims 
about sexuality also draw on several other, non-clinical observations 
concerning the human condition. 
On sexuality and reproduction 
In response to widespread criticisms of his theory of sexuality, Freud 
repeatedly claimed the lineage of his theory of sexuality in Plato's cele-
brated account of Eros in the Symposium: 
as for the "stretching" of the concept of sexuality ... anyone 
who looks down with contempt upon psychoanalysis ... 
should remember how closely the enlarged sexuality of psy-
choanalysis coincides with the Eros of the divine Plato ... 
(TE: 134) 
In Plato's Symposium, the Priestess Diotima gives the culminating the-
oretical account of Eros - desire, which includes (but is not reducible 
to) sexual desire. Eros, Diotima claims, is that drive in each of us that 
strives towards immortality. For non-philosophers, this can be seen in 
how our sexual drive pushes us to reproduce - our children will outlive 
us, as will the species. The first of Freud's observations in defence of the 
special status he accords to our sexuality points, like Diotima, to the 
function of sexuality in the reproduction of the species. In Chapter 1, 
we saw how for Freud the ego brings the individual's drives to heel in 
the name of its individual adaptation to reality. Freud's Diotimaian 
question concerning sexuality is this: how can sexuality fit with the 
ego's individualistic ends, given that it is the one bodily drive that func-
tions to reproduce the species? None of the other drives - hunger, 
thirst, respiration and so on - share this feature. For these reasons, 
Freud claims that our sexuality splits or divides us: 
The individual does carryon a two fold existence; one to serve 
his own purposes and the other as a link in the chain, which 
he serves involuntarily, an appendage to his germ plasm ... 
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the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance -like 
the inheritor of an entailed property. (ON: 78; cf. IV: 125) 
On the absence of a mating season 
If the previous observation points to a feature of sexuality common to 
all higher animals, the second Freudian observation singles out human 
sexuality. Humans are the only creatures who do not have a mating 
season. People show every sign of wanting to cavort all year around, as 
if their sexuality were somehow decoupled or "cut" from the natural 
function of reproducing the species. The Christian author Saint 
Augustine, reflecting on exactly such "Freudian" points, concluded 
that human sexuality was surely divine punishment for Adam's sin in 
the garden, a truth underlined by how the male sexual organ is the one 
part of the body men cannot consciously control - notably including 
when they dream ( see Chapter 3). 
On the latency period 
Freud observes in "Moses and Monotheism" and elsewhere that 
human beings have a singularly long "latency period" between birth 
and sexual maturity (MM: 77-9; TE: 176-7). No sooner have children 
learnt the difference between the sexes than they show every sign of 
wanting nothing to do with the opposite sex. (In Australia, young girls 
cite "boy's germs" as sufficient reason for their aversion, and boys vice 
versa.) Freud notes that neither hunger nor our other drives undergo 
any such latency - nor could they, if individuals are to survive. How 
does Freud understand this curious phenomenon? In "The Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning", Freud argues that it provides a 
further, good reason as to why sexuality, of all the drives, might be 
so closely caught up with the pleasure principle, and accordingly the 
unconscious (TP: 222-3). All the other drives must continually be 
tested against reality as the child becomes an adult. But sexuality - at 
least as long as we do not assume it appears all at once at puberty -
remains throughout the latency period insulated from such reality 
testing: 
[W] hen ... the process of finding an object begins [in the case 
of sexuality], it is soon interrupted by the long period of 
latency, which delays sexual development until puberty ... 
[ the result is] that the sexual instinct is held up in its psychical 
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development and remains for longer under the dominance of 
the pleasure principle, from which in many people it is never 
able to withdraw. . . (TP: 222) 
At this point, though, we have reached the nub of the issue: for many 
people, Freud's presumption that "finding an object" begins before 
puberty will seem abhorrent at worse, and certainly in need of further 
argument. 
The perversions, and what they reveal 
Freud's Three Essays on Sexuality (TE) is his longest statement on 
sexuality. The Three Essays challenges two long-sanctified views about 
human sexuality: 
• The idea that human sexual evolution is linear and unproblem-
atic' tending by nature and necessity towards heterosexual repro-
ductive activity. 
• The idea that children have no sexuality until they reach puberty. 
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, introduced what has since been 
called the transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments have 
this form: 
1. X is (where X is an observable phenomenon). 
2. Y is the (only possible) precondition of X (this is the controversial 
premise). 
3. Thus Y must be the case. 
Freud's Three Essays present a kind of transcendental argument based 
on evidence taken from the psychoanalytic clinic. The "X" Freud sets 
out to explain is, first, the sexual perversions: sadism (where the agent 
enjoys hurting their partner), masochism (where they enjoy being 
hurt by them), fetishism (where they enjoy seeing or touching some 
particular part(s) of others' bodies, or even their shoes, clothes, etc.), 
voyeurism (where sexual enjoyment comes from seeing others), exhi-
bitionism (where enjoyment arises from exposing oneself to others' 
gaze) and paedophilia. 
Freud's concern is that the perversions, however people morally or 
aesthetically judge them, pose intriguing theoretical questions about 
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human sexuality. How is it that some human beings can sexually desire 
animals, children, fetishes, or enjoy engaging in violent forms of sexual 
activity? And why, again, does ( say) our desire to eat exhibit similar, 
strange aberrations? Freud argues that theoretical reflection upon the 
perversions forces us to concede "that we have been in the habit of 
regarding the connection between the sexual instinct and the [normal, 
heterosexual] sexual object as more intimate than in fact it is" (TE: 
147-8). This is the founding claim of Freud's theory of sexuality. We 
might suppose that individuals' choice of a member of the opposite sex 
as their love-object is the most natural thing in the world. The problem 
for this view is that some people do enjoy forms of sexual activity in 
which the sexual object is not a member of the opposite sex, and the 
sexual aim evidently has little to do with reproduction. Just as human 
beings do not have a mating season, that is, the existence of perversions 
would seem to prove that our sexual drives are not as geared towards 
the natural ends of reproduction as we might suppose. 
But could not someone say; "It is true that the perversions attest to 
some people's ability to desire abhorrent things. But isn't this why we 
call them 'perverts'? Why infer anything about normal sexuality on this 
basis?" Freud's response comes through his analysis of a much less 
morally or aesthetically contentious sexual phenomenon. When cou-
ples make love, they indulge in foreplay - however brief. For example, 
they kiss. And what is in a kiss? When people kiss they get sexual enjoy-
ment by pressing together the mucous membranes of their mouths 
and tongues, parts of the body usually only serviceable for the "ego-
instincts" of eating and drinking (TE: 156). Similarly, people typically 
enjoy merely seeing their partner naked, or being seen by them, as part 
of sexual foreplay. Sexuality also involves some playful component of 
aggression or the desire to subjugate the other to one's will and charms. 
Sexual encounters may not even culminate in intercourse at all, as 
President Clinton reminded the world. 
Freud's point is that, with foreplay, normal sexuality is made up of 
components that also feature in the perversions, and which involve 
more than just the genitals. "No healthy person ... can fail to make 
some addition that might be called perverse to the normal sexual activ-
ity" (TE; 158). The desire to see one's partner naked, or to stroke his 
hair, for example, is perfectly normal, but will become a perversion if it 
becomes the principal aim of a person's sexual activity, overriding all 
shame, and providing more compelling enjoyment than intercourse 
itself. There is thus no absolute difference between perverse and 
"healthy" sexuality, Freud observes, as if perverts were wholly inhuman 
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monsters. What differentiates all but the most aberrant forms of 
perversion (e.g. paedophilia or fetishism, where the sexual object 
is different) is instead that in the perversions, sexual actions that 
usually feature as preliminaries to genital intercourse "usurp" its place 
altogether: 
[P]erversions are sexual activities which either (a) extend ... 
beyond the regions of the body that are designed for sexual 
union or (b) linger over the intermediate relations to the sex-
ual object which should normally be traversed rapidly towards 
the final aim. . . (TE: 157) 
The perversions, Freud contends, are rightly thought of as "the neg-
ative" of the neuroses that bedevil more normal subjects (TE: 165). 
Many of the anatomical "extensions" involved in perverse sexual activ-
ities, Freud means -like the "eroticization" of activities (such as seeing, 
touching or defecation) and organs (such as the anus, hair and so on) 
usually considered asexual - also feature in the conversion symptoms 
of hysterics, and the compulsive symptoms of obsessionals. Recall how, 
in one of Freud's examples above, the hysterical attack featured the 
autoerotic rubbing together of the girl's thighs. Equally, recall how in 
obsessionals' symptoms, the subject's very defences against their illicit 
wishes become the source of quasi-sexual enjoyment (Chapter 1) -just 
as in masochism, subjects perversely enjoy being punished by their 
partner, including the paraphernalia of handcuffs, whips, chains, 
blindfolds and so on. 
So, thinking again of Freud's transcendental argument, given that 
the "X" Freud reflects upon in the Three Essays is sexual foreplay and 
the perversions, what does Freud conclude that about the nature of 
sexuality to explain them? 
KEY PO I N T Three principles of Freud's theory of sexuality 
1. Human sexuality is not unproblematically calibrated to heterosexual 
reproduction, If heterosexuality is the ideal most fully in accord with the 
"reality principle", the achievement of this ideal can in no case be taken 
for granted: "We are. , , warned to loosen the bond that exists in our 
theories between instinct and object. It seems probable that the 
sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object; nor is 
its origin likely to be the object's attraction. , ," (TE: 147-8). 
2, Human sexuality is a "complex" phenomenon, in that it comprises more 
than one "component drive", These include the drives to see, touch and 
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to master, all of which feature in foreplay, and become dominant in the 
perversions. Nor should we discount the preponderant role played by 
fantasy (and thus the imagination) in sexuality. 
3. On the basis of 1 and 2 Freud maintains that human beings are animals 
who, uniquely, have to be taught what, whom and how to desire. Our 
many component drives must be "soldered" together (TE: 148); and our 
sexuality as a whole must be directed, through nurture, to its final 
object(s). 
4. What mental illness attests is that the component drives that are thus 
united can also always fall back apart into these separate components 
(TE: 162), or - depending on the individual's upbringing - these com-
ponents may never achieve subordination to the normal aim of hetero-
sexual coupling. 
The drives (versus the instincts) and their vicissitudes 
Freud's 1915 essay «The Drives (Triebe) and Their Vicissitudes" is a fur-
ther, decisive contribution to Freud's theory of sexuality. It is premised 
on what the Three Essays have argued: 
[T] his much can be said for the sexual drives: they are numer-
ous, emanate from a great variety of organic sources, act in the 
first instance independently of one another, and only achieve a 
more or less complete synthesis at a later stage ... 
(IV: 125-6) 
The problem is that if the drives are in this way numerous, and not 
automatically set in their ways, psychoanalysis will need a precise set of 
terms to track their different "vicissitudes", and how it is that they do 
not always make it to "more or less complete synthesis". To generate 
such a set of terms is the first task that "The Drives and Their 
Vicissitudes" sets itself. 
KEY POINT Fbur'7erms Which Are Used In Reference to the 
ConceptofaDrive ... II(lV: 122-3) 
1. The source: the source of a drive is the organ or part of the body whose 
"demands for work" are represented in the psyche by the Triebe. 
2. The pressure: the "motor factor" of a drive is "the amount of force of the 
measure of the demand for work it represents". All drives exert a "demand 
for work" on the individual's psyche. 
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3. The aim: the aim of a drive is in all cases, as per the pleasure principle, 
satisfaction: "removing the state of stimulation in the source of a drive". 
4. The object: the object of a drive is "that in regard to which and through 
which [the drive] can achieve its aimll. As the Three Essays established 
regarding the perversions, this is the most variable component of human 
beings' drives. These drives Ilare not originally connected" with their 
object(s): "they become assigned to it ll (IV: 123). Famously, Freud calls 
the process whereby a drive becomes strongly attached to one object 
"fixation" (see R: 148 and below). Objects may: 
• be parts of the individual's own body, or others', or animals', or inani-
mate things; 
• be changed as the individual develops; 
• satisfy a "confluencell of drives (as for example, the mouth for eating and 
kissing). 
With this vocabulary to describe the different "vicissitudes" of the 
drives in place, "Drives and Their Vicissitudes" centrally examines two 
such vicissitudes. Freud's hope is that tracking these vicissitudes will go 
further towards explaining how the sexual perversions and symptoms 
of neurotics are possible. The first "vicissitude" examined at length is 
the reversal of a drive into its opposite. A drive with an active aim 
may turn into one whose aim is passive, says Freud. For example, the 
desire to master one's beloved can turn into the desire, passively, to 
be mastered by her. Interestingly, Freud uses grammatical language 
to describe this process: in the case of masochism, Freud says, the verb 
involved ("to master") has changed from the active voice to the passive 
voice. We shall see in Chapter 5 what Lacan makes of such Freudian 
"metaphorics". The second vicissitude Freud examines closely in the 
essay is the turning of a drive, so its object becomes the individual's 
own self. Masochism, Freud says in this paper, is sadism with its object 
changed (but see EPM for a later, contrasting, account). The drive to do 
violence now has as its object the individual's own body, rather than 
that of its sexual partner. Equally, in exhibitionism the scopic drive to 
see the other becomes the drive to be seen by them. These transforma-
tions' then, are necessarily games "only two (or more) people can play". 
The exhibitionist needs an other to play the role he would play (that of 
the active subject) in voyeurism. The masochist needs his other not to 
inflict pain upon, but to inflict pain upon him. 
Freud's account of these transformations to which drives' aims and 
objects are subject in "Drives and Their Vicissitudes" arguably raises 
as many questions as it settles. If the reversal of a drive's aim, or the 
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changing of its object, is being adduced as an explanation of the possi-
bility of perversions and neurotic symptoms, we wonder in particular 
what nature the drives themselves must have, such that they can be so 
protean or pliable. One thing Freud's essay does underline in this con-
nection is the following point, which is also decisive for the way Freud 
thinks to bring together his biological metapsychology with his clinical, 
interpretive work (see Chapter 3). The drives are not the same thing 
as natural instincts, as Strachey's deceptive translation of Triebe as 
"instincts" conceals. Rather, says Freud: 
a Trieb appears to us as a concept on the frontier between 
the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative 
(Vorstellungen) of the stimuli originating from within the 
organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand 
made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connec-
tion with the body. (IV: 121-2) 
Just as human beings have no mating season, and their drives are not 
naturally bound to their objects, so Freud maintains that these drives 
too are less wholly bodily than uneasily situated at the "frontier" of the 
mental and the physical, the linguistic and the somatic. Lacan, later, 
takes up this thought as decisive for understanding psychoanalysis. He 
suggests that, if the drives are subject to such strange vicissitudes as 
Freud discloses, the only possible explanation for this must be that 
these vicissitudes reflect the effects of the drives' somatic "demand for 
work" having been caught up in the "unnatural" laws of language to 
which the drives' Vorstellungen become subject. However idle Freud's 
"grammatical" description of the reversal of a drive into its opposite 
might seem, that is (cf. SC: ch. 3), it is in this language that the truth 
of the unconscious is revealed. We shall return to these matters in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The riddle of the Sphinx - what is infantile sexuality? 
So for Freud, the sexual drives are multiple, "decoupled" from any nat-
ural object, and subject to the most uncanny vicissitudes, located as 
they are on the frontier between the mental and the somatic. Freud's 
second controversial claim in the Three Essays is his argument that 
children have a sexual life. There are moral and psychological reasons 
why this truth has been denied, Freud argues, although he suggests that 
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parents and carers have long been familiar with it. The moral reasons 
concern societies' understandable, but Freud thinks overprotective, 
investment in the idea of children's moral and sexual innocence (cf. 
SEC). The psychological reason - in itself interesting given Freud's 
accounts of repression and the latency period - is the phenomenon of 
infantile amnesia (TE: 174-6). Despite learning one or several foreign 
languages in their first years, people typically don't remember many of 
their own experiences from before their fifth or sixth years. 
So what does Freud say concerning the imputed vita sexualis of 
infants? As we saw in Chapter I, according to Freud the human child 
from very early on "pleases itself' by recalling the "mnemic images" of 
earlier gratifications. Its first sexual satisfactions are similarly auto-
erotic, Freud claims, on the model of an activity like thumb-sucking. 
Using the terms of "Drives and Their Vicissitudes': the sources of such 
enjoyments (in this case, the mouth) and their objects (in this case, the 
thumb) both belong to the child's own body. Now, nobody denies that 
many infants do suck their thumbs. But why does Freud argue that 
such activity is "sexual" and, indeed, compare it with the propensity of 
young children to masturbate - an activity whose sexual nature seems 
less controversial? Doesn't Freud collapse the distinction between sex-
uality and non -sexual activities in an unacceptable way? 
In order to understand Freud's answer, let us consider the case of 
thumb-sucking in more detail. The source of the satisfaction is the 
mucous membrane of the mouth. This part of the body is typically 
used by the child for eating (and for wailing its discontents), Yet when 
the child sucks its thumb, these egoistic functions of the mouth are 
evidently not in play. The child is using its mouth, and something (its 
thumb) is entering and leaving it, like food when it eats. But this entry 
and eviction of the object is repeated without any nourishment occur-
ring. If we accept that the psyche is governed by the pleasure principle, 
Freud reasons, this repeated act must aim at some satisfaction. But this 
satisfaction must be non-functional and, Freud reasons - in line with 
his wider theory of infantile psychology - be "determined by a search 
for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now 
remembered" (TE: 181): namely, its nourishment at the mother's 
breast. The child's evident need to repeat the satisfaction also indicates 
that a very strange type of sensation must be in play: ((a peculiar feeling 
of tension, possessing ... the character of unpleasure ... a sensation 
of itching and stimulation, which is centrally conditioned and pro-
jected onto the erotogenic zones ... " (TE: 184). Other examples Freud 
cites of this "unpleasurable pleasure" (or, in French, jouissance) include 
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the evident delight children take in riding on swings or on trains, 
together with the sensations produced by the child's holding in its 
faeces, and playing with its genitals. The sensual thumb-sucking 
involves a "complete absorption" of the child's attention "and leads 
either to sleep or even to a motor reaction in the nature of an orgasm" 
(TE: 180). Freud hypothesizes that it is the infantile precursor of the 
later enjoyment adults will find in genital sexual activity. "No one who 
has seen a baby sinking back from the breast and falling asleep with 
flushed cheeks and a blissful smile", Freud comments, "can escape the 
reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of 
sexual satisfaction in later life" (TE: 182). 
So Freud's contention is not the implausible one, that all children's 
behaviours are sexual. Infantile sexuality extends only to those activ-
ities that a child repeats, absorbed, having sated its functional needs. 
Moreover, Freud comments that nature gives infants "safe provision" 
to ensure that there are what he calls "predestined erotogenic zones" 
(TE: 183, 184). Infants' sexual activities initially "attach themselves to 
... the functions serving the purposes of self-preservation and seem 
not to become independent until later': Freud contends (ibid.: 182). In 
particular, those parts of the body serving these functions, wherein 
things enter it (the mouth, as in nourishment) and exit it (the genitals, 
as in urination and the anus, as in excretion) are subject to what Freud 
calls "eroticization': In addition to these autoerotic zones, Freud adds, 
infants in the first years oflife evince two component drives concerning 
objects external to their own body: a scopophilic drive to actively see 
certain objects (or, passively, to be seen by them) and a sadistic drive 
to destroy and control things. The multiplicity of infantile erotogenic 
zones and drives, Freud contends, represent the ((pre-historicaf' ante-
cedents of later tendencies subjects exhibit towards perversions or 
neurotic symptoms: 
In [hysteria for instance] repression affects most of all the 
actual genital zones and these transmit their susceptibility to 
stimulation to other erotogenic zones (normally neglected 
in adult life) which then behave exactly like genitals. 
(TE: 183) 
Think, for instance, of Anna O's symptoms, which affected her speech, 
a paralysis in her right side, or we could also cite Elizabeth von R's 
legs, which "joined in the conversation': experiencing sharp pain, as 
Elizabeth's treatment continued (CH: 148). The infant, Freud famously 
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says, has an innate "aptitude" for becoming "polymorphously perverse", 
especially if the child is subject prematurely to seduction by an adult or 
older child (TE: 191). 
As we have said, the founding claim of Freud's theory of sexuality 
is that human beings are creatures who need to learn how to desire. 
Natural bodily changes, Freud details, map out an itinerary of various 
libidinal "stages" children typically go through, in which one or other 
autoerotic and component drives will attain pre-eminence. However, 
Freud maintains that the way a child is nurtured is decisively important 
in how it proceeds through these organically conditioned stages. The 
principal means by which infants' multiple sexual drives are brought to 
heel, Freud maintains, is through the force of social law. ccShame, dis-
gust and morality" (TE: 191) are brought by parents and carers to bear 
upon the child to force him to renounce the earliest aims, objects and 
sources of his drives (ibid.: 225-8). Now he is a ('big boy like Daddy", 
the child will be served notice, "you can't do that". Moreover, "it is dirty 
... wicked ... ", "if you persist, then there will be consequences ... ". 
In the Three Essays, Freud famously maintains that infants pass 
through three stages of sexual development before the latency period 
and, with puberty, sexual maturity (see Table 2.1). Each is named after 
the source predominant in it: the oral, anal and phallic stages. Each, 
though, is also profoundly unsatisfactory for the infant, leaving them 
suspended in what Freud famously calls "ambivalence" towards their 
objects: since to eat or master an object tends to destroy it; and in 
the phallic or "Oedipal" phase, as we saw with Little Hans, the child 
wrestles with "mixed feelings" for his parents. 
Freud's stress on the importance of nurture in each of these stages 
is tied to his diagnostic concerns, and his central clinical claim that 
the origins of neurotic disorders can always be traced back, by free 
associations, to traumas affecting infantile sexual life. The final syn-
thesis of the drives with a heterosexual love-object may always misfire, 
neurotics' symptoms and perverts' activities attest. And why might 
things go wrong in these ways, given Freud's metapsychology? Recall 
that in Freud's biological account of the mind, pain results from the 
overstimulation of the individual's nervous system. In the same way, 
Freud argues that individuals' sexual development will be upset if a 
particular, infantile activity becomes overstimulated (ISA: 89), perhaps 
due to premature seduction, but also if they unwittingly witness the 
sexual activity of parents, as in the case of the Wolfman (see Chapter 3). 
What occurs in such traumatic events, Freud contends, is that the drives 
predominant at that point of the infant's development will become 
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Table 2.1 The phases of infantile sexual development 
Phase Oral (until 2-3 years old) 
Source Mouth 
Aim Organ satisfaction 
Non-sexual Nutrition 
function 
attached to 
Object 
Gender of 
object 
Activity/ies 
Attitude 
towards 
objects 
Mouth/mother's breast 
On sense of distinctions 
self/object, malelfemale 
Thumb sucking, sucking of 
nipple or bottle 
Ambivalence (to eat/drink 
object is to destroy it) 
Anal/ sadistic ("the terrible 
twos") 
Anus/child's motor capacities 
Phallic/Oedipal phase 
(3-6 years) 
Penis/clitoris 
Organ satisfaction/mastery of Organ satisfaction 
environment 
Defecation 
Anus, faeces/other(s) 
Bisexual 
• Holding in faeces 
• Cruelty to others 
• Exhibitionism ("look at 
this, Mummy ... ") 
Ambivalence (to master 
object is to destroy object) 
Urination ("micturition") 
An other 
Female (the mother) 
• Masturbation 
• Bed-wetting 
Identification with parent 
of one sex; desire for the 
mother; ambivalence 
towards father 
Latency period Adult/genital 
Reproduction 
An other 
The opposite sex (or 
in homosexuality, 
one>sown) 
Intercourse 
Table 2.2 The sexual theories of children 
phase Oral Anal! sadistic Phallic/Oedipal 
Theories of Not applicable Babies are produced Children are 
birth/marriage (child cannot by kissing, or eating produced by the 
yet speak) certain objects; girl exchanging 
by defecation; by her penis/being 
urinating in front castrated, in 
of each other; by exchange for a child 
urinating in the 
other's toilet, 
or by violently 
. , 
overpowenng one s 
partner 
Categories of Not applicable Activity versus Having a penis 
(boy) child's passivity (i.e. no (being male) versus 
thinking stable sense of being castrated 
male/female sexual (being female) 
difference) 
fixated. Although the child may later repress them, it will nevertheless 
be continually subject to "regressing" back to these unmastered forms 
of infantile sexuality, should it later undergo some Vorsagung and fall 
ill (Chapter O. 
One of the more endearing features of Freud's essays on infantile 
sexuality is his stress on how infants' development is both a practical 
and a theoretical process (see Table 2.2). Freud's child does not simply 
passively undergo things (STC; IGO; TI). It is always trying to under-
stand the world into which it has been thrown, drawing on its limited 
scope of memories and capabilities. Freud's infant, we might say, is a 
spontaneous scientist, theorist, or even philosopher (see Chapter 4). 
The motives children have for their "research projects" are deeply ego-
tistical. The most important question for infants, which Freud ironi-
cally calls "the riddle of the Sphinx') (TE: 194-5), is "where do babies 
come from?" Behind these dispassionate enquiries, Freud argues, is the 
anxiety that another child might appear, and compete with their pri-
vileged place in the parents' affections (STC: 212-19). The principal 
problem for infants pursuing these researches is that they typically have 
no knowledge either of semen or of intercourse. A further problem 
facing young boys, Freud argues on the basis of cases such as Little 
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Hans, is that until they discover otherwise, males narcissistically 
assume that girls have a penis just as they do. Even when they are con-
fronted with the fact that girls, and their mother, lack this special 
appendage, young boys exhibit a marked tendency to disavow such 
anatomical lack (ibid.: 215-19). The result is that the content of these 
infantile sexual theories can appear very humorous to us "enlightened" 
adults. 
The little boy (of Oedipus, madonnas and whores) 
To clarify Freud's understanding of infantile sexuality, let us focus here 
on Freud's understanding of the little boy, leaving his career-long hesi-
tations about femininity to Chapter 6. For children of both sexes, Freud 
argues, the most important phase in their libidinal development is the 
phallic or Oedipal phase (see Table 2.1) between the child's fourth and 
sixth year. Freud's (in)famous idea is that the fate that befell Oedipus in 
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannis (Oedipus unwittingly killed his father and 
slept with his mother) expresses all (male) children's erotic wishes at 
this stage of their libidinal development. For Freud, the central issue 
deciding the boy's subsequent mental health and sexual development 
is how the child resolves his "Oedipus complex" of amorous wishes 
towards his mother, and aggressive envy of his father. Its adequate re-
solution sees the child stabilize his own gender identification (for the 
boy, with his father) and, via the incest taboo which the dissolution of 
the complex sets in psychological place, also his "object-choice" (EI: 
31-8; DO; AC). The result is that when the latency period ends at 
puberty, the boy will be ready to desire women of his own generation, 
and not of his own family. One Freudian definition of neurotics, by 
contrast, is that they are those subjects who have incompletely resolved 
their Oedipus complex, and so remain prone to sexual dysfunctions 
with women, and problems with "authority", in whose prerogatives 
they repetitively see the "imago" of the feared and envied father. 
KEY PO I NT Freud's account of the (male) Oedipus complex and 
its resolution (esp. DO) 
• In this phase of his sexual development, the primary source of the little 
boy's sexual enjoyment is his penis. 
• The child normally has as yet no clear sense of what intercourse is. The aim 
of his sexual activities is bed-wetting and masturbation. 
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• The little boy's primary fear at this stage - based upon his own memories 
of weaning and defecation, jf not on the warnings of his elders - is losing 
the special organ involved in these activities. 
The active and passive Oedipus complexes 
The "complex" of conflicting wishes in the boy's Oedipus complex typically 
contains both active and passive wishes, Freud argues. 
• The active Oedipus complex is best known. The boy, identifying rival-
rouslywith his father, takes his mother as his sexual object, with the active 
aim of "loving" her in his father's place. Little Hans, for instance, at one 
stage wished he might sleep in his mother's bed like Daddy - without hav-
ing any idea about intercourse. 
• The passive Oedipus complex is less well known. For Freud the boy's sex-
ual identity and object-choice are not yet stabilized - this will only occur 
with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. The bisexuality of the earlier 
anal phase (see Table 2.1) is carried into this phase in the passive Wish to 
be loved by the father. 
The resolution of the Oedipus complex 
In both the active and passive Oedipus complexes, the achievement of the 
boy's sexual aim necessitates his acceptance of his possible castration: 
• If he pursues his active aim to replace his father, he faces the prospect of 
provoking his fathers (imagined) reprisals, including losing "it". 
• If he pursues the passive aim, because to be loved by the father wilf 
involve taking on a passive pOSition, a comparable blow will be struck to 
the child's narcissism. 
Faced with this unacceptable double bind - "damned if you do, damned if 
you don't" - the little boy gives up his Oedipal designs. 
With the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the boy identifies with 
his father, who until this point had been his rival. Importantly (see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 7), it is this identification that forms the basis of 
his superego (see Chapter 1): 
The authority of the father or the parents is introjected into 
the ego, and there it forms the nucleus of the superego, which 
takes over the severity of the father and perpetuates the pro-
hibition against incest, and so ensures the ego from the return 
oflibidinal object -cathexes [towards the mother or sister( s)] . 
(DO: 176-7) 
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Secondly, in taking on this prohibition, the bois sexual wishes con-
cerning the mother are repressed. The aim of these wishes towards her 
will instead now be inhibited (another vicissitude of the drives), so the 
bois conscious feelings towards his mother (and sisters) from this 
point on will be solely affectionate, however things stand in the uncon-
scious. In the terms of Freud's essay, "On the Universal Tendency to 
Debasement in the Sphere of Love", the sexual and affectionate (or 
((anaclitic") "currents» of the post-Oedipal boy's feelings towards his 
mother are separated when the Oedipus complex is resolved (UTD: 
180-83). In the short term - in what stands as Freud's explanation 
of the otherwise puzzling latency period - the boy's penis is "de-
cathected" or de-eroticized, and his Oedipal wishes are repressed. Yet 
when the boy goes through puberty, his object-choice will also have 
changed: from wishing to love his mother, he will instead be driven to 
choose a substitute for this first ((lost object" (e.g. Bion 1967: 169-70). 
Typically, this might be someone who resembles her in some way - her 
hair colour, way of speaking or acting, and so on. However, Freud's 
"Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love" makes it 
clear that, if the man is to desire a woman sexually, she should abso-
lutely not too closely evoke his first love-object (UrD: 185-7). In this 
remarkable essay and its precursor, "A Special Type of Object-Choice 
Made By Men': Freud is particularly interested in a "special type of 
object -choice" many men make of lovers whom they can neither 
respect nor affectionately love. Freud's analysis starts from a common 
enough symptom: that of a male's impotence with his regular sexual 
partner. This sexual inhibition looks like a simple case of his losing 
interest in her, or "wanting to sow his wild oats". Freud, however, 
argues that what is actually at stake in such male impotence is not that 
the man has fallen out of love with his partner. What has instead 
occurred is that, with the "routinization» of the love relationship, the 
man's partner has come too closely to evoke the "mnemic images" of 
his mother. Far from loving his partner too little, he loves her too 
much: so much that her presence evokes his long-repressed incestuous 
wishes. The result, evident in the boy's inhibitions, is that he now can 
no longer approach his beloved sexually without the prospect taking 
on an incestuous colour, and attracting all the repulsion the original 
prohibition of incest commands. 
For this reason, Freud laments, (where [such men] love they do not 
desire, and where they desire they cannot love" (UTD: 187). In order 
to re-experience sexual desire for a woman without evoking such 
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repressed incestuous wishes, they are compelled to choose a "debased" 
partner - someone whom they feel to be intellectually, morally or cul-
turally beneath them. Only iC<this condition of debasement is fulfilled, 
[can] sensuality ... be freely expressed, and important sexual capa-
cities and a high degree of pleasure can develop" (UrD; 187), 
Summary 
• In contrast to all previous philosophers excepting Plato and 
Nietzsche, Freud accords decisive psychological importance to 
sexuality principally because of the clinical testimony of hyster-
ics. Their free associations attested to their symptoms' origins in 
traumatic childhood events in which conflicting sexual wishes 
were evoked, and that hysterical attacks are symptomatic "actings 
out" of illicit sexual wishes. 
• For Freud, sexuality is so psychologically powerful (and poten-
tially disturbing) because it is the one drive that binds individuals 
to the species, beyond the "ego instincts" of hunger, thirst or 
respiration. 
• Yet individuals' sexual development towards the final aim of 
reproducing the species is a fraught process. The infant naturally 
develops multiple autoerotic and «(component drives)~ including 
the drives to devour, to master and to see. These drives are neither 
innately coordinated nor all initially geared towards a member of 
the opposite sex. 
• Infants must be taught how to desire, through their relations 
with their first others (parents, siblings, carers), This is a process 
in which the drives undergo multiple vicissitudes (such as re-
pression, drives' turning around upon the subject's own body, 
aim-inhibition, reaction formation and so on) that can "fixate" 
perverse forms of sexual behaviour and "object choices", and 
neurotic symptoms. 
• The decisive moment in infants' "libidinal education" is the 
"Oedipus complex", in which the male child (aged 4-6) develops 
aggressive feelings towards the father, charged by its wish to 
monopolize the mother's affections. 
• This complex of sexual and aggressive wishes is dissolved when 
the boy realizes that, if he persists in rivalry with his father, he 
risks punishment, including imagined castration. 
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• The "castration complex)) propels the male child into identifying 
with his father, and choosing female sexual object( s). Typically, 
the women he will desire will be substitutes for the mother, of his 
own generation. However, they must never become so similar to 
her in his mind that his repressed Oedipal wishes are evoked, in 
which case he may experience inhibition with her, and then need 
to seek out "debased" sexual objects (prostitutes, pornography 
and so on). 
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three 
To slip, perchance to dream: Freud on the 
unconscious 
Remembering Signorelli 
If dreams are "the royal road to the unconscious", Freud did not stum-
ble upon this road straight away. His discovery of the unconscious 
came via another route: the unlooked-for byway of the talking cure. As 
Freud puts it in ((The Question of Lay Analysis", psychoanalysis seemed 
to stumble upon a modern confirmation of ancient beliefs in the magic 
power of words to effect changes in the real world (QLA: 187). To 
understand this chance discovery, Freud turned to the mechanistic 
biology pre-eminent in the culture of his time (Chapter 1) and his the-
ory of the drives (Chapter 2). Yet the primary evidences upon which 
Freud based his theoretical conclusions remained linguistic: the spoken 
clinical testimony of analysands. When Freud asked his analysands to 
free-associate, phenomena emerged that seemed to point him away 
from the solely natural-scientific approach he desired. Instead, they 
recommended a primarily interpretive theory of the psyche (see 
Chapter 8). Analysands would recount their dreams, as if these were 
somehow connected to their malaises. Moreover, Freud's analyses of 
neurotics' symptoms pointed towards the specific importance of 
language in shaping neurotics' symptoms, as well as their cure. We 
glimpsed this in Chapter 1, when we considered the strange symptom 
of the psychotic who felt her deceptive boyfriend had «twisted her 
eyes': or the metaphorical "blood on Lady Macbeth's hands", The point 
can be illustrated further by returning to the Ratman case, and con-
sidering what might be in this name Freud bestowed upon him. 
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KEY POI N T Why did Freud call the "Ratman" the "Ratman"? 
(Rat = Ratte = Spielratte) 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the lIRatmanll suffered from an obsessional neurosis 
manifested in compulsive symptoms. Why did Freud dub him the "Ratman"? 
Freud's rationale comes from the young man's "great compulsive fear" (RM: 
165): 
• This fear hailed from a story he had been told by a captain, while serving in 
the army. This captain, who "took pleasure in cruelty" (RM: 166), recounted 
an oriental punishment whose culmination was rats boring into the 
criminal's anus. 
This story is shocking enough. But its immediate effect on the Ratman was 
very peculiar: 
• The cruel captain adVised him that he was in debt to "Lieutenant A" for a 
small postal fee. Although our young man knew that this was not truly so, 
he immediately felt compelled to pay Lieutenant A anyway, lest the rat 
punishment happen to him. 
How does Freud explain this bizarre symptom? 
• The rat story provoked the young man's unresolved Oedipal ambivalence 
towards his dead father (coupling rivalry towards him with anal eroticism, 
characteristic of the "passive" Oedipal complex (Chapter 2)). 
• The cruel officer recalled his father to the Ratman (his second association 
to the rat story was that the punishment should happen to his father), 
who had cruelly prohibited the young boy's infantile sexual activities 
(principally, his masturbation). 
• His father, who like the Ratman had been in the army, had once racked up 
a debt ("Ratte") in a game called "Spielratte" (gambling debt); and our 
young man also suspected that his father had acquired syphilis (through 
sexual misdemeanours) during his time in the military. 
Freud thus contends that in his unconscious the young man "inaugurated 
his own rat currency" (rat = Ratte ~ Spielratte) around which his symptoms 
turned. In reaction against the repressed Wishes provoked by the cruel 
captain's rat story, the Ratman identified with his dead father, taking on 
absurdly a proxy of his father's Spielratte debt (Ratte) as reparation for his 
own criminal impulses ("you will be a great man or a great criminal", his 
father had once opined) (RM: 205), lest the anal rat punishment happen to 
him. 
How was Freud to account for such phenomena, with their appar-
ently linguistic character? Given Freud's metapsychological apparatus, 
already discussed, the answer might seem dear enough. Consider, for 
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example, another of the evidences Freud encountered in the clinic, 
the famous "Freudian slips" or "parapraxes" ("practices beside them-
selves"), like that of the man described in The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life who says "I hereby declare this meeting closed" when 
his conscious, professional role was to open it (PEL: 59). Here, as in 
neurotics' compromise formations, the man's illicit wish to be done 
with the whole affair has put egg on his ego's face. Yet this explanation 
defers the deeper question, of how such an illicit wish could trouble 
this subject's speech at all. According to long-standing philosophical 
and cultural precedents, words are "higher things" - the bearers of 
intellect, soul and spirituality. Yet the drives Freud associates with 
the unconscious are anything but spiritual, when they are not evil. As 
we commented in the Introduction, in the modern culture Freud 
inherited, these older dichotomies (body-mind/spirit) were reflected 
in the disciplinary division between the natural sciences and the inter-
pretive human sciences. The symptomatic challenge Freud's clinical 
discoveries posed to these inherited oppositions emerges further when 
we examine another famous case from The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life: Freud's own "chance" forgetting of a proper name on a train ride 
to Herzogovina. While on this journey in 1898, Freud forgot the name 
of a painter who painted frescoes of "The Four Last Things". Although 
the correct name was on the «tip of his tongue", Freud could recall only 
the names Botticelli and Boltraffio. What did Freud's free associations 
on this matter reveal? 
KEY POINT Why did Freud forget "Signorelli"? (PEL: 1-7) 
• Freud had been talking to his companion aboutthe customs of the Turks 
living in Bosnia and Herzogovina. Freud was (favourably) struck by the 
confidence the locals placed in their physicians, even when the doctor 
was forced to convey the very worst: JlHerr [sir], what is there to be said? If 
he could have been saved, I know you would have saved him .. . " 
• This thought about death was connected in Freud's mind with another 
thought that Freud tells us that he, consciously, did not want to pursue: 
the great importance the Turks place on sexual health, so one had said to 
a colleague: "Herr, you must know that if that comes to an end then life is 
of no value./I 
• This thought reminded Freud of the news he had heard in Trafol about a 
patient of his who had committed suicide because of a sexual disorder. 
SOl Freud arguesl his forgetting of Signorelli was not senseless, but revealed 
the activity of his unconscious. The final motive concerned this last, dead 
patient and sexuality. Yet, as in a symptom, this motive was not all that was 
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repressed - what was lost to his consciousness was the name of a painter, 
albeit one who painted a fresco about such "last things". Why? 
• The vital thing is that the name "Signorelli" was repressed because it had 
become "placed" in an "associative" linguistic "chain" with this repressed 
thought. It concerned the syllables in the word "Signorelli", in particular 
"Signor', the Spanish equivalent of "Herr' ("Mister" or "Sir"). In Freud's asso-
ciations, this "Signor" evoked the sayings of the local patients: "Herr, you 
must know .. . " which so troubled him, since they recalled the suicide 
of his patient. Because "Signorelli" was thus so closely linked to the 
repressed, Freud says that it had been "drawn down" into the unconscious 
and forgotten. 
• Yet the repressed returned in substitutive linguistic forms. The "Herr' 
invoked in "Signor-elli" was associated with "Her-zogovina/, and thus 
Bosnia. Hence the two names that Freud could recall shared the first 
syllable "Bo-" with "Bosnia": "Bo-tticelli" and "Bo-Itraffio". The first name, 
"Bottic-elli", shares the "-elli" suffix with the forgotten "Signor-elJi". The 
second, "Bol-trofflo", evoked "Trofot', in turn indirectly connected in Freud's 
mind with the repressed thought, because this was where he heard the 
bad news about his dead patient. 
Hence, pictorially: 
Signorelli Botticelli Bo-ltraffio 
t _____________ He~vina - Bosnia---------/ 
Herr, « ••• what is there to be said ... ?" [death] 
~ Trafoi 
"", if that is ended" 'i [SeXualiY 
[Repressed drive( s) ] 
Freud's topographical account of the psyche 
Freud's account· of the vicissitudes of the drives allows him to explain 
how many symptoms (for example, obsessionals' compulsions) are the 
indirect expressions of repressed drives. Yet none of these vicissitudes 
(reversal of aim, turning around of object upon the ego, repression, 
aim-inhibition and so on) can help us with this case of Freud's forget-
ting of "Signorelli': For what Freud's analysis of this case supposes is 
that people's repressed sexual or aggressive drives are "caught up" in the 
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linguistic formulations of their memories and self-understandings. 
When these drives are formed, Freud's analysis suggests, they become 
"associated" with certain words, such as "Trafot' or "Herr, if that is 
ended ... ': These word-representatives of the drive(s), in turn, have 
different kinds of relations in the person's mind with other words (e.g. 
"Herzogovina", '(Boltraffio" and so on). Some of these relations are 
rational, but others are less dearly so: like relations based on sound 
("Herr') and "Her-", "Boltraffio" and "Trafoi"); or on meanings across 
different languages ("Signor" and "Herr"); or the common place these 
words have in otherwise unrelated, but personally significant, sen-
tences ("Herr" in both " ... what is to be said ... " and " ... if that is 
ended"). The key to Freud's analysis is that - in what he calls secondary 
repression (as opposed to the "primal repression" of the illicit sexual 
and aggressive wishes themselves) - many of these associated ideas, 
like the innocent name "Signorelli", are accordingly repressed by 
the individual. They become guilty by association. In our example, 
only "Botticelli" and "Boltraffio" were sufficiently distant from the 
repressed chain of words that they could reach Freud's conscious mind 
in place of the forgotten "Signorelli". 
In Chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams, reflecting on these 
types of analytic phenomena, Freud develops a "topographical" 
account of the psyche, different from the biologically based account of 
the psyche we have examined in Chapters 1 and 2. Drawing on ideas 
first developed in correspondence with his friend Fliess, Freud argues 
that the psyche is a kind of "mnemic" (remembering) apparatus. This 
apparatus has two functions. The first function, associated with "the 
system perception -consciousness", is the ability to perceive new things 
in the changing external world. This function is connected with the 
"access to motility": the individual's ability to fight, flee, or pursue what 
it perceives. The second function, equally crucial to the operation of 
the reality principle and the individual's maturation, is to record in 
memory significant aspects of the external world so that the ego might 
avoid painful and experience pleasurable things in future (Chapter 1). 
There are a host of things a person at anyone time will be able to 
remember by simply redirecting their conscious attention: for exam-
ple, what they had for breakfast, their pet's name, job, stock prices and 
so on. Freud calls these things preconscious (he abbreviates this to Pcs). 
They are generally "filed" in ways we recognize as rational: according to 
the rules oflogic and of the linguistic community we live in, or - in the 
case of experiences - according to rational considerations such as when 
and with whom we experienced them. 
freud on the unconscious 61 
Perception Mnem Mnem 1 2 3 . . . Ucs Pcs 
/ \ 
Sense data Motility/action(s) 
Figure 3.1 Freud's topographical model of the psyche (ID: 537) 
How then does the unconscious enter Freud's "topographical" model 
of the psyche? Freud's claim is that everything we experience simul-
taneously leaves a variety of "records" or "Mnems" in the psyche: 
The first of these Mnem. systems will naturally contain the 
record of association in respect of simultaneity in time; while 
the same perceptual material will be arranged in later systems 
in respect to other kinds of coincidence; so that one of the later 
spheres, for instance, will record relations of coincidence; and 
so on with the others. . . (ID: 539) 
Freud asks us to picture the mind, on this basis, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The sweeping arrow in the diagram below the mnemic systems indi-
cates the course taken by a perception that produces an immediate 
action: say, fleeing a threat. We perceive the threat (on the left) and act 
immediately (on the far right). The "Mnem': "Mnem 1': "Mnem 2" 
... lines signify the different ways in which the perception (let us say 
it is a snake) will be classified in memory, in terms of: how it looked, 
when we saw it, where, how, with whom, and so on. Freud's argument 
is that the same perception of the snake of our example will be "filed" in 
a number of mnemic systems, according to: when it was seen, what it 
looked like (snake, lizard, pole ... ), who we were with when we saw it, 
how it affected us, but also according to the words that share linguistic 
features with the word that describes it (snake-rake-cake ... snake-
snag-snack ... etc.). 
So note that the unconscious (Ucs), in this topographical Freudian 
model, is one such mnemic system. Located on the right-hand side of 
the diagram, it guards access to the preconscious, and with it, access to 
the sources of motility. The preconscious carries "word-presentations': 
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Freud specifies: "the conscious presentation comprises the presenta-
tion of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to if: The 
unconscious, by contrast, is a mnemic system that contains "presenta-
tion of the things alone" (Des: 201-2). Freud's idea is that, when an idea 
is repressed, the preconscious cathexes of energy are withdrawn from 
it, and with them, their rational or logical links with other ideas. The 
unconscious accordingly involves an unholy confusion of tongues, 
arranging words-presentations as if they were things - not according to 
rational rules or considerations, but like a bad poet, according to how 
they sound. This is why analysands themselves cannot understand the 
meaning of their symptoms, and why Freud could not at first remem-
ber "Signorelli': This name had been severed from its rational links 
with other ideas (like "the painter who painted the 'Last Things''') on 
grounds of its phonic associations (Herr ~ Signorelli) with the repre-
sentatives of repressed wishes. 
KEY POINT The five special characteristics of the system-Ucs, 
or "primary process" thinking rUes: 786-8) 
Freud contrasts the "primary process" thinking characteristic of the system-
Ucs with the "secondary process", rational thought (mostly) characteristic of 
the system-Pes. 
1. The representatives (Vorstellungen) of repressed drives, cut free of 
rational, logical links, are independent of each other. They exist side-by-
side in the individual's unconscious and can be logically contradictory. 
While one cannot rationally wish for both A and not-A, as philosophers 
underline, in the unconscious we do this all the time. 
2. There is no negation, nor any degree of doubt in the system-Ucs. As we 
shall suggest in Chapter 5, negation is a more advanced mental process 
to deal with things with which the psyche "disagrees" than the type of 
thinking characterizing the system-Ucs. 
3. The energy that is "cathected" or "bound" to drive-representatives in the 
unconscious is much more mobile than that attached to preconscious 
ideas. (We shall return to the two mechanisms Freud specifies here 
about how the quantities of affect can move around: displacement and 
condensation.) 
4. The processes of the unconscious are timeless. The memories or drive-
representatives are not ordered rationally in this temporal sense either: 
things remembered from yesterday can be linked in the unconscious 
mind with events that occurred in the individual's childhood. Nor does 
the passage of time age these earlier memories: "they have no reference 
to time at all" (Ucs: 187). 
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5. The system-Ucs lacks any ability to distinguish representations of inter-
nal/psychical ideas and outside reality - as in early infancy and also in the 
process of repressIon. Insulated from reality testing, "their fate depends 
only on how strong they are and on whether they fulfill the demands of 
the pleasure-unpleasure regulation" (ibid.). 
For all the apparent differences between Freud's topographical and 
the dynamic biological account of the psyche we developed in Chapters 
1 and 2, Freud always maintained that his two metapsychological 
perspectives were complementary. The reason is that each of the 
interpretable mnemic representatives of our external experiences and 
internal drives carries with it a quantity of "cathected" energy. A cor-
rect psychoanalytic interpretation releases the energy bound up with 
some repressed memories or idea(s). This is how Freud thinks that we 
can explain the central mystery of the psychoanalytic clinic: how an act 
of speech can produce effects on the analysand's body and psyche, dis-
solving her symptoms. Psychoanalysis as the practice of interpreting 
the unconscious, if Freud is right, is accordingly a practice located 
somewhere between hermeneutics and the natural sciences, in a way 
that has caused philosophers continuing epistemological problems 
(see Chapter 8). 
With both the dynamic and topographical perspectives on the 
unconscious in place, we are now in a position to travel directly down 
Freud's royal road . 
. . . Perchance to dream 
The dynamic account of dreams as the fulfilment of wishes 
Freud's account of dreams is among the richest but most difficult parts 
of his oeuvre. The basis of his account is typically clear and distinct. 
"The meaning of every dream is the fulfillment of a wish ... there 
cannot be any dreams but wishful dreams," Freud announces in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, after surveying and critiquing earlier religious 
and philosophical views (ID: 134). Dreams do not predict the future, 
nor do they give us direct insight into the "other world': as many of 
these views maintain. When looking at the contents of a dream, Freud 
proposes) we should effectively simply "prepend" to these contents: "I 
wish that. . . [dream contents a, b, c ... ]." Consider the dreams of 
small children. Freud recounts how a child who, during the day, was 
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denied her wish to eat strawberry cake, dreamt that night of savouring 
the most delicious cake. It does not take a contemporary Joseph to see 
that this dream provided the young girl with a substitute satisfaction, 
like a symptom. But Freud's interpretation goes further. Recall from 
Freud's account of earliest infancy in Chapter 1 his claim that children 
from very early on hallucinate fulfilments of their wishes. Sleep itself 
represents an approximation to reactivation of interuterine existence, 
Freud claims (MSD: 222). Our dreaming activity, he maintains, is a 
regressive reactivation of the hallucinatory means of "wish -fulfilment" 
of these first days, unchecked by the reality principle. 
Having stated the thesis that dreams stage the hallucinatory 
fulfilments of wishes in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud immedi-
ately recognizes: "1 feel certain in advance that 1 shall meet with the 
most categorical contradictions" (ID: 134). One objection that was to 
trouble Freud throughout his career is that people have nightmares or 
"anxiety dreams". These cases seem deeply opposed to any idea that 
dreams fulfil wishes. Although in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 
Freud later hesitated on this (see Chapter 4), in The Interpretation of 
Dreams he argues that anxiety dreams in no way contradict what his 
theory would lead us to expect. Recall how Freud's metapsychology is 
built around the postulate that human beings have competing wishes, 
and that many of these wishes - principally infantile sexual or aggres-
sive wishes - contradict the individual's reality-testing, moral self-
image. The drives that an individual represses are those drives the 
attainment of whose aim would produce pain instead of pleasure. 
Anxiety dreams in this light become intelligible as dreams that stage 
too direcdy the satisfaction of transgressive unconscious wishes. The 
ego, whose defences against the id are lulled when the person falls 
asleep, eventually responds to the hallucinated fulfilment of the id's 
wishes in the dream as if responding to a real, external threat. When the 
resulting anxiety becomes overwhelming, the sleeper indeed wakes to 
avoid the perceived danger (ID: 556-7, 580-85), 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Freud argues that even to pay wakeful atten-
tion to the outside world requires all the psychical effort involved in 
reality-testing. At its most basic, then, sleep for Freud is the periodic 
withdrawal of this psychical effort of attention, so "the batteries can be 
recharged': As the case of sleepers being forced to wake by anxiety 
dreams indicates, so Freud contends that the most basic wish at play in 
our dreaming activity is simply the wish to continue sleeping. We can 
see this also in cases where some external interruption (e.g. the sound 
of one's alarm clock) is more or less instantaneously woven into our 
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dreams (as, say, a church bell, school bell, part of a movie, etc.), so we 
can continue sleeping. However, if the aim of the wish to sleep is to 
wholly withdraw our "cathexes" from our daily concerns, why do we 
dream at all? Why isn't all sleep dreamless sleep? Well, for Freud, the 
fact that we do dream attests that the organic wish to wholly "shut 
down" stands arrayed against other wishes in the psyche that refuse to 
be wholly silenced when we go to sleep. 
Freud specifies two types of wishes that conspire against a night of 
undisturbed, dreamless sleep. The first are wishes we carry with us 
from the previous day or days, "the day's residues": 
Observation shows that dreams are instigated by residues 
from the previous day: thought -cathexes which have not been 
submitted to the general withdrawal of cathexis [to objects 
and concerns with external reality], but have retained in spite 
of it a certain amount of libidinal or other interest. 
(MSD: 224) 
These residues will be the types of thing that emerge more or less freely 
when analysands are asked in the clinic to free-associate regarding the 
various elements of their dreams (see below). Freud calls such chains 
of thought the "latent contents" of our dreams, in contrast to their 
"manifest contents". 
KE Y POI N T The distinction between the latent contents and 
manifest contents of dreams 
• The manifest content of a dream is what we experience as we sleep: usu-
ally a series of images that seem to form a coherent sequence, such as a 
movie - albeit one in which we are invariably the star. 
• The latent content of a dream are the "dream thoughts" that underlie and 
inform the manifest dream contents. They can be uncovered by asking 
the dreamer, as in the clinic, what the various elements within the mani-
fest contents "remind" them of. 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud specifies that the day's 
residues which inform the manifest contents of our dreams come 
particularly from wishes, concerns or chains of thought that have 
remained incomplete in the waking day. We might not all get as vexed 
as Freud's child was that we cannot eat strawberry cake. But perhaps an 
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important conversation was interrupted by chance. Or perhaps we 
have been obliged to ((sleep on" some unresolved work or personal 
problem. It is from the broken fabric of such interrupted events that the 
manifest content of dreams is woven (ID: 551-2, 554). 
The second type of wish involved in our dreams, Freud however 
stresses, is unconscious wishes - the types of wish that will not emerge 
instantly in the clinic. Freud hypothesizes that, however vexing the 
dream day's unfinished business, by itself it will not be sufficient to 
overcome the general shutting down of the psychical apparatus 
involved in sleeping. If it is "to figure as constructors of dreams", this 
unfinished business of the "dream day" must find "reinforcement 
which has its source in the unconscious ... impulses" (MSD: 224). The 
day's residues must form some "link" or "connection" with uncon-
scious wishes that date from much earlier than the previous day (ibid.: 
226). There is in this way a ((temporal regression" involved in the con-
struction of dreams. The manifest content of the dream will be the 
result of a kind of superimposition of the repressed unconscious wish 
with the unfulfilled, preconscious wishes of the dream day. In collo-
quial terms, two unfulfilled wishes are much better than one when it 
comes to the formation of dreams. Indeed, if the dream were solely the 
direct expression of a repressed unconscious wish, it would never make 
it into our conscious life, any more than a dream based solely on the 
day's events. However weakened the ego's vigilance against the id is 
when we sleep, it still maintains a "censorship" of our dreaming activ-
ities. This censorship is like the censorship political regimes exercise on 
the criminal actions or seditious statements of their subjects. Any too 
direct hallucinatory staging of the fulfilment of such wishes would 
hence be censored, just as it is the failure of the censorship that Freud 
argues leads to our having anxiety-provoking dreams (see above). 
Freud's hypothesis is that, since we do dream, we must suppose that the 
manifest content of any dream is the result of the psyche having it both 
ways - the dream "gives expression to the unconscious impulse in the 
material of the previous day's residues" (MSD: 226). 
The topographical account of dreams: Freud's psychoanalytic 
theory 
The second major objection facing Freud's claim that all dreams are 
wish-fulfilments is that so many of adults' dreams seem absurd - not 
signifying fulfilled wishes, but so much sound and fury. Surely the 
sleeping psyche is simply burning off energy, so that the products of 
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Figure 3.2 The metapsychology of dreams 
Notes: 
1 The system-Pes day's residues are «drawn into" the system-Ucs. 
2 Ues wishes are «linked" to day's residues to form the "dream wish". 
3 The dream work of condensation and displacement takes place. 
4 Dream content becomes conscious as a hallucinated sense-perception. 
this process have no rhyme or reason? Freud accepts the idea that the 
dreaming psyche is burning off energy. Yet he disputes the implication 
that the products of this "letting off of steam" have no meaning. In 
psychoanalysis, when an analysand "free-associates" on the manifest 
content of the dream, he claims, we very soon find that even the most 
apparently random products of a dreamer's mind have manifold con-
nections with their wider thoughts and concerns. Each dream has a 
plethora of "latent contents", to use Freud's technical term. Once we 
acknowledge this, the enigma posed by the manifest absurdity of 
dreams concerns· the relations between the manifest content of the 
dream and the individual's latent dream thoughts. 
When we examine these relations for any dream, Freud argues, it 
soon becomes clear that a complex process is involved in its construc-
tion. Freud calls this process the dream work. The dream work can 
be envisaged as in Figure 3.2, which can also form the basis of our 
understanding. 
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At point 1 of the process shown in Figure 3.2, the preconscious "day's 
residues" are debarred access to motility, since the person is asleep. 
Instead, a link between them and the unconscious impulses is estab-
lished, thanks to the easing of the communication between the Pes 
and the Ucs associated with being asleep. This is a regression, Freud 
specifies, since the preconscious thoughts are rational, and expressible 
in sentences such as: "I wish that I had been able to solve that maths 
problem" or e'I wish I had said more'~ and so on. However, when the 
"text" of these thoughts (ID: 324, 388) is "drawn into" the unconscious, 
it takes on ({the irrational character possessed by everything that is 
unconscious". At this point, Freud contends) certain "considerations of 
representability" present themselves. These "considerations" follow 
from how the "text" of the rational Pes chains of thought cannot all 
find "means of representation" in the more primitive system-Ucs (ID: 
314). The dream thoughts, Freud specifies, "stand ... in the most 
manifold logical relations to one another. They can represent fore-
ground and background, digressions and illustrations, conditions, 
chains of evidence and counter-arguments ... " (ID: 312). By contrast, 
we have seen that the system-Ues contains the separate, a-logical 
"thing-presentations" tied to repressed wishes. Faced with the task of 
"translating" dream thoughts involving connectives such as "'if', 
(because', 'just as') 'although') 'either-or', and all the other conjunctions 
without which we cannot understand sentences or speeches", Freud 
argues that the system-Ucs simplifies this original text: "When the 
whole mass of these dream-thoughts is brought under the pressure of 
the dream-work ... its elements are turned about, broken into frag-
ments and jammed together - almost like pack ice .. ," (ibid.: 312). To 
describe this process, Freud asks us to imagine what a journalist would 
do if asked to reproduce a «political leading article" (ibid.: 340) wholly 
by means of illustrations - say, in a cartoon strip. First of all, they might 
scan their mind for concrete "figures of speech" that would allow the 
abstract ideas of the article to be presented pictorially. Every language 
has such ((figures of speech': Freud notes, which "in consequence of 
the history of their development, are richer in associations than 
[more abstract] conceptual ones" (ibid.). To describe how fine some 
politician's rhetoric was, our political cartoonist might for instance 
evoke the {'lofty heights" of his speech. The politician could then be 
depicted speaking on the heights of some mountain range, and the idea 
would have been successfully "translated" while respecting the relevant 
"considerations of representability". In the same way, Freud argues 
that, in the formation of dreams: 
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A good part of the intermediate work done ... which seeks 
to reduce the dispersed dream-thoughts to the most succinct 
and unified expression possible, proceeds along the line of 
finding appropriate verbal transformations for the individual 
thoughts. . . (ID: 340) 
So let us grant Freud that the nouns and verbs of the Pes dream 
thoughts are in this way "packed intd' more concrete figures of speech, 
wherever this can be done. Freud gives us many examples: a girl's 
dream represented someone "hurling invectives" at her in the pictorial 
form of someone throwing a chimpanzee and a cat at her, making use 
of a German linguistic convention which "pictures" animals with 
invectives. A man's dream represented his "being retrenched" by way of 
digging a trench in his garden. What though does Freud think happens 
to the logical relations between the things and actions the Pes dream 
thoughts describe? How can these be pictured? Mostly, Freud argues, 
"it is only the substantive content of the dream -thoughts that [the Ucs] 
takes over and manipulates" (ID: 312). Nevertheless, the system-Ucs 
does use several primitive means available to it to try to represent 
higher-order logical connections between the preconscious dream 
thoughts. For example, a relationship of cause and effect can be repre-
sented in the dream work by the successive presentation of two wholly 
different scenes, or one dream figure transforming into another in 
front of our dreaming eyes; or the "distance" in time of an event repre-
sented in the dream can be represented by spatial distance - those 
people are now "so far away from us", and so on. 
As these examples show, the import of "considerations of repre-
sentability" for understanding Freud's interpretation of dreams can 
hardly be overstated. Dreams, for Freud, are distorted texts that, using 
"figures of speech" as a way of translating the linguistic dream 
thoughts, finally present themselves as sense-perceptions (at point 5 in 
Figure 3.2, "Perception-consciousness") in a way that convinces the 
dreamer of their external, spatiotemporal reality. Freud for this reason 
opens Chapter VI on the dream work by comparing dreams to picture 
puzzles or rebuses: 
Suppose I have a picture puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It 
depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the 
alphabet, the figure of a running man whose head has been 
conjured away, and so on. Now I might be misled into raising 
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objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its 
component parts are nonsensicaL A boat has no business to be 
on the roof of a house, and a headless man cannot run ... But 
obviously we can only form a proper judgment of the rebus if we 
put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its 
parts and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by a 
syllable or word that can be presented by that element in some 
way or another. . . (ID: 277-8) 
We could not then be further mistaken than to imagine, as people often 
do, that dreams represent coherent narratives which unfold wholly at 
the sensory level, like a feature film. This is the principal reason why 
they seem manifestly absurd, like so many bad movies, or movies by 
David Lynch. Dreams are, in their way, coherent and meaningful prod-
ucts of the human psyche. Yet their coherence lies in the linguistic text 
of the dream wish, as it is pieced together out of the linguistic content 
provided by the Pes dream thoughts. The sense we do sometimes get 
that the manifest pictorial contents of our dreams form a pictorial story 
Freud argues is a lure serving to lull the ego's censorship. It represents 
the deceptive result of a kind of supplementary process concealing the 
dream but itself «not to be distinguished, [Freud] says, from our wak-
ing thoughts" (Lacan 2006: 426). This is «secondary revision') (point 4 
in Figure 3.2). 
KEY POINT Whatis secondary revision? (10:488-508) 
Secondary revision is a final process of revision that hinders our waking 
ability to recollect, and interpret, our dreams. Secondary revision "fills up 
the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches". Its result is that 
"the dream loses its absurdity and disconnectedness and approximates 
to the model of an intelligible experience", concealing in partcular its 
linguistic constitutuion (lD: 490). In Lacan's 910ss: IIno better idea of this 
function's effects can be given than comparing it to patches of color wash 
which, when applied here and there on a stencil, can make stick figures ... in 
a rebus or hieroglyphics look more like a painting of people" (2006: 426). 
So what then happens at points 2 and 3 of Figure 3.2? The «text" of 
the dream thoughts has been reduced to more concrete, pictorial 
figures of speech. But we are still far from the point at which the 
secondary revision repackages the elements of the dream into the 
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semblance of a pictorial narrative. At point 2, Freud tells us, the dream 
wish is formed. This dream wish "gives expression to the unconscious 
impulse in the material of the preconscious day's residues" (MSD: 226). 
In an important footnote added in 1926 towards the end of Chapter VI 
of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud complained that people too 
often confuse the latent contents of the dream with its unconscious 
wish (note 2 at ID: 506-7). Nevertheless, as Slavoj Zizek has recently 
emphasized (Zizek 1989), the dream wish is not what a person will 
produce when asked to free-associate on the manifest elements of his 
dream. As with Freud's famous dream of Irma's injection, the latent 
thoughts will typically concern the person's workaday life. In the dream 
of Irma's injection, for instance, Freud7s preconscious wish was to be 
excused from culpability when his patient's, Irma's, health did not 
improve under his care (ID: 107-21). To use a metaphor, these pre-
conscious wishes are for Freud instead like the materials the artist-
unconscious has on its palette in order to make conscious its otherwise 
censored, illicit wishes. However, as in the "Signorelli" case, Freud 
emphasizes that these repressed dream wishes will always be of an 
infantile, sexual or aggressive nature, very different from the desire to 
"save face" in front of one's colleagues, as in Freud's Irma dream. 
At point 3, with the dream wish having now "met" the pre-packaged, 
simplified dream thoughts, the psyche distorts or ({transvalues" the 
dream thoughts to give indirect expression to this wish in a manner 
that further confounds the ego"s censorship. It does this through two 
processes, condensation and displacement. 
KEY POI NT Condensation and overdetermination 
• When an analysand free-associates on the manifest contents of her 
dream, she will always produce quantitatively more thoughts than the 
number of manifest contents in the dream. 
• These manifold latent thoughts, in order to make it into the dream, must 
accordingly be subject to a process of selection. In particular, only those 
elements that "link up" with more than one chain of latent dream 
thoughts will make it into the manifest content of a dream. Each of these 
"condensed" dream elements, Freud says[ js overdetermined. 
In order to illustrate condensation, consider Freud's famous dream af 
the botanical monograph (ID: 282-4). The manifest content of the 
dream was this: 
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I had written a monograph on an (unspecified) genus of plant. 
The book lay before me and I was at the moment turning over 
a folded colored plate. Bound up in the copy there was a dried 
specimen of a plant. 
What did Freud's free associations reveal? First, resisting the lure of 
"secondary revision': Freud divides the dream into its individual 
linguistic elements. He then associates on each of these in turn: 
• "monograph": Freud had seen a "monograph" on a type of plant 
the day before in a bookshop. Moreover, "monograph" reminded 
Freud of his own monograph on cocaine, and of his friend Dr 
Konigstein who had assisted the young Freud in his research for 
it. Freud had had a conversation with Dr Konigstein the previous 
evening about the payment of medical services which, he con-
fides, lay close to the illicit dream wish; 
• "botanical": the word "botanical" recalled the name of Freud's 
colleague Dr Gartner [ Gardener] , the "blooming" looks of 
Gartner's wife which Freud had recently remarked, and to two 
of his analysands, one named "Flora" and a second [Frau L] to 
whom Freud had "told the story of the forgotten flowers" (the 
details of which do not concern us here). 
Freud's thoughts concerning Gartner recalled a conversation he had 
had with Dr K6nigst~ein in which Flora and Frau L had been men-
tioned. «Forgotten flowers" recalled to Freud's mind his wife's favourite 
flowers, and his own "jokingly» favourite flower, the artichoke. 
«Artichoke" then recalled to him an episode from his childhood 
"which was the opening of his own intimate relations with books 
[monographs] ". 
Each of the dream elements, we can see, has "copious links with the 
majority of the dream-thoughts". What such cases compel us to hypo-
thesize, Freud says, is that 
A dream is constructed ... by the whole mass of dream-
thoughts being submitted to a sort of manipulative process in 
which those elements which have the most numerous and 
strongest supports acquire the right of entry into the dream-
content - in a manner analogous to election by scrutin de liste. 
(ID: 284) 
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Figure 3.3 The condensations in the «botanical monograph" dream 
In the case of the dream of the «botanical monograph'~ the work of 
condensation can be represented as in Figure 3.3. 
Famously, alongside condensation, Freud lists displacement as a key 
mechanism of the dream work. 
KEY POINT Whatis displacement? (10: 306-9) 
• Freud tells us that displacement is the "transference ... of psychical 
intensities" between elements of the already-simplified dream thoughts. 
It illustrates the "mobility of cathexis" that Freud associates with the 
unconscious. 
• The evidence that displacement has occurred in the dream work is that 
what psychoanalysis shows to be the most important dream thoughts 
(those closest to the unconscious wish) are completely unrelated to the 
events or actions that appear to be the most important in the manifest 
contents of a dream: "In the course of the formation of a dream these 
essential elements, charged ... with intense interest, may be treated as 
though they were of small value, and their place be taken in the dream by 
other elements, of whose small value in the dream-thoughts there can be 
no question" (lD: 306). 
The botanical monograph dream also illustrates what Freud means 
by «displacement". Freud tells us that the dream thoughts all turned on 
his important conversation with Dr Konigstein. This conversation, as 
he confides, had invoked illicit wishes he is not at liberty to disclose, 
given the censorship of his own times. Yet the manifest dream is about 
a botanical monograph, a folded plate and a dried specimen of plant! 
Nothing could seem further from any illicit sexual wishes, or even Freud's 
conversation with Konigstein. Displacement, Freud emphasizes, plays 
a particularly important role in the distortion of the unconscious 
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dream wish. Since the latent content of the dream is in this way "dis-
placed'~ the dream wish whose fulfilment is being indirectly repre-
sented simply does not come to the attention of the censor, just as it 
usually completely eludes the sleeper on waking. 
An illustration: the Wolfman's "primal scene" dream 
Given the complexity of Freud's understanding of the dream work, we 
close by considering one complete Freudian dream analysis. The dream 
in question comes from Freud's psychoanalysis of "the Wolfman". 
Alongside Little Hans and the Ratman (and Dora and Schreber, whom 
we have still to meet), the Wolfman analysis is one of Freud's great case 
studies. As The Interpretation of Dreams puts it, this case history pre-
sents not only a psychoanalysis of the individual elements in the dream. 
Freud also performs a "synthetic" reconstruction of the dream, in light 
of the analysis's full disclosure of the dreamer's unconscious wishes. 
At the heart of the Wolfman's analysis was a recurrent dream he had 
had over many years. The key elements of the manifest content of the 
dream were as follows: 
Suddenly the window opened, outside of which was a large tree. 
The tree had many branches. 6 or 7 wolves were perched upon 
them. They were not moving. The wolves sat still, looking in 
through the window at the dreamer. They each had large white 
tails. The overwhelming affect of the dream was one of fear. 
(cf. WM: 29) 
Here, as elsewhere, Freud's interpretation proceeds on the basis of 
the Wolfman's free associations on each of the dream elements. These 
associations disclosed the "latent contents" of the dream: the dream 
thoughts. As the analysis bore out, these latent thoughts turned on two 
associative chains: 
• a childhood memory of the door opening at Christmas time to 
reveal a tree with presents on the branches (WM: 35-6, note 2 at 
42-3); and 
• childhood fairy tales that had made a strong impression on the 
Wolfman, about wolves who eat little goats, hide in trees, but who 
end by having their tails chopped off as punishment for their 
misdeeds (ibid.: 29-32,41-2). 
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The Wolfman's psychoanalysis revealed, however, that the uncon-
scious dream wishes behind the dream concerned the analysand's 
infantile sexuality, and in particular his unresolved Oedipus complex. 
Specifically, the Wolfman's infantile sexual development was deeply 
affected, Freud contends, by his witnessing at a very young age the 
spectacle of his parents having sexual intercourse (WM: 36-8). 
Although he was too young to comprehend the spectacle (see Chapter 
2), this event was to have a lastingly traumatic effect upon him as he 
matured sexually. The Wolfman's sexual development suffered from a 
fixation at the anal phase. His own amorphous sexual wishes became 
fixated around a series of wishes characteristic of this infantile stage: 
the wishes to see his mother and father doing ((ie~ to be castrated (so his 
father might do it to him, according to the "passive" Oedipus com-
plex), and to be devoured by his father (on the basis of a sadistic/oral 
understanding for which to love is equivalent to "gobbling up" the 
beloved). 
Figure 3.4 shows how Freud understands the dream work in this 
case. The force of these repressed wishes distorted the Wolfman's latent 
dream thoughts concerning the Christmas tree and the story so as to 
give rise, in their place, to the horrifying insistent dream of the wolves 
on their braches, gazing in fixedly at him. 
Summary 
• Freud couples his dynamic, biological account of the psyche with 
his "topographical" account. The topographical account sees the 
psyche as a "mnemic" (memory) device with two "systems": the 
system-Pes (containing rationally associated memories, ideas 
and "drive representatives") and the system-Ucs (the uncon-
scious). The unconscious is a mnemic system characterized by 
"primary process" thinking, in which "drive-representatives" are 
treated separately, as "thing-representatives" not subject to reality-
testing, which may thus contradict each other, are timeless, and 
able to be linked, according to the most apparently tenuous links, 
with preconscious ideas. 
• The royal road to understanding the primary processes of the sys-
tem-Ucs is the interpretation of dreams. Freud's account of the 
construction of dreams, based upon his contention that dreams 
always stage the fulfilment of wishes, brings together his dynamic 
and topographical accounts of the psyche. 
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• The preconscious dream thoughts, made up of the dream day's 
cognitive "residues': are "drawn into" the unconscious, then 
"sifted" into more concrete pictorial language. Hence their 
manifold logical relations are simplified into the types of rela-
tions that can hold between pictured things (considerations of 
representability) . 
• The dream wish then "links" with the unsatisfied preconscious 
wish from the dream day. This simplified ((text" becomes the con-
tents out of which this wish will form its indirect hallucinated 
satisfaction in the dream's manifest contents. 
• In the process of condensation, only those elements of the latent 
content connected to many (or most) of these latent thoughts 
make it into the manifest content of the dream. Because of dis-
placement, by contrast, the elements seemingly central in this 
manifest content are generally not those that are most important 
in the original preconscious thoughts. The process of displace-
ment highlights the distorting impact of the intersection of the 
repressed dream wish on the latent dream thoughts. In order 
to reach consciousness, this wish must «(transvalue all [the] psy-
chical values" from the day's residues. In particular, the latent 
thoughts most closely connected to this illicit wish must them-
selves disappear from the manifest content, or be relegated to a 
seemingly incidental place in the dream. 
• In the process of ((secondary revision': finally, the contents of the 
dream are given a last ((once-over': so the dream is made to 
appear as a coherent pictorial story capable of convincing the 
dreamer that its manifest contents are real, and he can continue 
sleeping. 
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part II 
Freud's children 

four 
Precarious love: Kleinian object relations 
theory 
Introducing Klein and "object relations" 
We have now examined the foundations of psychoanalysis, laid down 
by Sigmund Freud. Part II of this book will consider developments 
of psychoanalytic theory after Freud. Melanie Klein's object relations 
approach to psychoanalysis represents one of the most original trajec-
tories to have emerged in psychoanalysis after Freud. Klein discovered 
psychoanalysis in Budapest. But it was only after moving to London 
that her work took on its distinctive, original character. Perhaps, Juliet 
Mitchell suggests, this was because of the peculiarly practical and "no-
nonsense" culture of England, in which divergence from orthodoxy 
was better tolerated than on the European continent. However that 
may be, Klein was explicit about her departures from Freudian ortho-
doxy. As we shall see, Klein offers a vivid account of this psychology: 
one that focuses much more than Freud's on the violent and erotic rela-
tion between the infant and its mother. In this relation, Klein holds, the 
erotic desire to possess the mother goes hand in hand with wanting to 
cut her up, rob her body of its good contents, poison her with excre-
ment, and destroy her. 
Yet Kleids analysis of children opens the way to a particularly sym-
pathetic account of the infantile psyche, and the problems children 
face in the normal course of their development. Kleinian object rela-
tions theory also opens up new insights into adult psychology) and 
pathologies such as schizophrenia and depression. According to Klein, 
these signal a regression to childhood states visited during the Oedipus 
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complex. But in her diagnostic picture what she calls the schizoid and 
depressive positions assume centrality, rather than Freud's familiar 
"phases". Finally, object relations theory underscores the role and char-
acter of "fantasy" in relations between the ego and its objects - an 
emphasis that connects Klein and her followers to a philosophical 
genealogy comprising Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The 
connection between human being and the object world is forged 
through representation (Vorstellung) or the imagination. In philosoph-
ical parlance, meaning is imbued in worldly things, and the mind 
grasps its objects, by virtue of an active capacity (or "faculty") of rea-
son, so that, in the words of Jorge Luis Borges: 
A man sets out to draw the world. As the years go by, he 
peoples a space with images of provinces, kingdoms, moun-
tains' bays, ships, islands, fishes, rooms, instruments, stars, 
horses, and individuals. A short time before he dies, he dis-
covers that the patient labyrinth of lines traces the lineaments 
of his own face. (Borges 1999: 327) 
Child analysis and the play technique 
Klein's chief clinical modus operandi, from which her discoveries about 
the child's psyche are drawn, she calls the "play technique': Klein devel-
oped this technique to treat children with language disturbances, or 
who are not yet able to speak. The technique involved introducing to 
the child a number of simple toys: 
little wooden men and women, usually in two sizes, cars, 
wheelbarrows, swings, trains, aeroplanes, animals, trees, 
bricks, houses, fences, paper, scissors, a knife, pencils, chalks 
or paints, glue, balls and marbles, plasticine and string. 
(Klein 1987: fn. 4, 230) 
This range of toys is generic enough to act as a conduit for the child's 
imaginary or fantasmatic projections. Klein's interpretations were for-
mulated on the basis of her attention to how the infant played, and how 
children treat the objects of their play. Her operative assumption was 
that the child transfers emotional attachments to loved ones on to the 
toys, thus enacting emotional situations - or fantasized relationships -
through play. The analyst's role as interpreter is to relay back to the 
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child what they are doing, thus presenting to their conscious awareness 
what the unconscious communicates by means of the game. The ana-
lyst must hence remain affectively neutral, no matter how violent or 
abject the child's behaviour: 
[T]he analyst should not show disapproval of the child having 
broken a toy; he should not, however, encourage the child to 
express his aggressiveness, or suggest to him that the toy could 
be mended. In other words, he should enable the child to 
experience his emotions and phantasies as they come up. 
(Klein 1987: 42-3) 
Klein stressed such procedural prescriptions in order to ensure 
scientific repeatability, and inure the procedure against the undue 
influence of suggestion (see Chapter 8). These principles also served 
the goal of analysis: to cure the child's disorder. To this end, Klein pro-
vided each child their own exclusive drawer of toys - an equivalent 
measure, for Klein, to the adult analysand's personal record of associa-
tions, shared only with the analyst. 
Klein drew analogies between what a child does in play, and what an 
adult does with language and in dreams. Klein's analysis of play is like 
Freud's analysis of dreams and analysands' spoken testimony, drawing 
upon the same principles of free association, the primacy of the uncon-
scious' and the "transference" - the analysand's affectively charged atti-
tudes towards their analyst (see Chapter 8). The child's play enables it 
to express the symbolic relations and meanings produced by its fan-
tasies, like - Klein claims - the structures found in adult dreams. Klein 
insists, however, that, as with Freudian dream analysis, the interpreta-
tion should not only rely upon a generalized <'translation of symbols'~ 
It should take its bearings from the milieu given by the child's emo-
tional engagement with the toys. In this way, as with the interpretation 
of dreams, the interpretation of the child's unconscious becomes pos-
sible only within the clinical situation, in the dialogue between the 
child and the analyst, as mediated by the child's toys and its play with 
them. 
Klein's writings give numerous examples of how the interpretation 
might proceed. For instance, a key event might involve the destruction 
of a toy - representing the wish to destroy a sibling or parent. This event 
might be followed by an attitude of regret, because the toy had stood, 
in the child's imagination, for this person. In communicating to the 
child this analogy between destroying the toy and wishing to harm the 
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person whom the toy represents, Klein would frequently observe an 
initial heightening of anxiety in the child, which would then subside, 
freeing them to produce more associations and material for analysis. 
The structure and development of the psyche 
The child at play, as a psychoanalytic motif, pre-dates Kleinian object 
relations. Famously, in «Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), Freud 
analyses his grandson's play with a wooden spool, repeatedly pushing 
it away (exclaiming fort! [gone]), and pulling it in (exclaiming da! 
[here]). In this <lort-da game", Freud argues, the wooden spool has 
corne to stand for the child's mother. In the repetitive play, the child 
manages his feelings of distress at separation from the mother by hurl-
ing the substitute from his cot ('lort!") and reeling it back in Cda!") at 
his pleasure. Importantly, Freud argues that this game also expresses a 
type of destructive impulse central to his postwar work, the famous 
«death drive" (see Chapter 7). 
KEY POINT Freud on the death drive 
In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Freud argues that two types of drives 
govern the psyche: 
• Eros sustains the life of the organism by connecting psychic energy with 
its "objects" (the breast, food, etc.), seeking pleasure through the discharge 
of tension. 
• Thanatos, or the death drive, accumulates tension, disconnecting and 
destroying alliances in order to achieve a "greater" equilibrium beyond 
the organism in death. 
Freud's theory of the death drive made sense of new clinical phenomena 
with which Freud had grappled, namely: 
- the transference, whereby the analysand relives her relations to her first 
others through the analyst (see Chapter 8); 
- the reappearance or "metastasis" of hysterical symptoms after their 
successful Interpretation; and 
- the traumatic "war" neuroses: returned World War I soldiers would dream 
repeatedly of their trauma-inducing experiences at the front. 
The death drive is one of Freud's most controversial concepts. It split 
Freud's followers down two lines: those who accept the death drive as 
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one of psychoanalysis's most pivotal concepts, and those who see it as 
obscure and metaphysical (for instance, Otto Rank, David Rapaport, 
Ernest Jones). Both Klein and Lacan (see Chapter 5) regarded the death 
drive seriously, although each accords to it a different significance. 
While Lacan viewed the death drive from the perspective of his theor-
etical structuralism, Klein saw it as galvanizing the formation of the 
self. 
The schizoid position 
For Klein, the ego is brought into being by its "object relations" - or its 
relation to the "part objects" of its earliest drives, such as the breast, face 
or voice of the mother, who is not yet conceptually unified as a whole 
object for the infant. Object relations exist for the child from the first 
time it feeds, and the relation to this object (initially the breast) is char-
acterized by the mechanisms either of "introjection" or "projection" 
(see Chapter 2), as Freud had argued in "On Negation" and "Drives 
and Their Vicissitudes": 
Expressed in the language of the oldest - the oral- instinctual 
impulses, the judgement [of the child regarding its first 
objects] is: "I should like to eat this;' or "I should like to spit it 
out"; and, put more generally: "I should like to take this into 
myself and to keep that out" ... the original pleasure-ego 
wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject 
from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to 
the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical. 
(N: 237) 
As for Freud, so for Klein: in the child's first months there is no clear 
boundary between the mother and the child. The child introjects 
the nourishing ("good") breast, with which it forms a positive identi-
fication. Klein contends that the "good breast" object comes to form 
the primary core of the child's ego. On the other side of the coin, the 
child identifies feelings of discomfort such as indigestion or hunger 
with the "bad breast". These bad internal feelings are projected out-
wards in the child's fantasy on to this (Cbad" "part object': which 
becomes for it the source of absolute danger: "an uncontrollable over-
powering object" (Klein 1987: 179). It is from this splitting of the 
bad and good objects, Klein argues, that the "death drive" emerges. It 
is "felt as a fear of annihilation (death) and takes the form of fear of 
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persecution" in the child. Because of the still-basic stage of mental 
development of the child, each of its "good" and "bad" feelings is exag-
gerated by the child, so that at one extreme they experience the fearful, 
persecuting "bad breast", and at the other, the "inexhaustible and 
always bountiful breast - an ideal breast" (ibid.: 182). It is a matter of 
heaven and hell, as it were, with little in between. 
The upshot of this scenario is that the child unknowingly identifies 
in the same real "object') (the mother) both its most valued and integral 
core - the fantasmatic good part object - and the greatest threat to its 
integrity - the fantasized bad breast. In order to secure their sense of 
self, the child will thus draw upon its oral sadism and - in fantasy - raid 
the mother's body for its good contents: «suck dry, bite up, scoop out 
and rob the mother's bodi' (Klein 1987: 183). At the same time, Klein 
holds, the child launches fantasized attacks upon the bad breast by 
drawing upon its emergent anal-sadistic impulses, hurling its own 
excrements into the mother, as weapons. The child attempts to appro-
priate all that is nourishing or good from the mother, and to control 
her from a distance by means of the parts of its own self that it has pro-
jected on to her "bad" breast. However, Klein argues, the infant's ego 
soon becomes depleted by this ambivalent, fantasmatic traffic of love 
and hatred between itself and its objects. Indeed, unlike Freud, Klein 
dates the Oedipus complex - with its ambivalence towards its first 
others - to this early, schizoid phase of childhood development. 
Because of its own attacks against the (m)other, the child begins to fear 
the mother's retaliation, which is anticipated in evermore anxiety-
producing fantasies regarding the bad breast. Ultimately, Klein says, 
the child fears being incorporated entirely by the mother, an infantile 
fear that manifests as castration anxiety (and later claustrophobia in 
adults). 
The child escapes this persecutory dialectic only when it comes to 
appreciate that the mother is actually one whole other - and so that 
what it had taken to be the "good object" and the "bad object" are one 
and the same. This stage is marked by the child)s experiencing of regret 
about its fantasized attacks against the mother, and the onset of what 
Klein calls the depressive position. 
The depressive position 
According to Klein's account, the depressive position catalyses the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex. In it, the superego is installed, and 
the child comes to accept its proper position in the family. The task of 
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this resolution for Klein, however, is not only for the child to take up its 
sodal position in relation to the father, in exchange for renouncing its 
claims upon the mother. For Klein it signals the child's acknowledge-
ment of the mother's completeness, through the conceptual integra-
tion of the "good" and ('bad" part objects. The "task" of the depressive 
position is the incorporation of the whole loved object - rather than the 
part object that characterized object relations during the schizoid posi-
tion. With this integration of the object, love and hate come to coexist for 
the child, so it learns to cope with ambivalence towards the loved one. 
KEY POINT Mourning and melancholia in Freud 
Klein's account ofthe depressive phase develops through central reference 
to Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia". 
• When a significant object (such as a parent or lover) dies or departs, the 
ego must undergo a process of adapting to this new reality, one that takes 
time, and whose failure results in melancholia. 
• Initially, the subject will over-invest (or "hyper-cathect") libido into the 
object by way of introjection. This will appear to others as a state of self-
absorption and dwelling upon one's loss. 
• In the normal case, however, the ego's work of mourning "incorporates" 
the lost object by way of identification, and in this way the loss is com-
pensated for. 
In the depressive phase, the child incorporates or comes to identify 
with the whole "loved object" (the mother). Such integration of the 
whole object signals new difficulties for the child. It must incorporate 
the whole good object (mother), overcoming the schizoid wish to 
destroy her and the fear of destroying its own self thereby. Most impor-
tantly, the child must negotiate its own guilt in relation to the good 
object regarding past aggressions enacted toward the object in the 
schizoid position. The ego is ultimately unable to sustain the degree 
of violence and instability that characterizes the schizoid position. 
Eventually it must become organized enough to gain a greater purchase 
upon reality, through an understanding of the object/mother as inte-
grated rather than split. Unlike in Freud (and, as we shall see, Lacan), 
there is no third term involved in this process for Klein: no father who 
will intervene to stabilize the dangerously intimate relation between 
the mother and the child. Rather, a solution to the schizoid impasse is 
galvanized by the child's own fear that it might destroy the good object, 
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reflected in the mother's decreasing availability to it during the period 
ofweaning. 
With these points established, we can chart the differences between 
Klein's account of the Oedipus complex and Freud's, which we exam-
ined in Chapter 2. 
KEY POINT Klein's disagreements with Freud over flOedipus" 
1. The Oedipus complex emerges and is dealt with in the child's first two 
years for Klein, which, as we have seen already in Chapter 2, is far earlier 
than for Freud. 
2. The object of both desire and fear for the infant is different for Klein. 
Rather than the father, it is primarily the mother who also incorporates 
the father's penis, and other objects such as faeces and rival children.' 
3. Following from this, it is the father who is castrated by the mother, notthe 
reverse. 
4. The mother is the predominant internalized model for the superego 
rather than the father, who is relatively peripheral. 
What is the significance of these differences? 
• The father's (or equivalent) prohibition is not required to catalyse the dis~ 
solution ofthe Oedipus complex. 
• The superego is engendered by the child's refinement of these primary 
relations and is not installed in response to the repression of the child's 
Oedipal wishes. 
• Because she lacks Freuds's pivotal concept of Nachtraglichkeit (or retro-
active effect), the superego is for Klein constructed cumulatively from 
very early infancy, instead of being installed late and then reorganizing 
previous experience. 
This shift from the schizoid to the depressive position is occasioned 
for Klein by the mother's increasing absence as the child grows up. 
Crucially, the child sets out to repair the damaged mother, who had 
previously borne the brunt of the child's aggressive and appropriative 
impulses. The child wishes now to protect the loved object, but -
because of the truth of its sadistic impulses - feels unable to do so with-
out also endangering it: 
the ego becomes fully identified with its good, internalized 
objects, and at the same time becomes aware of its own inca-
pacity to protect and preserve them against the internalized, 
persecuting objects and the id. This anxiety is psychologically 
justified. (Klein 1987: 119) 
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Klein's argument here becomes clear when we reflect again upon the 
function of play for the child. For instance, when a child damages and 
then attempts to repair a toy, Klein posits that this activity reflects the 
psychical activity of making reparations to the internal "good" object. 
Likewise, Klein cites the instance of a child "in the wars" - or victim to 
seemingly accidental, yet self-inflicted, injury - as a further case of act-
ing out internal psychic events through which the child wishes to keep 
in check its own destructive capacities. As with Freud's grandson in 
"Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Klein argues that the children she 
analysed were able to alleviate their anxiety about the absent mother in 
the depressive phase through play. There is, however, one key difference 
between Freud's conclusions about his grandson's activity and Klein's 
account of what the child achieves through play. Whereas for Freud the 
fort-da game represented an attempt to master the mother through 
playfully - and sadistically - sending her away and then bringing her 
back, for Klein the situation is reversed. Because the child initially 
understands itself to be omnipotent ("the whole world"), the child 
supposes it has already sent the mother away with its attacks against 
her. Worse still, the child fears her return as the "bad mother". Play thus 
functions in the depressive position as a mode of reparation of the 
loved object - and of mastery of the sadistic impulse - rather than as an 
attempt to master the object. 
This also demonstrates the extent of the ego's development in the 
depressive position. During the depressive position the child comes to 
desire the whole object rather than part objects. This involves a capa-
city to tolerate increased amounts of frustration, beyond simply enact-
ing its aggression upon the object through fantasized attacks. In turn, 
this increased tolerance leads to new anxiety contents, and a refinement 
of the defence mechanisms such that imagos of objects (or fantasmatic 
complexes relating to an object) rather than actual objects come to be 
split: 
Ambivalence, carried out in a splitting of imagos, enables the 
small child to gain more trust and belief in its real objects and 
thus its internalised ones - to love them more and to carry out 
in an increasing degree its phantasies of restoration on the 
loved object. (Klein 1987: 143) 
Under these conditions, the child is finally able to establish within 
itself the imago of the whole object: the superego, which (see Chap-
ter 1) represents the voice of conscience and social law. Yet this effect of 
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stabilization and resolution is only apparent. The schizoid structure is 
still always a possibility - albeit usually a latent one - for the psyche. 
This is because the superego, as the "integrated" and "organized" loved 
object, serves both as the ego's ultimate protection against attack and, 
at times, its most vicious aggressor. For this reason, Klein (like Freud 
and Lacan) stresses how the superego is inherently liable to attack the 
ego: as in everyday references to the "gnawing of conscience" which for 
Klein "testifies to the relentless 'persecution' of conscience and to the 
fact that it is originally conceived of as devouring its victim" (Klein 
1987: 123). 
In order to make clearer our understanding of Klein's account of 
childhood development, let us look at her most famous case study, 
"Little Dick': 
The case of Dick 
Klein's treatment of four-year-old "Dick" in 1929 gave rise to her best-
known, and most frequently criticized, paper, "The Importance of 
Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego". In "Dick", Klein 
confronted a child who exhibited no affective relation to those around 
him (including his mother and nurse), no interest in toys or play, and 
for whom words appeared to have no meaning. From the object rela-
tions perspective, Dick's history before entering Klein's clinic had all 
the hallmarks of an infancy destined for psychological difficulties. 
Attempts to breastfeed him had been aborted early and he had rejected 
replacement foods, so that at one point Dick approached starvation. 
Since then he had been plagued with poor digestion and haemor-
rhoids. Thus Dick's oral sadism had been excessively stimulated by 
painful indigestion, at the same time as his ability to appropriate the 
"good breast" was inhibited. In addition to this, his mother was cold to 
him, partly because of these early difficulties in bonding, and because 
it was clear to her that he was "abnormal': Finally, Dick had recently 
acquired a new nurse who - as in any classic psychoanalytic narrative 
- had caught him masturbating and threateningly prohibited this 
activity. 
Dick arrived at Klein's clinic with what she called "a complete and 
apparently constitutional incapacity of the ego to tolerate anxiety" 
(Klein 1987: 101). Dick had withdrawn from his fantasy life, which was 
too saturated with pain and discomfort for his meagre resources to 
handle. He thus could not maintain connections with objects. Klein 
argued that Dick had become afraid of his own potential for destruc-
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tiveness, as evidenced in his refusal to bite up his food. Deprived of any 
opportunity to enact a sadistic relation to the mother, he had never had 
the chance to develop control of his destructive impulses and to toler-
ate anxiety in the development and resolution of the schizoid phase. 
The task of his analysis, Klein accordingly argued, was to bring about 
the conditions in which Dick could become comfortable enough to 
express and come to terms with his aggression regarding the bad object, 
and to appropriate the good object. Such conditions would also serve 
to activate further development of his ego: 
In general I do not interpret the material until it has found 
expression in various representations. In this case, however, 
where the capacity to represent it was almost entirely lacking, 
I found myself obliged to make my interpretations on the 
basis of my general knowledge, the representations in Dick's 
behaviour being relatively vague. Finding access in this way to 
his unconscious, I succeeded in activating anxiety and other 
affects. (Klein 1987: 106) 
The methods Klein employs to spur Dick's ego development have 
drawn the most criticism to her analysis of him. Central to her analysis 
is her evocative description of the frightening spectre (for the child) of 
adult sexual relations, concealed behind Dick's play with two trains. 
The «big train" was Daddy, Klein advises, the "little train" was Dick, 
and ((the station is Mummy; Dick is going into Mummy" (ibid.: 102). 
Despite her own (and others') misgivings about clinical procedure, 
Klein was pleased with the results of Dick's analysis. She reports that 
subsequently Dick came to represent normal (sadistic) object relations 
through play, developing an appropriate affection for his mother and 
nurse, and adopting the normal Oedipal attitude toward his father. In 
short, he was able to engage with his surroundings and become a func-
tioning member of his family. 
Anxiety, symbol formation and the love of wisdom 
As well as recounting Dick's fate, Klein's "The Importance of Symbol 
Formation in the Development of the Ego" also discloses her (alheit-
nascent) theory about something also vital to Lacan's work: the psy-
chological function oflanguage and the symbol. Klein's thesis is that an 
affective relation to objects is a precondition for language acquisition. 
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This is because object relations themselves prefigure relations to sym_ 
bols and to abstract thought, identifications with objects being for the 
child a mode of equation: of faeces with weapons, for instance, Or 
the mother's nourishing breast with the good part of the self. By 
developing these elementary "equations", the child manages anxiety 
and frustration through its fantasy life, creating meaning through 
the manipulation of part objects. Fantasy thus represents a kind of 
symbolic, protolinguistic exchange of part objects for the real things. 
Language in turn is understood by Kleinians as merely a variety of 
shared fantasy life, wherein signs are standardized for more general 
consumption. To this extent, anxiety is what, psychologically or "genet-
ically", keeps symbol formation and exchange in train. '~ sufficient 
quantity of anxiety is the necessary basis for an abundance of symbol 
formation and of fantasy;' Klein writes. However, "an adequate capa-
city on the part of the ego to tolerate anxiety is necessary if it is to be sat-
isfactorilyworked over" (Klein 1987: 98). For this reason, language and 
anxiety operate together as the psyche's dual currency at the level of the 
unconscious as well as conscious thought. More precisely, words serve 
as "mother substitutes", or sites of investment for the management of 
anxiety concerning the mother. 
Just as Klein traces the origins of language to the rudimentary 
exchanges enacted through fantasy, she also locates the motivation for 
intellectual curiosity in these early object relations. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, Freud originally identified the "epistemophilic impulse" 
(which in ancient Greek means literally love of knowledge, while "philo-
sophy" refers to love of wisdom) as the infant's early curiosity about 
sexual matters. For Klein it refers to the desire to explore the mother's 
body, and is connected also to sadism, the wish to control the mother 
and appropriate all that is good within her. According to Klein, this 
relation to the mother's body sets up the child's relation to the whole 
external world. Its intellectual curiosity is then either promoted or 
stifled, depending upon its early ability to deal with inevitable frustra-
tions and fears in connection with the mother's body. Dick, for 
instance, was inhibited in his relation to the world, and remarkably 
incurious because his early experiences of aggression actually pushed 
his mother away, leading to his withdrawal from destructiveness, and 
from all object-cathexes. The kind of engagement with the world 
productive of philosophy requires an ability not only to withstand 
discomfort and anxiety, but also an adeptness in the manipulation 
of anxiety to one's own ends, through the kind of symbol formation 
characteristic of fantasy. 
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In this light, we might understand philosophers' preoccupations 
with the question of the role of imagination in thinking (particularly 
Aristotle's, Kanfs or Castoriadis's (who was influenced by object rela-
tions)) in connection with the object relations conception of thinking. 
The imagination has a similarly basic or C{constitutive" function for 
Kant as fantasy does in Klein. It is what forms a connection between 
the subject and its world. Likewise, the object relations account of the 
perilous relation to the mother's body is reminiscent of some philoso-
phers' (especially Nietzsche's) descriptions of their own philosophical 
activity, as involving a kind of fearlessness and readiness to face 
"abysses". Might it not be the case, then, that the old intuition that the 
philosopher risks madness signals the heritage of thinking as a mode of 
defending oneself against destruction by the mother's body? 
Art, reparation and creativity 
Klein also had something to say on the question of why humans create 
visual works of art. Here as elsewhere, rather than reinterpret Freud on 
her own terms, Klein deviates substantially from Freudian orthodoxy. 
As we shall see in Chapter 7, the usual psychoanalytic explanation for 
the work of art is that it is a product of the «sublimation" of otherwise 
disruptive drives into activities, such as art, amenable to the peace and 
cultural development of civilization. The object relations account of 
creativity and art by contrast refers us back to the depressive position, 
and the need to make reparations with the damaged object (particu-
larly the mother). Klein addresses this question in her short article, 
"Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the 
Creative Impulse') (1929). Here she discusses Ravel's opera Das 
Zauberwort C'The Magic Word"). Ravel's opera revolves around a 
childhood scene of frustration and compromise: a little boy would like 
to go out, play, and «eat up all the cakes in the world", but is told by his 
mother that he must finish his homework or she will give him tea with-
out sugar, and dry bread. He consequently flies into a rage and tears up 
the things in the room. The destruction culminates in his attempt to 
stab a caged squirrel, which escapes from an open window. But next the 
objects in the room «come to life" and start to exact revenge upon the 
boy. The room starts to rip itself up, and, if that were not surreal 
enough, a little man appears from under a book cover to instruct the 
boy in maths. The boy faints, and then escapes to a nearby park, where 
animals proceed to attack him. Finally, a wounded squirrel falls beside 
him, and he bandages its paw with his scarf. The child utters the "magic 
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word", "mamma'~ and, as Klein puts it, is "restored to the human world 
of helping, 'being good'» (Klein 1987: 211). 
KEY POI N T Klein's in terpretation of '7he Magic Word" 
Klein reads Ravel's opera as an artistic representation of the Oedipus com-
plex: the schizoid position, and its resolution with the depressive position. 
• When the boy's wishes cannot be immediately satisfied, he lashes out 
against the mother's room (or "womb"), unleashing his destructive 
impulses against it/her. 
• That the objects he attacks "come to life" means that they turn his aggres-
sion back on him. 
• The room is rent apart. He is afraid he has damaged his mother's body, and 
that he has destroyed all that is good in the mother and in himself. 
• The little man in the opera is the father, "about to call the child ... to his 
reckoning for the damage he has done and the theft he had committed 
in the mother's body" (Klein 1987: 214). 
• Finally, the child is moved to repair the damage he has done, represented 
by his attending to the squirrel's paw. He is restored to "mamma", who 
loves him for being a "good boy" after all. 
For Klein, artistic creativity represents an attempt to make amends 
with the mother, through the act of reparation characteristic of the 
depressive position. With reference to a narrative concerning the moti-
vations of artist Ruth Kjar, Klein argues that the creative impulse 
derives from a feeling of loss or emptiness that results from having 
driven away or destroyed the mother. The artist manages her anxiety 
regarding the object's revenge and the emptying of the ego by means of 
the reparative activity involved in the creation of the art -object. Klein 
ascribes particular significance to Kjar's work because she had begun 
painting her works (mostly of women) in response to her feelings of 
sadness, or emptiness, after her brother-in -law retrieved a piece from 
her home: "This left an empty space on the wall, which in some in-
explicable way seemed to coincide with the empty space within her" 
(Klein 1987: 215). The principle Klein wishes to communicate with the 
aid of these examples is clear: art and creativity are the drive's attempt 
at object-reparation rather than indirect satisfaction (as per Freud's 
account of sublimation, see Chapter 7). This is not a mere question 
of emphasis - rather, Klein's difference from Freud here is fundamen-
tal. Art is not merely an attempt to release an accumulated "neuronal" 
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tension that would otherwise build until breaking point. It is instead a 
redeployment of energy to the purpose of caring for the loved object, 
which is also intimately connected to the ego's own core, and with a fear 
of the mother. Or in more "poetic" terms, art is for Klein a loving 
acknowledgement of the mother's creativity, and so contains an ethical 
dimension missing from Freud's account. 
Other object relations theorists 
Winnicott, the "Good-enough mother" and the 
"transitional object" 
As Klein's work became better known among British psychoanalysts, 
differences between her theories and those of "the Freuds" (her rela-
tionship with Anna Freud was particularly adversarial) came also to be 
more pronounced. In the 1930s, Klein and her advocates started to be 
referred to as "Klein and her school", and analysts began to identify 
themselves as followers of the object relations approach: most notably 
Joan Riviere, Wilfred Bion, Hanna Segal, Paula Heimann, Donald 
Winnicott, Harry Guntrip, Herbert Rosenfeld and W. R. D. Fairbairn. 
In this concluding section of this chapter, we shall address three of the 
most prominent object relations theorists - Winnicott, Bion, and 
Fairbairn - each of whom took this approach in a distinct direction. 
As we have seen thus far, during the reparative or depressive posi-
tion, the child's world "becomes whole'~ and the child more integrated, 
paradoxically, through the mourning of a loss. As Klein writes in 
"Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms)~ 
With the introjection of the complete object in about the 
second quarter of the first year marked steps in integration 
are made. This implies important changes in the relation 
to objects. The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no 
longer felt to be so widely separated, and the result is an 
increased fear of loss, states akin to mourning and a strong 
feeling of guilt, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be 
directed against the loved object. (Klein 1987: 189) 
The child's mourning signifies the fear of the loss of the mother at its 
own hands: that he may have destroyed all that it loved. Donald W. 
Winnicott refigures this discussion in terms more readily accessible to 
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the experience of those concerned with the primary care of children: 
presenting a kind of everyday phenomenology of the parent-child rela-
tionship. For Winnicott, what the child mourns is its own sense of 
omnipotence embodied in consoling action of the mother; and what it 
must learn to make do with is the "good-enough mother", or a mother 
who is not a simple extension of the child's will, and who sometimes 
frustrates its desire for instant gratification. Specifically, for Winnicott 
the «good-enough mother" is "one who makes active adaptation to the 
'C' d" lniant s nee s : 
The good-enough mother ... starts off with an almost com-
plete adaptation to her infant's needs, and as time proceeds she 
adapts less and less completely, gradually, according to the 
infant's growing ability to deal with her failure. 
(Winnicott 2005: 10) 
While Winnicott articulates the concept of the "good -enough mother» 
in different terms to Klein's discussion of reparation, it refers to the 
same stage and the same phenomenon, wherein the child learns to tol-
erate the mother's failures at complete gratification. The key difference 
is that Winnicott places the child within the context of the home rather 
than the clinic. Winnicott also emphasizes the mother's active (rather 
than merely spectral) part in the exchange of unconscious material 
between herself and the child. 
Alongside the good-enough mother, Winnicott theorizes the role of 
the «transitional object" as key to the child's development of autonomy, 
and reparation of the mother. A transitional object may be a doll, blan-
ket or soft toy that comes to serve a comforting function for the child in 
their negotiation of the difference between "me" and "not-me". It is 
an object most typically encountered during weaning, where the ideal 
mother is also making the transition to the "good-enough mother». 
The transitional object is thus invested with a degree of cathexis pro-
portionate to what the child feels is being withdrawn by its mother. 
Winnicott also designates as «transitional phenomena" activities such 
as babbling, idibsyncratic mannerisms, or the singing of familiar tunes 
in preparation for sleep. Both transitional objects and transitional 
phenomena refer, for Winnicott, to "an intermediate state between a 
baby's inability and his growing ability to recognize and accept reality" 
(Winnicott 2005: 3). 
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KEY POINT The transitional object 
"1. The infant assumes rights over the object, and we agree to this assump-
tion. Nevertheless, some abrogation of omnipotence is a feature from 
the start. 
2. The object is affectionately cuddled as well as excitedly loved and 
mutilated. 
[ ... ] 
4. It must survive instinctual loving, and also hating and, if it be a feature, 
pure aggression. 
5. Yet it must seem to the infant to give warmth, or to move, or to have 
texture, or to do something that seems to show it has vitality or reality 
of its own .. 
6. It [does not come] from without ... from the point of view of the baby. 
Neither does it come within; it is not a hallucination. 
7. Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected, so that in the course 
of years it becomes not so much forgotten as relegated to limbo ... It is 
not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning ... " (Winnicott 
2005: 5). 
The transitional object is thus a kind of quasi-animated object, which 
is both real and an extension of the child: invested with illusion, but not 
illusory. Like the toy within Klein's clinical play technique, the transi-
tional object takes on a role within the child's fantasy life as an object on 
to which anxiety can be projected, and from which comfort is sought. 
However, Winnicott's idea of the object here is a significant develop-
ment of Klein's understanding of the toy. The transitional object assists 
the child to come to terms with the reality principle - or the requirement 
that it defer immediate gratification - negotiating the fine line between 
absolute illusion, through which reality is disavowed (see Chapter 1), 
and the illusions required in order to develop relations with others at 
all. More precisely, the transitional object helps the child utilize illusion 
(or fantasy) in order to negotiate the processes in which the ideal 
mother becomes the "good-enough mother". The function of the tran-
sitional object is, however, perversely reflected in its "fate" (point 7 
above): for it helps the child achieve its detachment from the primary 
object, the mother. Yet, once it has done this, it "loses its meaning", to 
be replaced by "the whole cultural field": all the art, religion and cul-
tural pursuits that absorb us in adulthood. 
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Bion: a containment or modification of Klein's thought 
Wilfred Bion extends object relations theory in a different) but 
related, trajectory. Bion develops Klein's account of the psycho~ 
dynamics between mother and baby in terms of "containment» 
and "modification". In the best-case scenario, according to Bion, the 
mother receives and "contains" the child's projected anxiety, so she 
may return it to the child to be «reintrojected" in a "modified': more 
palatable, form. 
From the infant's point of view [the mother] should have 
taken into her, and thus experienced, the fear that the child 
was dying. It was this fear that the child could not contain. He 
strove to split it off together with the part of the personality in 
which it lay and project it into the mother. An understanding 
mother is able to experience the feeling of dread that this baby 
was striving to deal with by projective identification, and yet 
retain a balanced outlook. (Bion 1967: 104) 
This is the paradigm of good communication, according to Bion, 
and provides a model for the role that the analyst performs for the 
analysand. Communication originates in what he calls «realistic pro-
jective identification" (ibid.: 118), wherein the infant engages in a 
"behaviour reasonably calculated to arouse in the mother feelings of 
which the infant wishes to be rid" (ibid.: 114). A mother who, unlike 
Little Dick's, allows herself to feel, but is not overwhelmed by, the 
child's fear of self-annihilation is then able to reassure him that he is 
safe. Such exchange is deeply corporeal, as it is the mother's gaze, as well 
as her breast (a «thinking breast"), that plays this role of containing the 
child's anxiety: 
Normal development follows if the relationship between 
infant and breast permits the infant to project a feeling, say, 
that it is dying into the mother and to reintroject it after its 
sojourn in the breast has made it tolerable to the infant psyche. 
(Bion 1967: 116) 
In this manner, Bion inflects the act of breastfeeding with an inter-
subjective, ethical dimension. 
On the other hand, where the intersubjective process (of contain-
ment and modification) between mother and child fails to occur - in 
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situations where a mother is despondent or a child especially anxious -
the returned material appears to increase in volume and menace, such 
that the infant reintrojects "not a fear of dying made tolerable, but a 
nameless dread" (ibid.). 
KEY POINT T1Containment" and symbol formation 
That Bion designates this dread as J/namelessJ/ indicates that it is in some 
sense beyond symbolization. 
• The relation of "inside" and "outside" that the child masters by means of 
the mother's body is the basis of the binary opposition, and the first 
"system of difference" that the child recognizes as such. In it inheres the 
possibility of symbolization. 
• Language finds material support in this first, bodily relation with the 
mother, and words eventually come to stand in for the mother's body, as 
"objects" that mediate the subject's relation to his own anxiety or death 
drive. 
• When the system of exchange between the child and the mother breaks 
down, anxiety escapes the technique of management that this proto-
symbolization represents (thus producing "nameless dread"). 
For Bion (a la Klein), then, thinking is nothing other than a mechanism 
for dealing with frustration brought about by the obstacle of reality 
when, for instance, the breast is found to be empty or unavailable. 
Thought, far from in essence "abstract", is the body's means of negoti-
ating the demands and limitations placed upon it by other bodies, and 
by the self-regulation of the ego. Following Freud's contention in "Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning" (see Chapter 1), Bion states that a 
"capacity for tolerating frustration ... enables the psyche to develop 
thought as a means by which the frustration that is tolerated is itself 
made more tolerable": 
I shall limit the term "thought" to the mating of a pre-
conception with a frustration. The model I propose is that 
of an infant whose expectation of a breast is mated with a 
realization of no breast available for satisfaction ... If the 
capacity for toleration of frustration is sufficient the "no-
breast" inside becomes a thought and an apparatus for 
"thinking" it develops. (Bion 1967: 111-12) 
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W. R. D. Fairbairn: psychoanalysis between science and 
philosophy 
W. R. D. Fairbairn studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh before turning to medicine, and his particular 
deployments of object relations theory - especially his objections to 
Freud - reflect this philosophical background. Fairbairn radicalizes a 
more general object relations objection to Freud: one more significant 
than the question of, for instance, when the onset and resolution of the 
Oedipus complex occurs. Like Ricoeur or Habermas (see Chapter 8), 
Fairbairn's position is that Freud's libido theory is potentially inconsis-
tent: and in particular, that his commitment to an energetic model of 
the drive - derived from nineteenth-century neuroscience - is in 
conflict with the principle that it is the relation to objects (in Oedipus) 
that determines ego development. The former view, he argues, casts the 
drive as essentially aimless, dissipating itself by the most expedient 
means available (given any number of obstacles set in its path). By con-
trast, the latter, object relations, view of the drive is concerned with 
intentionality - and it is this intentionality towards an object that gen-
erates its "energy': rather than a reservoir, or quantum, of energy native 
to it. Fairbairn thus pitches a structuralist account of the libido against 
a vitalist account, and argues that anxiety issues from object relations 
rather than the reverse. 
What, then, are we to make of Fairbairn's disagreement with Freud? 
Should we put it down to a mere quibble between members of a closed 
fraternity? In fact, something more is at stake, both philosophically 
and for psychoanalysis. First (for psychoanalysis), Fairbairn's claim 
concerns the undue influence of a particular (and perhaps limited) 
scientific model over the entire corpus of psychoanalytic theory and 
practice. Freud's commitment to the energetic model of the drive is a 
factor both of his desire to maintain scientific legitimacy for his disci-
pline, and his own training in medicine. Yet, if this account is wrong, 
then it might have deleterious effects upon what psychoanalysis can do 
as a discipline. For Fairbairn, this model of the instincts not only 
stymied our understanding of the psyche and of hunlan being. It also 
ignored what were in his own time the most recent advances in science 
- advances that, according to Fairbairn, emphasize structure over 
underlying substance: ((atomic physics has revolutionized the scientific 
conception of the physical universe and has introduced the conception 
of dynamic structure" (Fairbairn 1994: 176). Secondly (and for philo-
sophy), Fairbairn held that Freud's two-tiered (or internally incoher-
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ent) explanation of the drive - as on the one hand energetic, and on 
the other determined by its relations to objects -leads us back to the 
mind-body dualism that psychoanalysis would ostensibly seek to 
avoid. Fairbairn held that while the energetic account of the drive 
explains how materiality - cells, "neurones" - motivates psychological 
behaviour, when it comes to explaining more complex social and cul-
tural phenomena, Freud shifts gear. Faced with these topics, Fairbairn 
argues, Freud recurs instead to what he calls a «structural" model of the 
self (organized in terms of the id, ego, superego; and catalysed by object 
relations, with reference to Oedipus). Is Freud's double concept of the 
drive, then, not equivalent to Descartes's pineal gland, as the inter-
mediary between two incommensurate "substances': body and soul? 
We might intervene at this point, however, that Fairbairn's exclusive 
"either/or" approach to the drive misses the evocatively dialectic register 
of Freud's theory. As we saw in Chapter 2, Freud's drive is not a simple 
impulse or instinct, but rather is both impulsional and sociolinguistic: 
it alters the body in relation to its environment. In response to Fair-
bairn, we might then ask, could not the drive be both object-oriented 
and pleasure-seeking? If we understand the structural and visceral 
elements of Freud's drive theory as working in tandem, rather than 
as opposed to one another, then perhaps we thereby find in Freud a 
solution to mind-body dualism instead of its reiteration. We shall 
return in Chapter 8 to consider the value of Freud's energetic account 
of the drive. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whom we will 
address in Chapter 5, also read Freud's theory of drives in structural 
terms. It is to Lacan's contribution to understanding psychoanalysis 
that we now turn. 
Summary 
• Melanie Klein adapted Freud's clinical methodology of free asso-
ciation for children, using rudimentary toys rather than words as 
units of meaning. This approach she called the play technique. 
• Drawing on Freud's later, "death drive" hypothesis, Klein's 
account of early mental life emphasizes the domination of sadis-
tic impulses, conceived as defences against discomfort or pain. 
• During the earliest, schizoid, position, the infant manages aggres-
sion and anxiety by projecting these into the fantasmatic "bad" 
underperforming breast, and bolsters itself by appropriating the 
"goodness" of the nourishing breast. The exchange of psychic 
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energy between the child and its objects in fantasy at this stage, 
whether defensive or appropriative, is characteristically violent. 
• When the child realizes that the good and bad mother are one 
and the same "object" (the depressive position), guilt replaces 
aggression, and diverts instinctual energy to the task of repairing 
the loved object (and the parts of the self associated with it). 
• The depressive position marks the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex, and the complete integration of the superego. It also 
signals the ability to tolerate anxiety and frustration rather than 
projecting it on to the object, and to feel ambivalence regarding 
the loved one. When the individual is intolerant of anxiety and 
loss (as in the case of Little Dick), difficulties in thinking and 
symbol formation arise. . 
• The Oedipus complex culminates far earlier according to Klein 
than other Freudians allow - in the first two years oflife. 
• Creativity and artistry involve, according to object relations the-
ory, the attempt to recuperate the loved object to the self - it is 
thus a return to the depressive position, and an act of mourning. 
• Donald W. Winnicott develops the concept of the "transitional 
object", which assists the child in negotiating the separation from 
the loved object (a role that is eventually played by culture in 
general). He also introduces the notion of the "good-enough 
mother": a mother who will lovingly apply to, yet sometimes 
frustrate, the child's desire for instant gratification - thus prepar-
ing it for independence. 
• Wilfred Bion theorizes the manner in which the mother "con-
tains" and ('modifies" the infant's mortal fear, returning his 
projected material back to him in a more palatable form. This 
process lays the groundwork for communication in general. 
• W. R. D. Fairbairn emphasizes the potential inconsistency of 
Freud's approaches, favouring the topographical (interpretive) 
over the dynamic (biological) account of the psyche. According 
to Fairbairn, the former approach is elaborated and developed 
by object relations theory. Furthermore, the object relations 
approach avoids mind-body dualism, whereas, Fairbairn claims, 
Freud's energetic account of the drive revisits it in psychoanalyt-
ical terms. 
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Jacques Lacan: rereading Freud to the letter 
Introducing Lacan's return to the meaning of Freud 
Few twentieth-century thinkers have exerted such far-reaching influ-
ence on intellectual life as Jacques Lacan (1901-81). Lacan's interven-
tion changed the face of the psychoanalytic movement internationally. 
Lacan's seminars in the 1950s and 1960s were one of the formative 
environments of the poststructuralist ideas that dominated French 
intellectual life in subsequent decades. Yet Lacan's writings are notori-
ously difficult. As we shall see in Chapter 7 (when we look at Mulvey's 
reading of "the gaze"), many of the secondary presentations distort 
Lacan's ideas, or share the originars esoteric character. In this chapter, 
we shall provide as clear an understanding as we can of Lacan's central 
ideas. We take as our cue the way Lacan suggests we should read his 
work: as a "return to the meaning of Freud') (Lacan 2006: 415). 
Three points need emphasizing from the start. 
First, Lacan proposed a return to the meaning of Freud in the 1950s. 
Implicit in the idea that we should need to return to this meaning is 
Lacan's strong criticism of the way psychoanalysis had developed in the 
previous decades. Although Lacan's relationship with the object rela-
tions theorists (Chapter 4) is nuanced, he is uncompromisingly critical 
of the "ego psychology" of figures such as Hartmann and Loewenstein 
(who analysed Lacan), predominant in the United States by the 1950s. 
For reasons we shall see, Lacan is particularly critical of the ego psy-
chologists' idea that psychoanalysis should strengthen analysands' 
egos, on the model of the ego of the psychoanalyst. One consequence 
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of this reconception of psychoanalysis, Lacan argues, is that Freud's 
discovery of the unconscious has been repressed in the history of 
psychoanalysis. This means that psychoanalysis itself needs to be 
(re-) analysed. 
Secondly, Lacan adopts Freud's aspiration that psychoanalysis 
should keep abreast of the most advanced sciences of the day. Lacan 
brings to his rereading of Freud resources taken from developments in 
the human sciences that took place after Freud was writing his ground-
breaking psychoanalytic texts. Lacan's interpretation of Freud in the 
1950s is centrally indebted to resources taken from the structuralist lin-
guistics developed by Saussure and Jakobsen (especially "The Instance 
of the Letter in the Unconscious", Lacan 2006: 493-528; and «The 
Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis", ibid.: 237-322), and 
its application in anthropology by Lacan's friend, Claude Levi-Strauss. 
However, Lacan also draws on ideas from disciplines such as ethology, 
game theory and mathematics (especially "The Function and Field of 
Speech"), not to mention his debts to the philosophers Sartre, Kojeve, 
Heidegger, Hegel, Kant, Aquinas, Augustine and Plato. 
Thirdly, by bringing these resources to the "Freudian field", Lacan 
rereads Freud the way psychoanalysis suggests we ought to read all pro-
ductions of the human psyche. According to Lacan, Freud thought 
beyond his means, never "catching up" theoretically to what he had 
stumbled upon in the clinic, and by dint of his speculative acumen. 
Lacan argues that it is only in the light of the subsequent developments 
in the human sciences that the resources have become available to 
"formalize" the field of investigation Freud opened up into the un-
conscious and its effects on human life (Lacan 2006: 267,284-5). 
This third point is vital to understanding Lacan's contribution to the 
history of psychoanalysis. Lacan's return to Freud's meaning is neither 
uncritical nor wholly apologetic. Lacan instead attempts to "work 
through" symptomatic enigmas in Freud's metapsychology, using 
structuralism and resources from the other disciplines mentioned 
above. 
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KEY POINT Symptomatic points in Freud to which Lacan I1returns" 
• Freud at different points in his text presents the ego as both the subjective 
agency of reason and sanity, and a narcissistic love-object. This later 
account of the ego as love-object sees the strengthen'lng of the ego not 
as the key to mental health, as ego psychology was to maintain, but at the 
heart of psychotic megalomania. 
understanding psychoanalysis 
• Freud argues that the human sexual drives are "de-centred" from the 
natural cycle of the seasons, or from any direct link to one type of object 
(Chapter 2). How is this possible? 
• Freud tells us that, in the event of a psychical trauma, the representatives 
of repressed drives are :'fixated", so the person develops a permanent 
tendency to repeat infantile forms of sexual activity in later life. How can 
the unconscious be a "timeless" memory system, given the nature of the 
"wetware" (the brain) it is housed in? 
• How, most broadly of all, can we synthesize the biological account of the 
mind we saw in Chapter 1 and Freud's interpretive procedure of psycho-
analysis, his case studies, and in The Interpretation of Dreams, Jokes and 
Their Relations to the Unconscious, and The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Ufe? 
At the basis of Lac an's return to the meaning of Freud is an emphasis 
on how psychoanalysis is a talking cure: one whose efficacy concerns 
the "agency" of language on the human psyche. The pivotal break-
through of Breuer and Freud, Lacan emphasized, is that the psychoso-
matic symptoms of neurotics are manifestations of desire which repeat 
in so far as they have not been "symbolized" by individuals. When 
analysands, through free association and analytic interpretations, do 
remember the cause of these symptoms, this linguistic recognition of 
the symptoms' causes affects the symptoms. More specifically, the 
desire "caught up" in the symptoms is evidently satisfied (Freud says 
"abreacted"). This elementary clinical datum, Lacan reasons - adapt-
ing Hegel's philosophical account of human desire as the desire for 
recognition - can mean only that the analysand's desire must have been 
shaped by their linguistic experiences, and their desire for recognition, 
from the start (e.g. Lacan 2006: 279). 
What psychoanalysis reveals to us, Lacan contends, is that human 
beings are the "animals captured and tortured by language" (Lacan 
1993: 243). The Freudian unconscious, he says, far from being a 
swirling chaos of primal drives, is structured like a language, "a chain 
of signifiers that repeats and insists somewhere" (Lacan 2006: 799). 
Remember from Chapter 3 how Freud, reflecting on parapraxes (such 
as his forgetting "Signorelli") and on dreams as distorted, censored 
((texts': developed his topographical account of the psyche. Lacan 
draws on structuralist linguistics to reformulate these ideas, arguing 
that the unconscious comprises signifiers (as we shall see, words, letters, 
also images) "at large" - or cut loose from their ordinary meanings. 
If certain traumatic things are permanently "remembered" in the 
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unconscious, it is because they become "caught in the gullet of the· 
signifiee': maintained as symptomatic points in a larger system oflin~ 
guistic Vorstellungen which a person carries with them from the time 
they learn their "mother tongue" to the grave. The unconscious, for 
Lacan, is what we might call a private language, had Wittgenstein not 
argued the impossibility of such a thing. Just as Freud's "Signorelli'} 
case shows how the unconscious ccfiles" the representatives of the drives 
in irrational ways inaccessible except by the individuars own free asso-
ciations (including according to the coincidental sounds of words and 
personal associations), just so Lacan argues that the unconscious con-
tains irrationally connected Vorstellungen whose insistence only ceases 
when they are symbolized before an other (the analyst) in the psycho-
analytic clinic. 
With these framing anticipations in place, we turn to Lacan's 
metapsychology in detail. 
I is an other: from Freud to Lacan 
The young Lacan was trained as a medical psychiatrist. Whereas 
Freud began his psychoanalytic career analysing hysterics, Lacan's early 
clinical and theoretical work was based on the clinic of the psychoses. 
Importantly, Freud's own confrontation with the psychoses after 1910 
(the year of "The Schreber Case") was pivotal in his reconsideration 
of the nature of the ego, and eventually the later metapsychology 
of the superego and death drive. As Freud's essay "Some Neurotic 
Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" (JPH) - which 
Lacan translated in the early 1930s - highlights, the reason concerns 
Freud's discovery through the clinic of the psychoses of the potentially 
regressive role of the ego and its identifications in cases of paranoia. 
KEY POINT Some mechanisms Freud sees involved injea/ousyand 
paranoia 
Freud's "Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homo-
sexuality" analyses a series of progressively more severe forms of mental 
disturbance: 
• Normal jealousy, the blow struck at a person's ego when they become 
aware, correctly, that their beloved can desire someone else. 
• Projected jealousy, where a person accuses their partner of infidelity, 
whether fairly or falsely, in this way disavowing their own desire for 
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infidelity. Freud gives the example of a man who has an affair, and (10 and 
behold!) from this time starts suspecting his wife of infidelity at every turn. 
In such cases, Freud argues, the person's disavowed wish is projected on 
to their partner. In other words, I (the jealous one) identify with my partner 
and so "truly" see my desire operating in her - "you are unfaithfut not I!" 
• Delusional jealousy: Freud argues that, in cases of pathological jealousy, 
what is at stake is an unconscious desire for homosexual infidelity. By way 
of projective identification with the other, this becomes: "/ do not love 
him,you love him", matched by the same paranoid certainty that sees psy-
chotics such as Judge Schreber (see below) "know"that God, the CIA, ASIO 
and 50 on are after him. The psychotic can be so certain that others love 
him (in the case of erotomania) or hate him (in paranoia) because the 
wishes in question truly do exist, but in the individual, not in the other with 
whom they identify. 
Freud's account of the role of regressive identification in jealousy 
and paranoia confirms a finding he elsewhere talks of under the head-
ing "hysterical identification" (ID: 149-51). This is the strange discov-
ery that people seemingly structure who, what and how they desire by 
way of their identifications with others. In a famous case from The 
Interpretation of Dreams, for example, Freud claims to show how the 
apparently disappointing dream of a "witty butcher's wife" - about 
being unable to hold a dinner party (because she had only smoked 
salmon in her cupboard) - turns out to have been fulfilling her hus-
band's wish not to get plump. Then there was her own, rather nasty 
wish that her slim friend (who loved smoked salmon) should not get 
any plumper. The rationale of this jealous wish again concerned the 
desire of her husband, since her husband (who always spoke well of this 
girlfriend) usually only desired plumper women (ID: 146-9). 
In Lacan's early writings on "the imaginary': he considers how this 
strange phenomenon of "desiring through others" could be possible. 
Lacan's famous 1936/49 article "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
In draws on observations on the behaviour of infants aged between 6 
and 18 months. Before this time, as Freud and Klein agree, infants are 
unable psychologically to distinguish what is "inside" and "outside" 
their own bodies. Nor have they mastered their manifold "component 
drives': They are wholly dependent (for a length of time unique in the 
animal kingdom) on their first nurturers. In Lacan's formulation, their 
self-experience is rather like those "bodies in bits and pieces" pictured 
in Hieronymus Bosch's disturbing canvasses (Lacan 2006: 96-7, 
105), Nevertheless, between 6 and 18 months) babies become able to 
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recognize their own mirror image. Nor is this a dispassionate experi-
ence. It brings the child great pleasure, as their repeated, "experimen-
tal" movements in front of the mirror attest (ibid.: 93-4). For Lacan, 
we can only explain this CCjubilation", (again) unusual in the entire 
animal kingdom, as testimony to how the child gains in front of the 
mirror its first ((anticipation" of itself as a unified, separate "I" or ego 
(ibid.: 97,112-13). 
The implication, as Lacan examines it, is that we should not be sur-
prised at Freud's accounts of "hysterical identification" or delusional 
jealousy. The human ego is an other, to invoke the poet Rimbaud, based 
on an "image-inary" mapping of the body. Lacan's account of the ima-
ginary accordingly echoes Freud's second conception of the ego - inti-
mated in Freud's recourse to Narcissus' mythical fascination with his 
mirrored image in the waters of the fountain. The formative role of a 
child>s identification with the "images" it perceives in the mirror, and of 
the others among whom it grows up, is evident in the phenomena 
of "infantile transitivism", wherein one infant hit by another (for 
example) proclaims: "I hit himl ': and vice versa (Lacan 2006: 112). It is 
evident also in our abiding superegoic capacity to think of ourselves 
in the second person, usually harshly - "What are you saying now? 
They'll never like you, if you act like thae', and so on. 
This imaginary make-up of our identity, Lacan argues, also under-
lies the irremovable component of jealousy and aggression in human 
behaviour. As we saw in Chapter 2, in Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud 
stressed the primordial ambivalence of children towards their love-
objects: in the oral phase, to love is to devour; in the anal phase, it is to 
master; in the Oedipus complex, it is to hate the father one also loves. 
Lacan's theory of the imaginary reframes these Freudian insights on a 
more systematic basis. On the one hand, phenomena such as "follow-
ing the fashion" reflect that human desire, framed in the imaginary, is 
the desire of the other from the ground up. We should not be surprised 
when for instance, children cease to desire something they ardently 
wished for at the same moment their sibling loses interest in it. It was 
their identification with this sibling that shaped their desire. On the 
other hand, and more enigmatically, Lacan's conception of the imagin-
ary underlies his adaptation of Freud's later hypothesis of a primary 
masochism in human beings (EPM). Given that young infants shape 
their early identifications around fixed images of other(s), when 
the child's bodily drives subsequently change, this "ideal ego" will be 
rigidly unable to accommodate these new somatic demands. Instead, as 
we saw in Freud's account of repression (Chapter 1), such drives will be 
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experienced as alien threats. This is what for Lacan explains the pre-
eminence in dream imagery of the ego as a beleaguered camp or 
fortress (Lacan 2006: 97). It also explains children's invariant compen-
satory delight, noted by Klein, in the "mutilation) dismemberment, 
dislocation, evisceration, devouring, [and] bursting open" of their 
playthings (ibid.: 104). 
"1'11 be what she's having": rethinking Oedipus 
Lacan's claim that the ego is an other constituted by the infant's imagi-
nary identifications has remarkable implications for Freud's central 
doctrine of the Oedipus complex. Lacan's position is that, because of 
the unusually long period of infantile dependence on others, human 
beings' biological needs become inseparable from their demand to be 
recognized and loved by others. Events as apparently "natural" as toilet 
training are experienced by the child as episodes in the "history" of its 
relations with its parents - as expressive of its identification as a "good 
boy» or (say) revenge for some imaginary grievance (Lacan 2006: 
261-2). Lacan agrees with Freud contra Klein that the Oedipus com-
plex arises only in the fourth to sixth years of this developmental 
drama. However, given his account of the imaginary configuration of 
human desire, Lacan's understanding of the Oedipus complex rejects 
Freud's emphasis on the biological organ of the penis - an emphasis 
that famously compromised Freud's ability to ascertain what women 
want (see Chapter 6). Lacan talks instead of "the phallus". What "the 
phallus" names in Lacanian theory is what the child imagines its first 
provider and object of identification, the (m)other, desires (Lacan 
2006: 690-93). Like Klein, that is, Lacan accepts the primary impor-
tance of the mother in the early development of the child. But for 
Lacan, it is primarily the desire of the mother as imagined by the child 
that is decisive, and that becomes the decisive stake in the child's 
Oedipal rivalry with its father. 
KEY POINT Lacon's rethinking of the Oedipus complex, around the 
desire of the (m)other 
• In their first years, Lacan contends, infants of either sex devote themselves 
to fathoming what the mother wants: che voui?The object of infants' first 
researches is not to discover where babies come from (Freud) or to make 
reparations to the mother (Klein). It is to tl)' to make themselves the 
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phallus for the mother. The child wants to be this singular, fully satisfying 
Thing or love-object. 
• In the infant's fifth or sixth year, however, thefatherwill normally intervene 
in a waythatthwarts this aspiration. The Oedipal child perceives the father 
as its imaginary rivaL on to whom it projects its hostile wishes. Lacan 
accordingly likens the father-child relation at this point (at least as it is per-
ceived by the child) to the famous "struggle to the death for pure recog-
nition" dramatized in Hegel's Phenomen%gyofSpirit. 
• In this struggle for the desire of the mother, the child should cede to the 
father. The mother should cease to entertain the child's wish to be her 
Thing. (Lacan sometimes talks of this as the "castration of the mother".) 
The ensuing renunciation of the aspiration to be the phallic Thing for the 
mother, not any physical event or its imagined threat, is what Lacan more 
generally calls "castration". 
On the basis of his critique of Freud's account of the Oedipus com-
plex, Lacan at one point goes so far as to suggest that the Oedipus 
complex was Freud's "dream". What Lacan agrees with Freud about is 
that the child's acceptance of its "castration" marks the decisive 
moment in its libidinal education. Everything turns in this drama, 
Lacan adds, on how the child understands the "castration" of its infan-
tile wish to be the phallus for the mother. The decisive issue is whether 
this renunciation is experienced as a violent, illegitimate humiliation 
by the imaginary father-rival or whether, as in Hegel's Phenomenology, 
its resolution involves the founding of a pact between the parties. If the 
castration complex is to normalize the child, Lacan argues, the child 
must "see" that what orders the desire of the mother is not any visible 
(imaginary) feature of the father - say, his obviously better endow-
ments, ability to shout louder, beat the child and so on. The child must 
instead see that the "whims" of the mother are themselves ordered by a 
law that exceeds and tames them. Like Kleinian object relations, that is 
to say, Lacan's account of the imaginary underscores how the first years 
of life, wherein the infanfs desire is nearly wholly dependent on the 
desire of the mother, are not any kind of paradise. Unsure of the bound-
aries between itself and the other, and of the destructive power of its 
aggressive wishes, if its infantile dependence on the mother is not 
"mediated" by the intervention of the law, the individual will remain 
subject to fantasies of the unpredictable omniscience of the devouring 
(m)other, therefore incapable of normal sexual desire (Lacan 2006: 
814). 
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In order to clarify the stakes in the dissolution of the Oedipus com-
plex, Lacan introduces a key distinction, not in Freud, between the 
imaginary, the real and the symbolic father: 
• The imaginary father is the father as perceived by the Oedipal 
child. The child projects all his sexual jealousy on to the ima-
ginary father, and imagines and fears the father feels such 
unchecked, castrating hostility toward him. 
• The "real father" in Lacan's early seminars is the real individual 
who bears the freight of the child's imaginary hostility, and is 
asked to intervene as the symbolic father. 
• The symbolic father, decisively, is the bearer of a {(structural func-
tion" which mayor may not come into being for the child. 
Everything depends on how the father's words are received by the 
mother. Problems will ensue if, when the father speaks, ((he may 
as well be whistling': as Lacan puts things concerning the rela-
tions between Little Hans' mother and father. As in Hans' case, 
in the absence of the law-giving words of the father, nothing can 
check the child's aggressive imaginary fantasies about the real 
father (and the omniscience of the mother), and phobia (or 
worse) will ens\le. The symbolic father acts through his words 
("symbols"), which ideally "break open" the child's dyadic rela-
tion with the mother, carrying the force of the social law for her, 
and thereby for the child. 
The law mediating the child's dyadic relation with the mother is what 
Lacan dubs the ('name of the father", Hthe paternal function" or 
[(metaphor': In French, le nom du pere invokes a homonymy between 
nom (name) and the non! the symbolic father's intervention "says" to 
the child's incestuous wishes concerning the mother. When the father 
intervenes as the symbolic father, he does so less as a living, enjoying 
individual than as the delegate of a set of social conventions respected 
by the mother. The symbolic father is always a dead father, Lacan thus 
says (e.g. Lacan 2006: 812) -expanding on a motif in Freud's analysis of 
the Ratman (and Dostoevsky), and in Freud's "Totem and Taboo" (see 
Chapter 7). The body of social convention the father symbolically 
represents, Lacan in turn calls the "big Other" of the child's socio-
linguistic community - to distinguish it from the «little-o others" 
with whom the subject is caught up in the aggressive tete-it-tetes of its 
imaginary identifications. 
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So the child's acceptance of the sovereignty of the impartial law 
borne by the father over the whims of the mother leads it out of its 
ambivalent attempts to be what Freud jokingly called "His Majesty 
the Baby" (ON: 91). All such incestuous wishes are henceforward 
repressed by force of social law. If things go well, as Lacan puts it in his 
unpublished "Seminar V", the child will go away with "title deeds in 
its pocket" that guarantee that, when the time comes (and if it plays by 
the rules), it can have a substitute for its first "lost" love-object. What 
occurs with the acceptance of one's symbolic castration, Lacan argues, 
is that the individual's imaginary identifications (or "ideal ego(sY') 
have been supplemented by an identification of an entirely different 
order: what Lacan calls a symbolic identification with an "ego ideal". 
This is an identification with something that cannot be seen, touched, 
devoured or mastered in the ways the child has hitherto deployed to 
impose itself on its world, namely, the words, norms and conventions 
of its society. Symbolic identification is always identification with a 
rule-governed way of organizing the social world, within which the 
subject can take on its various imaginary identifications and play out 
its rivalries. For example, the hysterical-vulnerable female identifies at 
a symbolic level with the patriarchal way of structuring social relations 
between sexes. Outside of this order, her imaginary identification as a 
"cute", vulnerable female in need of male protection makes no sense. 
Opening the purloined letter: Lacan's sructuralist 
anthropology 
With Lacanian psychoanalysis, the resolution of the Oedipus complex 
thus becomes a structural operation that should elevate the child's 
identifications to a different, symbolic level. In place of its incestuous 
desires, repressed by law, one identifies with a symbolic ideal and way 
of arranging social relations "in the name of which" one defers 
gratifications of one's wishes. In patronymic societies, the child at this 
point ceases to see himself as "little Johnnie: "Mommy's special little 
guy': and to understand that he is "John Winston': If Freud pointed to 
the singularity of sexuality among the human drives, and stressed how 
it needs to be educated in the earliest years of our lives, Lacan specifies 
that human sexuality is uniquely closely associated among the drives 
with the dimension of social law. One's surname does not after all usu-
ally have a say in what you can eat. What having a "surname" or "name 
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of the father" means is that one can absolutely not have sexual relations 
with anyone sharing that surname no matter how attractive they might 
be, and so on - except in the statistically exceptional, and potentially 
psychologically fraught, case wherein one meets an unrelated person 
with the same surname. To evoke another of Freud's essays, the child 
has now passed beyond the "family romance" to become part of the 
wider, social system of kinship exchange. In this system, the family 
"Winston" is only one amidst many others, from among whom the 
person must choose the objects of its desire. 
So since for Lacan human desire is the desire of the (m)other, which 
ought to be mediated by the law-bearing words of the "paternal func-
tion': so for Lacan human beings' desire is caught up in the social 
imperatives borne by the "mother tongue" of their society. Lacan picks 
up on certain cues within Freud's essays (notably those on the 
"Psychology of Love" (STC; UTD) to emphasize the "dialectical" con-
stitution of human desire in relation to the prohibitions oflaw. We not 
only desire illicit things despite the law, Lacan agrees with Saint Paul. It 
is because the law prohibits them that they take on such a "fatal attrac-
tion" for us (Lacan 1992: 83-4). In colloquial terms, there is always 
something "sexy" about transgression per se for human beings that 
haunts our unconscious fantasies. In "On Narcissism" and his essays on 
"The Psychology of Love" (see Chapter 2), Freud argued that with the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex, the affectionate "current" of the 
boy's love for his mother is "cut" from its incestuous-sexual current. 
Lacan rejoins that, from this point on, the incestuous-illicit current 
of the child's desire will be separated from its conscious demand for 
affection (Lacan 2006: 691). Unconscious desire (not "demand") will 
now insinuate itself "between the lines" of what is said in polite con-
versation, in symptoms, slips and jokes, and the double entendres upon 
which these and dream condensations play. 
KEY POI NT IEXCU RSUS Jouissance, the Real, the objet petit a, 
and fantasy 
• The child's identification with the symbolic other "cuts" it from the 
object of its incestuous wishes. Lacan argues that, because this occurs, 
individuals are prey to fantasies about the things and acts we retrospect-
ively suppose are prohibited by the symbolic law. Lacan calls the type 
of illicit enjoyment we suppose ourselves to have lost jouissance (see 
Chapter 2). 
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• The Lacanian "Real" involves the content of these fantasies concerning 
what is "before the law". The Real is what "cannot be symbolized", instead 
haunting and interrupting the sense the subject makes in symptoms, slips 
and other excursuses into ordered social discourse. 
• The Lacanian formula for the fundamental structure of fantasy is $ (the 
subject) <> a. The "a" here is the famous "objet petit a" Lacan introduces 
after 1958. The objet a is no normal thing. It is that "X-factor" that causes a 
person to desire another. Lacan models it on the secret treasures (aga/-
mota) the love-sick Alcibiades "sees" in Socrates in Plato's Symposium (see 
Chapter 8). The objet a is the principal exemplar of what Lacan calls the 
Real: an object "even better than the real things" we ordinarily encounter, 
because the subject sees in it the mnemic trace of its fantasized, lostjouis-
sance. 
• Unconscious fantasy has a compensatory function. It allows the subject to 
cope with its castration by sustaining the false idea that it once knew a 
fully satisfying relationship with another (the mother) that was taken from 
it, and so can be regained. Predominant in the obsessional's fantasy lifer 
for instance, is the figure of the ferocious, "anal" father (modelled on the 
imaginary Oedipal father) who took its lostjouissonce. Predominant in the 
fantasies of hysterics (like Alcibiades) is the fantasy of one real man who 
knows the truth of what women want, and - as such - the idea of a true 
woman capable of resolving the enigma of desire. 
• Lacan's formula for the fantasy, $oa, aligns the subject ($) with the objet 
petit a. The subject is "barred": there is a line through the "5" to indicate 
that the individual is subject to law, which "strikes out" its direct access to 
jouissance. That the "a" is aligned with the subject (<» indicates that the 
Real object is something that is relative to each individual: it reflects the 
implication of their desire in the way they experience the world. The objet 
a that causes an individual's desire only becomes so esteemed for them 
because of the place it holds in their unconscious fantasy, cobbled 
together out of the history of their development. 
• The fantasy is finally a lure that preserves the subject as the passive object 
of his fate, rather than a subject who takes on responsibility, Oedipus-like, 
for the contingent events that make up its history. In the Wolfman's primal 
fantasy, for example (see Chapter 3), the uncanny gaze of the wolves con-
ceals from the Wolfman his own desire to actively see the primal thing. 
• Fantasy conceals from us "the non~existence of the other": the fact that 
the symbolic order with which we have identified, and its authoritative 
others, are themselves finite. The other does not have the real thing we 
(fantasmatically) "lost". Love, neuroses and the gUilt central to the sub-
ject's superego are hence for Lacanians different ways of preserving 
the other against this recognition. 
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So Lacan does not preach good news to the unconscious fantasy 
that «the grass is always greener" on the other side of the law. Oedipus, 
the man who satisfies all repressed human wishes, strikes out his eyes. 
Bringing his reframing of Freud's notion of the castration complex 
together with the structuralist anthropology of Levi-Strauss, Lacan's 
principal emphasis is instead on how far-reaching the effects of the 
symbolic order of law and language are upon human experience. 
('Alienated" by our imaginary identifications with others, Lacan argues, 
we are irrevocably "separated" from the Real of jouissance when we 
take on a name in the symbolic order. Indeed, despite our abiding 
imaginary misrecognitions, Lacan argues that the place we occupy in 
the symbolic order determines how we stand towards (what people 
usually take to be) the most important or satisfying things (Lacan 2006: 
258). 
Lacan's reading of Edgar Allen Poe's story «(The Purloined Letter" 
illustrates well this point concerning ((separation". The story centres 
around a stolen letter, whose secret contents symbolize for Lacan the 
unconscious "letters" of our repressed wishes. There arc two key scenes 
in the story, as Lacan reads it (Lacan 2006: 12). The first is in the queen's 
chambers. A conniving minister «purloins" (steals) a letter of the 
queen's from right before her eyes, hoping to use the threat of its dis-
closure as a way to bribe her. He can do this because, looking around in 
good imaginary fashion, he sees how the queen is very anxious that the 
king, also present, should not have his attention drawn to the letter. 
The second key scene takes place in the home of our minister, once the 
police have finished their vain and thorough search for the letter. 
Lacan's emphasis is on how the same symbolic matrix our minister so 
successfully exploited in the queen's chambers is repeated in this sec-
ond scene - but now, decisively, he has a different place in the game (see 
Figure 5.1). 
Nothing about the minister's visible or other imaginary qualities has 
changed between the first and second scenes. Moreover, he now has the 
illicit thing he is banking on. Yet, because he has it, he can do nothing 
to stop our hero Dupin, when he sees the letter "hidden" in plain sight 
above the fireplace, from taking it from him. Like the queen in the first 
scene, to make a fuss would be to alert the law (the police who are pre-
sent), and in this way to confess his guilt. What the strange case of the 
purloined letter illustrates for Lacan in this way is that, whatever we 
might imagine about the spoils of social power (or illicit jouissance, 
embodied in the story by the stolen letter), it too is de-centred in the 
symbolic order - power and the ability to "win friends and influence 
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A. Thelaw= 
power without knowledge 
(of the letter) 
(1) the king (2) the police 
C. Knowledge and power 
(1) the minister (2) Dupin 
B. Possession of the letter = 
knowledge without power 
(to act to prevent the thief) 
(1) the queen (2) the minister 
D. The letter (content 
unknown) 
Figure 5.1 The social structure of the "purloined letter" (see Lacan 2006: 15) 
Note: (1) is the scene in the queen's chambers and (2) is the scene in the 
minister's rooms. 
people" in social situations are shaped by the places we hold in the 
social structures we inhabit. 
To be castrated, for Lacan, means to be subject to a social structure 
which determines how one stands towards jouissance. In the symbolic 
order, in fact, to act violently to "get to the point" is generally a sign of 
weakness. It signifies to others that you had to use violence, and that 
your words have failed to resolve the issue. As animals who are "cap-
tured and tortured by language'~ the best things in human life indeed 
are not free, Lacan argues. We can attain them only indirectly, if at all, 
by playing by the rules of the phallic/symbolic order, "climbing up" 
what he calls "the inverse scale of the Law of desire" (Lacan 2006: 827). 
To be loved, for instance, one should not be too abject in one's demand 
for love. Equally, to be respected, one should not be too obviously 
interested in achieving exactly this end - instead, one must act as the 
symbolic representative of a cause, or produce works of culture "to 
make a name for oneself". 
On negation: Lacan's "linguisterie" 
Lacan's most apparent departure from Freud is the importance he 
accords to developing a psychoanalytic "philosophy of language" after 
1953. This follows from his founding commitment to psychoanalysis as 
the clinical practice of the talking cure. Yet Lacan's conception of lan-
guage is the result of his developing certain "currents" in Freud's texts 
in light of resources taken from structuralist linguistics, as founded by 
116 understanding psychoanalysis 
Ferdinand de Saussure and developed by people such as Jakobsen and 
Benveniste. 
KEY POI NT What is structuralist linguistics? 
For Saussure, every sign (words, or any material thing, such as letters, used to 
communicate) has two components, and a "referent" in the real world: 
• The first is the "signifier", like the words of the English language. Our exam-
ple can be the word "dog" as written here, or spoken. 
• The second is the "signified": the concepts these signifiers "d-o-g" taken 
together invoke. Our word "dog" calls to mind the concept of what a dog 
is: say, "a canine, four-legged mammal known for its friendliness to 
humans". 
• The referents of the signifier "dogll will be the real canine animals out 
there. 
Why "structuralism? 
The elementary insight of structuralism is that there can never be just one 
signifier or one signified. One sign could not "make sense" or pick out any-
thing specific in the external world. Each sign is instead part of a larger struc-
ture. The proof is that: 
• Different languages have different IIsignifiers" for the same signified: 
"Hundll in German, "chien" in French, "dog ll in English, and so on. 
• Different cultures have concepts with different semantic "boundaries": 
the English-language concept of a river, for example, covers the extension 
of the French concepts of a riviere.(a waterway that runs to the sea), and a 
fleuve (a waterway that does not). Structuralism emphasizes how signifiers 
hence signify only in contrast and combination with other signifiers in a 
linguistic system or "structure" (such as English or French). They do so on 
the basis of their differences from other signifiers in the structure Cd-o-g" 
is not "f-o-gll or "d-a-g" or "d-o-c", which signify different concepts). Equally, 
each of the individual "signineds" that a culture develops to understand 
the world gets its "ostensive boundaries" through its differential relations 
to the culture's other signifieds. 
• Our natural language's structure is something we learn from others early 
in our lives. Far from able to "mean whatever we choose", the meanings of 
our wishes are shaped and can only be expressed by way of this linguistic 
structure, which preceded us and will outlast us. 
Individual signs, Saussure argued, are "unmotivated" by their refer-
ents in the natural world. The reality of this canine animal here does 
not demand that I call it either ((un chien" or "a dog". Either will do in 
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different places around the world, so long as everyone else in each soci~ 
ety agrees on the word to use, and this signifier is not already in Use in 
each language's structure to signify something else. Saussure's descrip .. 
tion of the sign as unmotivated by its referents is vital to the way Lacan 
brings Freudian psychoanalysis to bear upon structuralist linguistics., 
The key to why this is so can be shown by considering in Lacanian light: 
Freud's remarkable short paper "On Negation" (see Lacan 1988a': 
" 52-61,289-98), which we saw Melanie Klein put to a different purpose 
in Chapter 4. 
Freud argues in "On Negation" that the ability (which has puzzled 
philosophers since Parmenides) to speak about things that do not exist 
or are not this or that, is a development from earlier, more primitive 
ways of our rejecting things in the world. We recall that for Freud, the 
infant "introjects" what gives it pleasure, and "projects" what gives it 
pain. This primitive operation, Freud argues, must lie at the origins of 
linguistic judgements concerning the predicates or features of things, 
especially those concerning whether we think they are good or bad 
objects. Every satisfaction the infant achieves, we also recall, is for 
Freud modelled on the initial satisfactions that left a "good" mnemic 
trace in the baby's mind. On this basis, Freud argues that the infanfs 
ability to use what philosophers call the "existential predicate" (to say 
of things that "it is the case") develops from the more primitive wish-
fulfilling process of testing whether external things match its primal, 
good "mnem". The earliest wish motivating judgements of existence 
(such as what Lacan discerns beneath the structure of fantasy ($<>a)) 
is thus to refind the first (lost) Thing. Our ability to make judgements 
of negation, by contrast to affirmative judgements, hence presupposes 
a capacity to withhold satisfaction, and an ability to sharply separate 
what we see externally from our wish-fulfilling "good memories": 
the performance of the function of the judgment is not made 
possible until the creation of the symbol of negat~on has 
endowed thinking with its first measure of freedom from the 
consequences of repression and, with it, the compulsion of the 
pleasure principle. . . (N: 239) 
On such bases as Freud's "On Negation': Lacan can argue that the 
elementary "cut" of the linguistic sign from its referents - which struc-
turalism's account of the differential nature of signs presupposes - is 
none other than the castrating non!, which "cuts" the individual from 
the Thing of its first wishes. Freud says in "On Negation" that the pre-
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condition of a child's ability to competently use the symbol of negation 
is "that objects shall have been lost which once brought real satisfac-
tion" (N: 238). Lacan reads Freud as referring to the child's renuncia-
tion of its wish to be the phallus for the mother. All subsequent 
negations will be predicated, as we might say, on this first absolute non! 
All the child's subsequent experiences, also, will be shadowed by this 
first negation, and the consequent sense that ecCe n' est pas Ca" / ((This is 
not It (the lost Thing)." It is in this gap between reality and the lost 
Thing, and the sense of lack it creates, indeed, that Lacan situates 
human desire in relation to language. Human desire is a «metonymy", 
Lacan says, evoking the figure of speech whereby the parte s) of an 
object (say, the. crown) comes to stand for the whole (king, country). 
Each of the things we desire, Lacan means, will evoke some part of the 
lost Thing of our unconscious fantasies: this elusive "part object" or 
"x factor" being the objet petit a we encountered in our excursus on 
the Real. 
So Lacan agrees with Saussure that each natural language is a system 
of differential signifiers. Lacan agrees with Saussure's idea that each 
natural language is "bigger than anyone of us", since it is the product of 
a culture into which we are socialized by our first others. Yet Lacan 
extends this structuralist undermining of the modern idea that each of 
us is the sovereign master of his own meaning( s) by aligning it with 
Freud's "Copernican" discovery of the unconscious. Just as Freud said 
that sexuality is that drive that binds us to what is immortal in the 
species (Chapter 2), so Lacan argues that the unconscious is "the dis-
course of the Other" (SSD: 689-90/812): that part of our desire caught 
up in a linguistic system which, if not immortal, is the moving image 
of countless generations. When anyone forms a meaningful wish or 
intention, Lacan agrees with Saussure, they must do so in terms of the 
code of their natural language. As Wittgenstein noted, even Descartes 
had to say, in Latin, cogito ergo sum. Other people, equally, can only 
understand individuals' speech via this code of the "big Other". Only 
psychotics believe people's thoughts can be directly transmitted 
between their minds. When subjects speak, Lacan maintains, they are 
so far from being fully "in control" of their meanings that they receive 
their true message back from the (big) Other in an inverted form. 
This in fact is where Lacan's Freudian-inspired criticisms of Sa us sure 
come into their own. For Saussure, despite his structuralism, still holds 
on to the (for Lacan, untenable) idea that the basic unit of sense is a 
single sign (see Figure S.2). Lacan by contrast joins other influential 
twentieth -century philosophers of language in claiming that the most 
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Signifier "tree" 
Signified (the concept of a self-standing arborescent growth 
with a trunk, branches, leaves, etc.) 
Figure 5.2 Saussure's (sychronic) theory of signification 
basic unit of sense is a sentence. The feature Lacan stresses is that the 
meanings of sentences, and of each of the signifiers comprising them, 
only becomes clear at the end of the sentence. This is why reading inter-
minably long sentences is so profoundly frustrating. Conversely, if I cut 
my sentence short, saying, for example, "I went down ... " - and find 
myself (for whatever reason) unable to remember what I meant to say 
- my hearers will be left in suspended semantic animation: ""Where did 
you go down? What?" When any of us speaks a sentence, that is, our 
hearers anticipate our meaning as we go. Until we finish each of our 
speech acts, the signifiers we use each "float" or "slide': Far from signi- . 
fying by themselves, as Saussure suggested, each waits to receive its 
signification until the subject arrives at its destination, the "last word': 
It is in this time between the formation of one's intention and its 
linguistic consummation at sentences' ends, Lacan contends, that the 
unconscious - trading on the differential nature of our signifiers 
(duck" is dose to «truck" but also ... ) - makes itselfheard in the small 
distortions characteristic of slips, plays, puns, inhibitions or the forget-
ting of words (see Figure 5.3). 
Only at such time that I complete any utterance (on the right-hand 
side) will my listeners be able to understand me. This is achieved by 
referring what I have said to the big Other of socially accepted rules 
and possibilities: «so he went down to the milk bar ... the sports 
ground ... " Lacan hence talks about the big Other as a ('tribunal" to 
Start 
sentence 
"I . .. went . .. down . .. to .,. the . .. milk . .. bar. " 
t t t t ... 
Possible slips, being alterations of 
signifiers or their ordering to disruptively 
intimate unconscious wishes, facilitated by 
the differential constitution of the signifier. 
Figure 5.3 Lacan's (diachronic) theory of signification 
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End sentence 
~ 
Signifiers ({quilted" 
to code of the Other 
(linguistic and social 
conventions) 
which our linguistic utterances are referred - a tribunal based on the 
dimension of symbolic pacts into which our castration initiates us: 
As a rule everyone knows that others will remain, like himself, 
inaccessible to the constraints of reason, outside an acceptance 
in principle of a rule of debate that does not come into force 
without an explicit or implicit agreement as to what is called 
its basis, which is almost always tantamount to an anticipated 
agreement to what is at stake. . . (Lacan 2006: 430-31) 
Particularly important in this process of retrospectively tying 
signifiers to the. Other are what Lacan calls "master signifiers" - words 
such as "freedom" in the United States today, or "the revolution" in the 
former Soviet countries. These are the types of signifiers in a culture 
whose meanings people tend to take for granted, because they carry 
with them the force of social law. Their (approving) use by a person 
identifies the speaker as belonging to the group, and "making sense" to 
others. The founding model of such master signifiers, Lacan claims, is 
at base the "paternal metaphor" or "name of the father": that signifier 
that "stands in" for the child's repressed desire of the mother at the re-
solution of the Oedipus complex. Lacan's theory of language picks up, 
at a very foundational level, on the "promissory" component of the 
signification of the "paternal signifier" in the resolution of the Oedipal 
drama - since the child's identification vyith it signifies that it will with 
time be able to find a substitute for the renounced Thing. Similarly, 
Lacan argues that the master signifiers with which subjects identify 
"quilt" the subject's other signifiers, and guarantee that meaning will 
emerge from them, however incoherent or otherwise unconvincing 
their words have been. 
Conclusion, on why Schreber had to become a woman . .. 
With Lacan's central teachings concerning the imaginary, real and 
symbolic orders in place, we can appreciate that, for Lacan, mental ill-
ness is not caused simply by conflict between the embattled ego, the 
superego and the id (see Chapter 1). What is decisive is how the subject 
bears up vis-it-vis the condition of being a castrated animal forced to 
pursue its desire on the "inverted scale" of the signifier, within the sym-
bolic order of its society's big Other. The question to be asked, for 
Lacan, is: how fully has the subject acceded to its symbolic castration? 
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And, accordingly: how fully have they overcome the ambivalent transi-
tivity and aggression characteristic of the earlier stages of their devel-
opment? Lacan keeps Freud's tripartite diagnostic scheme of neurosis 
) 
perversion, psychosis. Yet here as elsewhere Lacan reframes Freud's 
scheme according to his structuralist refiguring of Freudian theory: 
• The neurotic has submitted to castration, but with reservations. 
Her symptoms and slips stand testimony to her lasting resent-
ment towards the agency of the big Other. As we commented 
above, underlying hysterics' and obsessionals' symptoms are fan-
tasies concerning the possibility of fully satisfying, lost jouissance, 
little pieces of which their symptoms set out to restore to them. 
• The perverse subject has only partly acceded to the law whose 
founding prohibition creates the lack constitutive of desire. In 
order to create such a lack, the pervert needs to enact (or have 
enacted) the agency of the law itself. This is why perversions 
invariably involve not simply aggression, but the enacting of 
quasi-punishments - "You have been a naughty girl': "You must 
chain me up", and so on. 
• The psychotic has never acceded to castration and the agency of 
the law of the big Other. For him, the symbolic order in which 
people freely abide by the rules "because they are the rules" is 
experienced as a semblance - witness the common psychotic 
delusion that all others, except one's chosen persecutors 
("them"), are robots or "hastily improvised men" (Schreber). 
The power of Lacads diagnostic refiguring of Freud around the 
parameters of the symbolic and the law becomes clear in his analy-
sis of Freud's only great case study dealing with a psychotic, Judge 
Schreber. 
KEY POINT Freud on '7heSchreberCase"(SC) 
The facts of the case 
Daniel Paul Schreber was a gifted lawyer born in 1842. In 1884, he ran as the 
Liberal Party candidate for the Reichstag and, after losing, suffered his first 
nervous breakdown, undergoing extended treatment for "hypochondria" 
under the renowned neurophysiologist, Doctor Flechsig. After his release, 
Schreber worked as a district judge in Saxony for eight years, "marred only 
from time to time by the repeated disappointment of our hope of being 
blessed with children".ln June 1893, Schreber was promoted to the position 
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of 5enatsprasident ofthe Supreme Court of Appeals, at which time he com-
pletely broke down. 
What were Schreber's symptoms? 
• Schreber claimed God was visiting painful physical "miracles" upon him: 
f/[he] had lived for years without a stomach, without intestines, almost 
without lungs, with an oesophagus in shreds, with no bladder, with 
smashed rib bones, had sometimes eaten part of the larynx with his food, 
and so on .. ,II (Doctor Samuel Weber), 
• Schreber believed that God, in mysterious league with Doctor Flechsig, 
communicated with him in rays of light and the chatter of "miracled 
birds". 
• Schreber suffered from a harrowing sense that the world was ending, 
that people around him were unreal, "hastily improvised men", and that 
Doctor Flechsig had committed "soul murder" upon him. 
• Schreber became convinced that he was being "unmanned" (turned into 
a woman) by God, so that he might become His divine consort and the 
progeny of their sexual union would repopulate a rejuvenated earth, 
How did Freud understand the Schreber case? Well, as per Chapter 1, 
Freud argues that Schreber's delusions are his best attempts at a cure. 
They respond to a prior Vorsagung, and their contents reflect the nature 
of this libidinal "forsaking)'. Freud points out two key elements in 
Schreber's delusions. These elements point to one cause of Schreber's 
illness: foreclosed homosexual wishes. The first key element in 
Schreber's delusions is its theological content, and the central role 
played by God in the delusions. Freud interprets Schreber's heretical 
personal theology as re-presenting Schreber's father complex by delu-
sional means (see Chapter 7). The second element, Freud argues, is the 
presence of homosexual wishes towards his father. These wishes are re-
presented in disguised form in Schreber's delusions of being turned 
into God's female consort, and rationalized in terms ofSchreber's mes-
sianic mission of saving the world. 
The crux of Lacan's criticism of Freud developed in Seminar III: The 
Psychoses is the observation that Freud's notion offoreclosed homosex-
ual wishes seems simply to be the wrong type of cause for Schreber's 
exotic theological delusions. These speak of a much more fundamental 
disturbance in his ability to signify or "make sense" of the world. Given 
Lacan's structuralist rereading of Freud, which places emphasis on the 
linguistic disturbances Schreber reports in his Memoirs, Lacan's inter-
pretation is different. Like many psychotics, Schreber was subject to 
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linguistic hallucinations: he heard voices inside his head that he took 
to have been put in there by a persecutory other (ultimately, God). 
Schreber's sense of these voices oscillated between two poles, Lacan 
notes. On the one hand, there were certain words charged with extra~ 
ordinary meaning, like the "soul murder" he accused Flechsig of enact~ 
ing upon him. On the other hand, for much of the time, the voices 
Schreber heard made little sense (Lacan 1993: 32-4). One feature of 
these "chattering)' voices is that they would feature sentences that did 
not end, such as "lacking now is ... ". 
As you can see, this last phenomenon in particular, passed over by 
Freud, seems made for Lacan to interpret. For Lacan, Schreber's entire 
sense of reality did not break down because of foreclosed, projected 
homosexuality - this was an effect, not the cause. What was ('lacking 
now" for Schreber is what Lacan calls the "paternal function", the 
signifier "being a father" - that master signifier through which the 
order of the law, and of social trust, is instated, and which could tie psy-
chotics' words and sentences to the Other (Lacan 1993: 196-205). This 
is why Schreber had to break down when he was called by the Other of 
his community to take on a law-giving, "paternal" role in the Court of 
Appeals in 1893. The big Other effectively said to him, "You will be a 
President in the Court of Appeals." But Schreber could draw only upon 
his imaginary identifications to understand this symbolic mandate. On 
the one hand, Schreber heard this invocation in the manner of a kind of 
sinister prediction - "How does the other know that I will become this 
paternal figure? How can he see into the bowels of my future?" His 
answer, of course, eventually took on the bizarre theological form of his 
delusions concerning his persecutory god, "not one hair on Schreber's 
head could move without Him knowing': On the other hand, 
Schreber's homosexual delusions take on sense for Lacan as his best 
attempt, using the tools of his imaginary identifications, to make up for 
the lacking signifier "being a father": 
This is why he had to make a mistake, become confused, to the 
point of thinking and acting like a woman. He had to imagine 
himself a woman and bring about in pregnancy the second 
part of the path that, when the two were added together, was 
necessary for the function of being a father to be realized. 
(Lacan 1993: 293) 
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Summary 
• Lacan's return to the meaning of Freud attempts to "formalize" 
Freud in the light of resources from philosophy and the most 
advanced human sciences of his day (principally structuralism). 
• According to Lacan, the infant gets its first, anticipatory sense of 
being an "I" by identifying with its mirror image, and the visible 
images of its first other( s) - this is the imaginary register in 
human subjectivity. 
• Lacan agrees with Klein about the primacy of the child's relations 
to the mother in its first years, arguing that the decisive stake in 
the Oedipus complex is the Real thing the child imagines the 
mother desires. The child perceives the father as a rival for this 
"phallus". 
• The Oedipus complex can be satisfactorily resolved only if the 
father intervenes in the name of social law or "the symbolic», 
impressing upon the child that the desire of the mother, too, is 
subject to impartial, social law. 
• The unconscious is that part of us which resists this "castration". 
Its nucleus is found in fantasies concerning the thing or jouis-
sance "lost" to us at this time - what Lacan calls "the Real': 
• Lacan's account of the symbolic order brings together insights 
from structuralist anthropology and linguistics, arguing that 
"castration" opens up the space for the differentially constituted 
linguistic signs we are each bound to use to form and express our 
wishes. 
• When we speak, we "get back our message from the Other in an 
inverted form': Lacan claims: our words "make sense" in so far as 
they are "quilted" to the "big Other" of our society's norms and 
conventions. 
• Particularly important in this process are "master signifiers", 
modelled on the original nom/non! of the father (to the incestu-
ous wishes of the child). As the Schreber case exemplifies, in the 
absence of such signifiers, individuals will be unable to stabilize 
their sense of linguistic meaning, sexual difference, and their 
place in their society's kinship system. 
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• SIX 
What does woman want? Feminism and 
psychoanalysis 
The relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis has been 
intimate, if troubled, since its very beginnings. The question of "what 
woman wants)) was central to the inception of psychoanalytic thought, 
even before Freud entered the scene, as we saw in our Introduction, via 
the case of Anna O. Yet) depending on which feminist analysis one 
reads, this uwoman question» has been either totally manhandled by 
psychoanalysis, or treated in a most ground-breaking way. We might 
say feminists' disagreements over psychoanalysis mirror contentions at 
the heart of feminism in general. Are women's social disadvantages 
engendered by their biological differences from men? Or is culture 
paramount over nature) and the body? Is there a distinction between sex 
and gender, Of was Freud right that "anatomy is destiny»? Can bodies 
simply be set aside in order to attend to social disparities? Or are there 
already more primary inequalities perceived at the level of anatomy? 
Psychoanalysis has unwittingly become one battleground where 
such larger disagreements between feminists have been played out, not 
least because of certain, rather inflammatory, claims made by Freud -
centrally the ide~ that girls experience "penis-envy" as a key part of 
their maturation. As we shall see, feminist contentions about psycho-
analysis turn particularly on whether Freud's account of femininity 
described a particular, predominantly social, circumstance for women 
- and is thus a measure of how ideology affects the way the body is lived 
and interpreted - or if this account was prescriptive of how women's 
lives should be lived, due to fixed, anatomical factors. As we shall see, 
the question of whether Freud's account of "woman" was descriptive or 
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prescriptive cannot be definitively answered, even through the kind of 
close reading of his texts offered by feminists such as Sarah Kofman, 
Luce Irigaray or Juliet Mitchell. Freud's own vacillations and ambiva-
lences about "the woman question" ensure that his conclusions about 
femininity remain obscure and contested. Yet the answer to this ques-
tion is crucial to how feminists are able to situate themselves in relation 
to psychoanalysis. For instance, what are we to make of the centrality of 
the penis to Freud's, or the "phallus') to Lacan's, accounts of childhood 
development? How should we evaluate Freud's implied equation of all 
women with the maternal, as either "mother" or "mother substitute"? 
And is it acceptable, in the final analysis, that "woman» can be reduced 
to the one who lacks, or has no sex, because her path to sexual matura-
tion diverges from that of Hman"? 
Prescriptive or descriptive? Freud on femininity 
Given feminism's fraught relation to psychoanalysis, it is perhaps 
surprising that many of the early adherents and practitioners of psy-
choanalysis were women. Women were the first objects of study for 
psychoanalysis - Lacan once called Anna 0, Dora and the other women 
the young Freud analysed the «patron saints" of psychoanalysis. And 
the question ((what does woman want?" was an enduring and seem-
ingly insoluble problem throughout Freud's lectures and writings. 
Indeed, early psychoanalysis was primarily concerned with a condition 
(hysteria) arguably brought about by the excessive sociopolitical 
repression of women, over and above that required of men. Because 
women were socially designated as ((passive'~ and because such passiv-
itywas supposed to characterize every arena of their lives - intellectual, 
emotional, physical and sexual - women at that time were subjected 
from infancy to the most throughgoing repression of their natural and 
cultural potentials. 
Unsurprisingly, then, it was from the very social context Freud's 
early case studies, such as those of Anna 0 or Elizabeth von R, that the 
beginnings of a new feminism emerged, concerned with universal suf-
frage and the improvement of conditions for women within marriage, 
and regarding property rights. In connection with this burgeoning 
movement, many women were drawn to psychoanalysis because of the 
tools it promised to theorize, in Freud's own words, '<how [a woman] 
comes into being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual 
disposition" (F: 116). 
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The "question of woman" haunts Freud's entire oeuvre. As Sarah 
Kofman has convincingly argued (see later in this chapter), Freud's 
ambivalence about femininity can surely be understood in relation 
to his own anxieties about his masculinity, and also his relations to 
his mother. Freud's early suggestion was that feminine identity and 
sexuality develop in a symmetrical manner to masculinity. Taking the 
Oedipus complex as the central apparatus for explaining the begin-
nings of sexuality, Freud first understood the Htde girl's primary love-
object to be her father, in an exacdy equivalent manner to the boys 
attachment to the mother. This would explain not only the hetero-
sexual imperative that appears to shape desire, but also the evident 
conflict that women in his clinic repeatedly avowed, in one way or 
another, towards their mothers. Just as at the height of his Oedipus 
complex, the boy's attachment to his mother had led him to want to do 
away with his father, at the time of writing The Interpretation of Dreams 
Freud hypothesized an equivalent rivalry between the litde girl and her 
mother: 
We learn from [dreams of the death of parents] that a child's 
sexual wishes - if in their embryonic stage they deserve to be 
so described - awaken very early, and that a girl's first affection 
is for her father and a boy's first childish desires are for his 
mother. Accordingly, the father becomes a disturbing rival to 
the boy and the mother to the girl; and I have already shown 
... how easily such feelings can lead to a death wish. 
(ID: 257) 
By the time Freud's theory reaches its later maturity, however, he 
revises this thesis in ways that have profound consequences for how we 
might understand the relation between the sexes, and the relation 
between socialization and desire. In "Female Sexuality" (1931) and his 
lecture on "Femininity" (1932), Freud argues that, in contrast to his 
earlier ideas, girls' first love-object is also the mother, and the later 
attachment to the father is a screen for this early, repressed wish for the 
mother. According to this scenario, girls start out life just like little 
boys, but must be socialized to renounce their primordial love for the 
mother, before being able to achieve femininity. The key points of 
Freud's later position on femininity can thus be summarized. 
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KEY POINT (The later) Freud on what little girls want 
• The little girl at first sees herself as a "little man", with a "little penis", the 
clitoris. 
• upon seeing the boy's penis, the little girl inevitably develops a deep-
seated feeling of inferiority. She recognizes her own lack in relation to the 
boy - the little girl's "castration complex" thus in fact pre-dates her 
Oedipal phase, rather than dissolving it, as with Freud's boys. 
• This feeling of inferiority gives rise to "penis-envy", and generates in her an 
ambivalence towards her mother, whom she blames for her own lack, but 
also identifies with. 
• The girl seeks social value by attempting to acquire the "phallusJl either 
through "masculine" projects or, if she is to achieve normalcy, by repress-
ing her active desires and replacing them with more passive satisfactions 
- particularly vaginal pleasure instead of clitoral, and pregnancy (wherein 
the baby stands in for the phallus). 
Accordingly, whilst for the little boy, the Oedipus complex and 
rivalry with the father resolves itself with the castration complex, for 
the little girl this is where her problems begin. Her "recognition" of her 
lack of a penis gives rise to "penis-envy", given which she understands 
herself as inherently inferior. From here on, she will be driven by the 
need to create social value, approximating the penis with its symbolic 
substitutes (for instance, babies). . 
Understandably, this schema has divided feminists. It is time now to 
examine their responses directly. 
Female psychoanalysts, and the desire of the mother 
One common feature in the differing responses to Freud developed by 
figures such as Lou Andreas-Salome, Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, 
as well as Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, is the central place they allot 
to the mother instead of to the father. However, there are significant 
differences between their theories, which are reflected in how feminists 
have evaluated them in the later part of the twentieth century. 
Particularly Deutsch and Horney have received attention from feminist 
readers of psychoanalysis. Deutsch tends to be read as a "stooge" for 
Freud's particular articulation of patriarchal ideology, while Horney is 
taken up as a voice of resistance against it. 
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Ambivalence about the feminine: Helene Deutsch 
Helene Deutsch's theoretical position is subtler than her detractors 
suggest. But it is true that, like Freud, she emphasized "passivity" and 
"narcissism" as characteristically feminine traits, and saw motherhood 
as the pinnacle of female experience. Deutsch's emphasis upon mother .. 
hood and passivity certainly raises questions similar to those posed to 
Freud's own account of femininity. For instance, what are we to make 
of women with no desire to have babies, and who pursue "active" goals, 
such as intellectual, artistic or sporting endeavours? Do these proclivi .. 
ties necessarily render such women "masculine", and thus deviant? And 
what is the task of analysis in this context? Is it simply to "normalize) 
women, so they desire gender-appropriate goals that complement, 
rather than emulate, «masculinity"? 
Deutsch does not question Freud's characterization of woman as 
passive and narcissistic, and declares no allegiance to feminism 
(through which, she holds, women depart from their "nature"). 
However, Deutsch does challenge Freud's explanation of feminine 
passivity in an interesting manner - particularly with regard to the 
nature/nurture debate central to feminist thought. The orthodox psy-
choanalytic view had been that women become passive, and then nar-
cissistic, to compensate for a perceived genital mutilation ameliorated 
only by pregnancy and motherhood. Deutsch argues, on the contrary, 
that feminine narcissism is invoked as a defence against passivity; and 
she redefines passivity as an instance of masochism, whereby active 
instincts are turned inwards to attack the ego. In this manner, feminine 
narcissism becomes an active response for Deutsch to a situation in 
which a limit has been placed upon women's powers - in other words, 
as an environmentally conditioned response - rather than as indicative 
of innate passivity or weakness. And, as you can see, this presents a 
potential advance for feminism, in that the restrictive sociopolitical 
situation that produces feminine masochism might conceivably be 
altered. 
Deutsch's own account of how women's active instincts come to be 
inverted, however, is subject to some confusion between what she con-
siders as natural or essential to woman, and what may be attributed 
to social conditioning. On one hand, Deutsch holds that, just like the 
little boy, the little girl identifies with her father rather than her mother. 
The father represents the outside world - the "environment" or "cul-
ture" - and thus a turn away from the mother and the inner life of 
simple nourishment. The trouble begins when the father discourages 
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this identification) thus inhibiting her active drives and forcing the 
Htde girl to divert them inward. Deutsch seems) with this argument, 
to suggest that the impetus for what ultimately is to become feminine 
narcissism is cultural or social. Yet on the other hand, she admixes the 
social and biological in this account, writing that the function of the 
father is to provide "an inhibiting influence on the woman's activity 
and drive her back into her constitutionally predetermined passive role" 
(Deutsch 1944: 252, emphasis added). Deutsch thus regards the social 
pressure that the father provides as a mere trigger to a more primary) 
biologically determined situation. 
Likewise, Deutsch's focus upon motherhood can be read as simultan-
eously advancing and working against the interests of feminism. On 
the one hand, her account of motherhood repudiates Freud's emphasis 
upon penis-envy, or feminine lack. She emphasizes a positive connec-
tion to one's own mother as galvanizing the desire for motherhood. For 
Deutsch, a woman's strong identification with her mother in fantasy 
can never entirely be broken, and corresponds to a wish to bring forth 
one's essence through "motherliness". Freud's stress upon feminine 
passivity and lack as catalysts for woman's desire for a child is in this 
sense moderated by Deutsch's account, in the importance she gives to 
women's identification with the image of the active mother of early 
childhood. On the other hand, Deutsch characterizes motherliness as a 
narcissistic activity, wherein ~ove for the self as object is diverted to the 
baby, conceived as only a piece of the self. In this context, Deutsch's 
contention that woman's greater purpose lies in "motherhood" loses 
any feminist edge it might have had were motherhood conceived less 
ambiguously, as promoting a positive identification between genera-
tions of women. 
In general, feminists have good reason for discomfort concerning 
Deutsch's emphasis upon the biological register of motherhood and 
gender: for instance, her suggestion that motherhood behaviours 
are instinctual remnants of our primeval past. Like the great French 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Deutsch suggests that problems 
encountered in mothering (and female sexuality) arise primarily 
because women come to be alienated from their nature by culture. 
Likewise, feminism itself falls within the scope of this criticism) as an 
unnatural deviation from woman's biological destiny. Yet other ele-
ments of Deutsch's naturalization of female sexuality might just as 
easily be turned towards, rather than against, feminism. For instance, 
she sexualizes her account of motherhood, in counterpoint to Freud's 
sexualization of infancy, and thus shifts the balance of subjectivity from 
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the little boy of Freud's account to the mother. In this way, the mother 
becomes an active participant in her own sexuality, with a libido and 
fantasy life distinct from that of men. With her various case studies 
of nurses, childcare workers, prostitutes and women found in litera-
ture, Deutsch was able to trace a connection between sexuality and a 
woman's relation to her feelings about motherhood and her own 
mother, rather than to the father. Such a focus paved the way for later 
feminist approaches to understanding female psychology in terms 
of women's intergenerational relations to one another, or maternal 
lineages rather than the patrilineage that has tended to dominate 
Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Karen Horney: a holistic approach to feminine sexuality 
Karen Horney was far more open in her opposition to Freud's per-
ceived sexism than Deutsch, and so has been easier for later feminists 
to embrace as a precursor and example. Horney adopted what might 
be called a ((holistic» attitude to the study of female sexuality, explicitly 
rejecting the biological focus championed by Deutsch and other 
Freudians, instead unambiguously emphasizing environmental and 
social influences. Horney criticized Freud's scientific methodology, 
arguing that Freud was too general in applying his findings to all 
women, given the clinical setting in which his observations were made 
(since all the women he analysed were neurotic). For Horney, psycho-
analysis's «truths" are shaped primarily by the observer's gender, rather 
than the true nature of what Freud and other male psychoanalysts 
observed. Horney highlights this charge of masculine bias in psycho-
analytic theory by directly and compellingly comparing the infantile 
theories of little boys about little girls to mature psychoanalytic 
theory's observations about femininity. For instance, the little boy's 
"naIve assumption that girls as well as boys possess a penis" is mirrored 
by the psychoanalyst's belief that "for both sexes it is only the male 
genital which plays any part" (Horney 1967: 57). 
Horney argued that what Freud had called "penis-envy" is truly a 
specific form of a more general envy evident in boys as well as girls. 
Particularly, she set penis-envy against a backdrop of the envy the little 
boy exhibits in relation to the mother, and those activities associated 
with motherhood: childbirth, the suckling of babies, and pregnancy. 
Boys' ('breast-envy" and "womb-envy" is not only as psychologically 
significant for boys as penis-envy is for girls. It also explains men's 
investment in the denigration of female experience. That women's 
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creative and nurturing bodies are so clearly enviable, according to 
Horney, gives rise to a "reaction formation" in men. Their envy of the 
female body is repressed, emerging instead as disgust and a conviction 
in their own biological superiority. In this vein, Horney issues a chal-
lenge to Freud's account of the origins of culture in "Civilization and Its 
Discontents" (wherein culture is the effect of the sublimation of sexual 
energy; see Chapter 7). Horney argues that culture and civilization 
emerge as a means for men to compensate themselves for being unable 
to create life, and thus for their own lack in relation to the female body. 
This critique of masculine culture prefigures other feminist attempts to 
construct alternative myths about the origins of civilization, such as 
those found in lrigaray's ('Women, the Sacred, and Money" (1986). 
"Second-wave" feminism, and the sins of psychoanalysis 
Simone de Beauvoir, her progeny, and Dora 
A second wave of feminist responses to psychoanalysis was precipitated 
by Simone de Beauvoir in 1953, with the translation into English of The 
Second Sex. In this text, de Beauvoir addressed to the philosophers her 
own question: "Why is woman the Other?" Or: why is man so widely 
considered the prototype of humanity, while woman is reduced to her 
sex? Psychoanalysis figures as one object of criticism for de Beauvoir's 
programme, because - as Horney emphasized - Freud's model of 
human sexuality took the little boy to occupy the "normal" position, 
from which the little girl must deviate in order to become a woman. By 
defining woman precisely as she who lacks man's essential organ, psy-
choanalysis became exemplary of the masculine position, which rele-
gated woman to its Other, the sole purpose of whom is to reflect back 
to man his subjectivity and transcendence. Thus, while The Second Sex 
attempts to describe the lived experience of being a woman, in relation 
to the different registers through which femininity is evaluated (social 
and biological, as well as age, economy, race and class), Freud describes 
womanhood as the experience of not being a man. In doing so, more-
over, Freud makes reference to a biological model of femininity that, 
arguably, is already inflected with these other registers. 
De Beauvoir's refrain "one is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman" (de Beauvoir 1972: 296) set feminism alight in the 1960s and 
1970s. Feminists' primary concern became to separate one's socially 
prescribed identity (or "gender") from a perceived given essence (or 
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"sex"). Many also uncritically adopted de Beauvoir's negative assessment 
of psychoanalysis, presenting it as one more central pillar of patriarchal 
ideology. These feminists (including such luminaries as Betty Friedan, 
Kate Millett, Germaine Greer, Shulamith Firestone and Eva Figes) 
emphasized the repressive and sexist times to which Freud belonged, 
and his complicity in the subjugation of women in "Victorian" Vienna. 
This contention might be best highlighted by examining another of 
Freud's great case studies - his first, and arguably least convincing - the 
case of Dora, frequently cited by feminists as an allegory for the failure 
of Freud's theory to understand femininity. 
KEY POINT Freud's "Dora" case study 
The facts of the case 
• Freud analysed the eighteen-year-old "Dora" for three months in 1899, after 
which she ended the analysis, unsatisfied with Freud's treatment of her. 
• Dora suffered from a "petite hysterie". Her symptoms included a persistent, 
unexplainable cough, a phantom appendicitis, a sore and paralysed ankle, 
and, recurrently, aphonia or the complete loss of her voice. She had also 
had what Freud regarded as a history of hysteria since childhood. 
• The particular crisis that prompted the analysis concerned her avoidance 
of her family's friends Herr and Frau K, the former of whom Dora accused 
of trying to seduce her, and the latter of having an affair with her father. 
Freud's interpretation 
Freud's conclusion is drawn from the analysis of Dora's symptoms, her own 
narration of the events, and his interpretation of two dreams she brings to 
him. Freud suggested that: 
• Dora was attracted to Herr K, but wants him to prove to her that his inten-
tions are honourable: thus she deflects his advances - obscuring this 
attraction even from herself - such that he will be pushed to take her 
more seriously than if she were only a maid or governess. 
• Freud speculates that Dora identifies Herr K with her father, and admon-
ishes himself in a "postscript" for failing to notice during the analysis the 
"transference" of her affections for Herr K and her father on to himself (see 
Chapter 8). 
Freud's Dora case is particularly instructive about the sexual politics 
of late-nineteenth-century Vienna - the relations between bourgeois 
men, their wives and female servants - and the difficulty for a young 
woman to negotiate her way in this social world. Interestingly, from a 
134 understanding psychoanalysis 
psychoanalytic perspective, Freud's text shows signs of an awareness of 
its own "failure" - or that alternative interpretations of the situation 
were possible - especially in what might be called the "unconscious" of 
the text. 
• In the footnotes to Freud's case study, Freud entertains an alter-
native interpretation of Dora's case, in which her homosexual 
love for Frau K emerges based on an inherent bisexual tendency 
in hysterics, as well as Dora's possible identification with her 
father rather than her mother. 
• Moreover, Freud momentarily acknowledges Dora's own, quite 
plausible, interpretation of the situation, which she states in eco-
nomic terms: that her father had turned a blind eye to Herr K's 
advances toward her, in exchange for Herr K's tolerance of the 
fathees affair with his wife. 
From a feminist perspective, then, Dora's hysteria can be understood 
less as a wholly irrational mental illness than as a curious manner of 
"protesf' against her part in the commerce of women tolerated within 
Victorian society, the best manner available then to a girl of her age. 
Following de Beauvoir, Friedan et al. criticize Freud's biological 
determinism to explain what are in fact socially decided phenomena, 
like Dora's terrible social plight. Moreover, they stress the effects of 
Freudianism upon contemporary women who, coming across psycho-
analysis in the course of their studies, might take to heart his recom-
mendations regarding normal femininity. They feared psychoanalysis's 
potential to return women to the home and to patriarchal dependence. 
Arguably the most thorough representative of this particular response 
to Freudian psychoanalysis is Kate Millett. 
Kate Millett: forget Freud's feminine fantasy! 
Like de Beauvoir, Millett sets out to show that Freud consistently mis-
recognized the effects of social conditioning and disparity, entrenched 
only through their historical repetition, for predetermined and neces-
sary biological differences. By insisting that anatomical difference bears 
an intrinsic cultural significance, Freud naturalizes (and thereby 
justifies) the prejudice he pretends only to describe. Freud represents 
for Millett a chief protagonist in what she calls the "counterrevolution" 
against the "sexual revolution" - which Millett dates from 1830 to 1930 
(Millett 1971: 63) - contributing to a general reaction against the 
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success of the early women's rights movement, and a reassertion of 
patriarchal ideology. In this light, according to Millett's analysis, the 
primary purpose of Freud's account of femininity was to return women 
to a position of sexual subordination to men: "the effect of Freud's 
work ... was to rationalize the invidious relationship between the 
sexes, to ratify traditional roles, and to validate temperamental differ-
ences" (ibid.: 178). 
Notably, Millett brings to her analysis of Freud a very rigid under-
standing of the relations between the body and culture, sex and gender, 
where the former represents that which is fixed and inevitable, and the 
latter is conceived as mutable, or subject to change through a conscious 
alteration of behavioural patterns. In doing this, Millett arguably fails 
to grasp the subtler nuances of the psychoanalytic account of feminin-
ity, and what it has to say about a body that is already cultural, viewed 
subjectively by the child, through the veils of fantasy. The incompati-
bility between Millett's understanding of the relation of the body to 
society and Freud's can be brought out within her analysis of penis-
envy, where she states as an aside: 
(It is interesting that Freud should imagine the young female's 
fears centre about castration rather than rape - a pheno-
menon which girls are in fact, and with reason, in dread of, 
since it happens to them and castration does not.) 
(Millett 1971: 184) 
We can see here that for Millett what is significant is the world of actual 
things and events. Accordingly, the little girl's "fantasy life" can only 
plausibly pertain to what realistically can occur, not to cultural preju-
dice. The distinction between body (unchangeable fact) and culture 
(imaginary and arbitrary) is crudely maintained, in comparison with a 
figure such as Melanie Klein, for example. It is inconceivable for Millett 
that a little girl might fear the loss of an organ she never had in the first 
place. For Freud, as for Klein, though, the "real" body apart from its 
social significance had no role in his explanation of feminine subject-
ivity - however otherwise contentious their accounts. The little girl's 
experience of her own body is already mediated by culture, through 
fantasy: neither purely bodily nor simply social, but rather the nexus of 
their intertwining. 
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Feminist recuperations of psychoanalysis 
The Anglo-American reconnaissance: Juliet Mitchell 
Within the Anglo-American feminist movement, there are some who 
have understood Freud's account of sexuality and gender identity dif-
ferently from the feminists we have looked at so far. For them, Freud's 
account of sexuality is not primarily another biological description of 
how a girl "inevitably" becomes a woman. It is also an account of how 
the body comes to be invested with social significance through fantasy. 
For instance, within her own reinterpretation of Freud for feminism, 
psychoanalysis and Feminism, Juliet Mitchell objects to Millett's criti-
cisms of Freud on grounds similar to those outlined above. According 
to Mitchell, whilst Millett presents a more rigorous analysis of psycho-
analysis than Friedan, Firestone or Figes, her position still exemplifies 
the kind of error that follows when Freud:'s work on femininity is read 
in isolation from his broader psychoanalytic theory. Mitchell contends 
that although ostensibly these feminists each object to what Freud had 
to say about women, what actually offends them is his theory of infan-
tile sexuality and the unconscious. This is perhaps partly due to the 
influence of de Beauvoir's existentialism - particularly her existential-
ist objection to psychoanalysis from a concern to preserve free choice 
from past determinations. According to Mitchell, Millett's and her con-
temporaries' political project also informs their discomfort about the 
existence of irrational influences - such as unconscious fantasy. The 
reason is that these threaten to obscure and complicate the separation 
between nature and culture they believe must remain clear if feminist 
social reform is to be successfully advocated. There is no room for the 
unconscious if one wants only rational feminist agents, ready to tran-
scend their bodily immutability to enact social change. For Mitchell, by 
contrast, "Freud was trying to explain what feminine 'fantasy' did with 
social facts and cultural demands, and how a child reasoned" (Mitchell 
1975: 354): a process that it is incumbent upon feminists to under-
stand, if social change is to be possible at all. 
For Mitchell, the status Freud accords the body is not as unequivocal 
as earlier feminists had suggested. Mitchell correctly understood that 
Freud had already effectively posed de Beauvoir's dictum, "one is not 
born, but rather becomes a woman", albeit through the rubric of psy-
choanalytic theory, rather than existentialism. By means of an amalga-
mation of Freud and the anthropological structuralism of Levi-Strauss 
(reminiscent of Lac an's reworking of Freud through Saussure, Jakobsen 
and Levi-Strauss (see Chapter 5)), Mitchell sees the Oedipus complex 
feminism and psychoanalysis 137 
less as a biological mandate than as the culturally genetic element of a 
more or less universal social repression of femininity. For Mitchell, 
Oedipus represents at a mythic level the kinship relations that enable 
society to operate as such. More precisely, the Oedipus complex dra-
matizes within "fantasy" the social imperative to exchange women, 
and the equally necessary injunction against incest. Drawing upon 
Levi -Strauss, Mitchell clarifies that the incest taboo is not grounded 
in biology - for instance, the avoidance of congenital weakness -
but rather is a purely social measure to ensure the growth of society 
through marriage alliances. 
Likewise, for Mitchell, the fact that it is women who have been circu-
lated between kinship groups, rather than men, in most societies is not 
biologically determined. Instead it is explicable in terms of a "phyloge-
netic" (or prehistoric) heritage relayed to each of us through the cul-
tural imagination or fantasy. This cultural memory, represented by the 
Oedipal complex, provides the impetus for children to make their way 
into social roles accorded to them through a bodily elaboration of 
social meaning. Mitchell is careful to state, against the sex/gender dis-
tinction, that bodies are never "simply" bodies: that from the begin-
ning biology is already "transformed" by the structures into which 
individual girls and boys are born (Mitchell 1975: 407). Freud declares 
Oedipus to be "universal", she argues, but not in the same sense that the 
body is thought to be universal by the sociological feminists. Rather, 
Oedipus is a fantasy structure remnant of generations of accretion of 
social practices, which can then take any number of concrete cultural-
historical manifestations. And for Mitchell this is the coup de grace 
against those feminist critics that her interpretation of Freud counters. 
For the Oedipus complex - and its corollaries of penis-envy and 
feminine narcissism - are not only applicable to the specific situation 
of "Victorian" Vienna. It is recapitulated even in the contemporary 
Western, late-capitalist context, where "fathers" ("patriarchy" being 
the rule of fathers, not "men" per se) still have power in so far as they 
represent the law in terms of which each individual's social and sexual 
identities are organized. "Mothers", at the same level, represent the 
underside or repressed of that law: that is, the "natural" family, which, 
somewhat paradoxically, the law allocates the place of its own excess 
(Mitchell 1975: 405). 
Perhaps most interesting in Mitchell's account is her analysis of the 
role of Oedipus and the nuclear family within late-capitalist societies. 
Employing a logic influenced by Hegel and Marx, she locates the family 
as the point of inner contradiction through which capitalism comes 
138 understanding psychoanalysis 
into its own. The family keeps the desultory tendencies of capitalism in 
check. Yet capitalism places the family under great strain by alienating 
all labour equally. Furthermore, under capitalism there is no longer a 
need for the exchange of women, as capitalist society is supported 
instead by the exchange of commodities and capital. In fact, Oedipus 
becomes most visible and pertinent in Freud's Vienna precisely at a 
time when it verged upon social redundancy. As an example of this 
irrelevance of the family, Mitchell cites Britain during World War II, 
where women were expediently sent into the workplace, men into 
combat, and children into the countryside, away from their families 
in London. Yet at the same time, at either extreme of the debate, the 
capitalists and socialists each expressed concern for the demise of 
the "traditional" nuclear family. This is because, according to Mitchell, 
the family recapitulates those very internal contradictions that Marx: 
had hoped might blow capitalism apart: « [ t] he ban on incest and the 
demand for exogamy howl so loudly in the contemporary Oedipus 
complex because they are reinforced precisely when they are no longer 
needed" (Mitchell 1975: 410). In this sense, the family itself has become 
a ((fetish'~ standing in for a presumed unity (or ((big Othee') that the 
system now lacks: "Capitalist society establishes the family in the con-
text of its redundancy" (ibid.: 411). 
Mitchell's hope for feminism is that the current of contradictions 
within patriarchal capitalism will catalyse the unravelling of Oedipus: 
or a "cultural revolution» of a different, but related, kind to that en-
visaged by Marx. «Femininity'~ as described by Freud, designates the 
psychology of repression through which women live the ideology of 
patriarchy. Thus, according to Mitchell, the transformation of this ideo-
logy, as well as the material conditions of women, depends upon such 
analysis. From this point of view, social change is not only a matter of 
altering gender roles and the partition of work, as was argued by Millett 
et al. It also depends upon the transformation of psychology and 
ideology (or cultural memory), and through these even our biology. 
Mitchell presses for radical change through a thorough reconception 
of the sex/gender relation, arguing that psychoanalysis offers the best 
tools to enact such change. 
The French resistance to psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis has been critical to informing the development of theor-
etical feminism even more in France than in Britain or America. 
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Resistance to psychoanalytic assumptions of patriarchy has shaped the 
French articulation of feminism, so French feminist thought emerges 
through a conflicted engagement with Freud and Lacan. In this respect, 
theorists such as Kristeva, Irigaray, Cixous and Kofman have developed 
an ambivalent, yet integral, relation to psychoanalytic theory. Perhaps 
reflecting a wider "cultural difference': English-speaking feminists have 
accused them of various crimes against feminism: from "biological 
essentialism" (Irigaray; Cixous); to an over-reliance on the "word" of 
Herr Professor Freud (Kofman); to outright prejudice against their 
own sex (Kristeva). Here we shall look at but three proponents of this 
rich seam of thought within feminism: Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva and 
Sarah Kofman. 
Julia Kristeva: powers of horror and desire in language 
Given that she has distanced herself from the feminist movement 
(Oliver 1993), Julia Kristeva might seem an unlikely inclusion here. 
However, a current of feminism runs through her philosophy, quite 
inseparable from her concern for psychoanalysis. Kristeva is best 
known for her work on "abjection", contained in her book Powers of 
Horror (1982). Influenced by Klein, Mary Douglas and perhaps also 
Lou Andreas-Salome (Markotic 2001), Kristeva engages with the ques-
tion of how the ego is formed, arguing that the infant must be able to 
draw a boundary between itself and its waste products before being 
capable of recognizing itself as a separate entity. Such waste products 
comprise the "abject"; neither "subject" nor "object", but demarcating 
the limit between them. The abject provides the self its connection to 
the object (through the piece of the self that is relinquished to the 
world), but also threatens to destroy this connection and the integrity 
of the self, precisely because it is what Kristeva calls "the jettisoned 
object"; it is "radically excluded and draws me toward the place where 
meaning collapses" (Kristeva 1982: 2). For this reason, the abject elicits 
an uncanny feeling of dread and fascination in the subject, which can 
be summarized in the encounter with a dead body: the discarded self 
par excellence. 
The corpse, seen without God and outside of science [i.e., 
outside of a culturally mediated context]) is the utmost of 
abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something 
rejected from which one does not part, from which one does 
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not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness 
and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us. 
(Ibid.: 4) 
However, for Kristeva, abjection also characterizes the relation to 
the mother, from whom one must separate in order to individuate 
oneself, and (following Lacan) before one can become a speaking 
subject (ibid.: 13). Especially in the case of the boy, because the child 
and mother are but one merged entity before ego formation, he must 
relinquish this identification with her to make way for an identification 
with the "father') (or his equivalent), and the paternal law (language). 
Interestingly, for Kristeva the father merely represents some third term 
whose function is to interrupt the unity between mother and child. 
This function may just as easily be served by her friends, female lover 
or work, as by the male head of a nuclear family. Thus her theoretical 
apparatus does not necessitate patriarchy, although the meaning of 
abjection - particularly as it concerns the abjection of the mother -
suggests a mechanism for the reproduction of misogyny. 
Kristeva's work in linguistics - influenced by Lacan, as well as 
Saussure and C. S. Peirce - also gestures towards a concern for the cul-
tural significance of femininity. According to Kristeva, there are two 
registers of language: the symbolic and the semiotic. The former is 
far less broadly encompassing than Lacan's use of the term, referring 
only to structural elements of language rather than culture in general: 
grammar, the extant or conscious dimension, and that which brings to 
language its stability and form. The semiotic, on the other hand, refers 
to the unconscious register oflanguage: its mobile, motivating force (or 
"drive", in the Freudian sense of libidinal energy). The semiotic, then, 
comprises the material element of language, its rhythms and timbres, 
which, without the symbolic, would consist of nothing but inarticulate 
noise. Language as it is lived, in speech and in writing, requires each of 
these registers if it is to be meaningful: for, while the symbolic organizes 
meaning, from the semiotic issues language's "material conditions" -
understood not merely in terms of biology, but as its historical and 
social significance. For Kristeva, this semiotic register, like the abject, 
simultaneously provides language with its ground, and threatens to 
upset meaning. It is the "feminine" - repressed, misunderstood, 
volatile, unconscious - quality of language, which both supports, and 
looms as a potential destroyer of, the boundaries of the symbolic 
through which language is structured, but which do not (contra 
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structuralism) amount to its totality. In this respect, the "feminine» 
represents a revolutionary force of language and meaning, manifest in 
poetry and art, among other social practices. 
Luce Irigaray: the speculum of the other woman 
Luce Irigaray addresses psychoanalysis more directly as an antagonist 
of feminism. Yet, influenced by the deconstructive philosophy or 
interpretive practices of Jacques Derrida (as well as Freud and 
Lacan), she does so by situating her thought within its concepts, as 
its "unconscious" underside. Irigaray's aim is to enact a kind of "self-
examination" of psychoanalysis against itself (Irigaray 1985a: 63). 
This involves an intimate reading of the theorist whom she addresses, 
sometimes at the level of a line-by-line analysis, from the viewpoint 
of the repressed. Like Derrida, Irigaray speaks from and for the very 
position within Western males) discourses that must remain silent, 
if the integrity of the author's position is to remain intact. However, 
Irigaray's point is directly political, concerning what she sees as a 
repression of femininity for the purpose of supporting the masculine 
subject's self-identity, at work in Western philosophy and culture in 
general. Feminist concerns can only be addressed, according to 
Irigaray, once the West's ontological reliance upon the subjugation of 
the feminine is reworked and relinquished. 
Irigaray's technique for dismantling this "ontology" is to figuratively 
occupy this unvoiced position within the text, and push it out 
(speculum-like) until philosophers' unacknowledged debt to the 
feminine is fully revealed. In psychoanalytic parlance, lrigaray enacts 
a return of the repressed of the dominant discourse. Such an acting 
out invariably draws upon the very stereotypes of femininity that it 
hopes to abolish: like the hysteric or the femme fatale, who toys with 
the philosopher but refuses to bring him to climax. But such a mimicry 
of traditional female positions does not represent an uncritical com-
plicity. It is about revealing what is at stake in Western philosophers' 
masculine self-understandings: what they take for granted, in order 
to function smoothly. In this manner, in Speculum of the Other Woman 
(a reference to de Beauvoir, as well as to gynaecology), Irigaray responds 
to Freud by "inhabiting" his lecture on "Femininity" as its own Other, 
interpolating within it objections to each statement Freud makes about 
the "truth" of woman's sex. 
Reflecting her debt to deconstruction, lrigaray interrogates not only 
Freud's positive theories, but also the rhetoric with which he presents 
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them. These stylistic nuances, Irigaray argues, far from being merely 
incidental, already reflect the masculine "imaginary" that conditions 
how the «question of woman') may be addressed. The force oflrigaray s 
argument against Freud, then, is that the "question" of woman is only a 
question because women's voices are excluded from representations of 
human enquiry. And it is this very "lack" of women's perspectives (and 
correlatively, of woman's sex) that ensures the smooth functioning of 
masculine identity and desire. 
Irigaray's relation to Lacan is also oppositional- perhaps especially 
so after she was expelled from the Ecole Freudienne, and her position at 
the University of Vincennes, upon publication of Speculum. However, 
the psychoanalysis with (and against) which Irigarayworks is Lacanian 
rather than Freudian, in that it deals with structures and linguistics 
instead of drives. From Lacan she takes a focus upon the "symbolic" as 
the place in which gender is assigned, as well as the concept of the 
';'imaginary" - albeit an imaginary that is retroactively gendered "mas-
culine': and against which a "feminine" imaginary must reassert itself. 
Yet she criticizes Lacan for continuing to define "woman" in terms of 
penis-envy, even jf elaborated in terms of structural linguistics, rather 
than Freud's "biologisrn': What lrigaray does with Lacanian theory is 
try to demonstrate what a female sexuality unhinged from masculine 
desire might look like. What are the corollaries we might invent for 
such a femininity in the fields oflanguage and poetry, as well as in social 
relations between the sexes, and - most significantly - between women 
(whether mothers and daughters, lovers, colleagues, or friends)? The 
essay "This Sex Which Is Not One': for instance, develops a conception 
of the female body not as lacking (nor as complete, as masculinity repre-
sents itself), but rather as plural: as self-embracing, proliferating and 
contiguous to itself. Likewise, in "When Our Lips Speak Together': of 
the same volume, lrigaray depicts a feminine body and pleasure that is 
self-sufficient, drawing upon and enlarging (through mimicry) the 
image of narcissistic woman that Freud entertains in "On Narcissism" 
and elsewhere. 
"And the One Doesn't Stir without the Other': on the other hand, 
emphasizes intergenerational relationships between women: a relation 
that is poisoned by the patriarchal culture that psychoanalysis summar-
izes, being mediated by the separating function of "the father». In this 
piece lrigaray plays the part of the daughter) imploring her mother to 
attend to their relation. Employing the metaphor oflactation, she con-
tends that the relation between them should allow each to grow rather 
than devour one another. In this piece, lrigaray refers to the Lacanian 
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indictment that, to an extent, girls must always stay trapped within the 
imaginary, by reappropriating the reflective function that each plays 
for the other as a mode of exchange between mother and daughter: 
"You/I exchanging selves endlessly and each staying herself. Living 
mirrors" (Irigaray 1981: 61). In this manner, Irigaray re-evaluates the 
identification between mother and daughter, and recommends that 
this relation be developed rather than discouraged. In so far as the 
mother is able to short -circuit a sexual economy in which she is defined 
as lacking, she will not resent the daughter for failing to provide her 
with the coveted phallus. In turn, the mother will avoid inflicting her 
own sense of lack upon her daughter. Thus, at this stage of her work, 
Irigaray emphasizes a self-sufficiency of women among themselves, 
challenging the status allotted to them as commodities of exchange 
enabling men's relations to each other. In some of her later works, by 
contrast, the question of <'sexual difference'~ and relations between 
men and women, eclipses that of relations between women. And here 
the psychoanalytic Oedipal narrative remains central for her, as exem-
plifying the masculine imaginary to which her feminism responds. 
Sarah Kofman: the enigma of woman 
Sarah Kofman reads psychoanalytic theory as far more equivocal 
and subtle than Irigaray allows. Indeed, Kofman's book on Freud and 
femininity, The Enigma of Woman, in part serves as a vehicle to accuse 
Irigaray - parenthetically and in footnotes - of relying upon distortions 
and exaggerations of Freud's position (Kofman 1985: 12, 104, 109n, 
122, lIS, 116, 117, 118n, 120n, 126, 132, 132n). Kofman presents a 
very dose, scholarly and sympathetic reading of Freud, who (with 
Nietzsche) was a formative influence on her work. However, Enigma 
is also a critical examination of Freud from a feminist perspective. 
Kofman's primary objective is to demonstrate how Freud's writings 
on femininity dramatize the underside of his own masculinity: or in 
other words, his investment in representing woman in the manner he 
does. One of her methods for doing this is to place Freud's various con-
tradictions about HwomanJ) alongside one another. For instance, she 
indicates the incompatibility between saying that woman lacks - con-
structing her botched desire by fabricating a relation to the penis - and 
the claim that woman is characteristically narcissistic, which would 
suggest an enviable self-sufficiency with regard to desire (Kofman 
1985: 52). Other contradictions in Freud's representation of woman 
include his conflicting accounts of her Umodesty" as cultural, and then 
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as natural (ibid.: 49-50); his claims that woman is inscrutable to the 
male point of view, and that her truth is accessible only by means of the 
most scientific (i.e. psychoanalytic) methods (ibid.: 39-42); and that 
woman is a "great criminal" - self-sufficient and in possession of her 
own secret - whilst also being ignorant of herself, and thus requiring 
the expertise of the analyst (ibid.: 66). 
Kofman's hypothesis is that these equivocations reveal Freud's fear of 
"woman". Woman for Freud is both an uncanny birthplace, and (cor-
relatively) the enigmatic cipher of his own mortality. In this vein 
Kofman argues that penis-envy is a projection of men's fears regarding 
castration, and so does not reflect women's desires so much as what 
men require of woman's desire (Kofman 1985: 85). Through the notion 
of penis-envy, Kofman argues that Freud transfers to the father, as the 
bearer of the phallus, the omnipotence that the child originally 
accorded the mother (ibid.: 72). She argues that Freud's desire to be sci-
entific and objective about woman is a means of mediating and con-
trolling his discomfort respecting his own disavowed femininity and 
narcissism, as well as Oedipal desire for his mother and anxieties about 
death. Thus Freud domesticates the threatening and enigmatic "grand 
criminal" woman (who withholds her truth and so captivates men) 
into his own accomplice: the little hysteric, the meaning of whose 
"speech" the psychoanalyst alone is able to restore (ibid.: 67). 
Arguably, Kofman's work represents the most worked-through and 
integral encounter between feminism and psychoanalysis. Other of 
her works, however, are haunted by her "unresolved" relation to both 
feminism and psychoanalysis, particularly her autobiography, Rue 
Ordener, Rue Labat, which documents her childhood in exile as a 
Parisian Jew during World War II, the loss of her father in Auschwitz, 
and her subsequent "abjection" (Kristeva), or pathological rejection of 
her mother. To this extent, Kofman might have had something to learn 
from other feminists about the mother-daughter relation. And for 
this reason, Kofman is an appropriate conclusion to this chapter. For 
as we have seen, the relation between psychoanalysis and feminism is 
precarious precisely because, through its engagement with psycho-
analysis, issues central for feminism have been enabled to bubble to the 
theoretical surface - whether the question of how girls become women, 
of the relation between women, or the relation between the sexes. 
Contestation about the uses and disadvantages of psychoanalysis for 
feminism provides a very good way into the conflicts between femin-
isms. It also furnishes a privileged site for the ongoing negotiation of 
feminist futures. 
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Summary 
• The question of femininit)' is one about which Freud equivocates 
throughout his career. His final position is that women's sexual~ 
ity and identity are organized according to a masculine frame~ 
work (i.e. the Oedipus complex), and are characterized by envy of 
the penis. 
• Some of Freud's most significant followers and interlocutors have 
been women, from the earliest reception of his work: Helene 
Deutsch and Karen Horney, as well as Lou Andreas-Salome, 
Melanie Klein, Marie Bonaparte and Freud's daughter, Anna. 
• Helene Deutsch's focus was the influence upon a woman's sexu-
ality of her mother. In her work, sexuality becomes a woman's 
means of exploring her relation to her mother, as well as her own 
"motherly" potential. Like Klein, Deutsch renders the mother 
more active than in Freud's accounts. Yet she also emphasizes 
what she (with Freud) identifies as women's passivity and nar-
cissism, and has thus often been represented by feminists as 
regressIve. 
• Karen Horney was openly and scathingly critical of Freud's sex-
ism. She is best known for her comparison of the psychoanalyst's 
attitude towards women and the little bois attitude to the little 
girL Horney rereads penis-envy in the context of other kinds of 
envy, such as womb-envy, challenging its primacy in Freud. 
• Second-wave feminism (after de Beauvoir) identified Freudian 
psychoanalysis with patriarchy. Figures such as Kate Millett, Betty 
Friedan, Shulamith Firestone, Eva Figes and Germaine Greer 
argue that psychoanalysis served to naturalize cultural and social 
inequalities between men and women. 
• Some Anglo-American feminists - notably Juliet Mitchell, Nancy 
Chodorow, Laura Mulvey, Jane Gallop and Joan Copjek - have 
since attempted to reappropriate psychoanalysis to feminism, by 
demonstrating how psychoanalytic theory provides insight into 
the social construction of gender and sex, family and patriarchy. 
• French feminists, responding often principally to Lacanian 
theory, have attempted to negotiate a position betweep. advocacy 
and criticism of psychoanalysis: particularly Luce Irigaray, Julia 
Kristeva and Sarah Kofman. 
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part III 
Psychoanalysis and its discontented 

seven 
Freud as philosopher? Civilization, art and 
religion 
In Part I, we examined Freud's ground-breaking theoretical work. In 
Part II, we looked at subsequent developments in psychoanalytic 
thought, in object relations, Lacanian, and feminist (readings of) 
psychoanalysis. Part III continues the process, begun in Chapter 6, of 
understanding how psychoanalysis has influenced and been challenged 
by thinkers in other dIsciplines, and in particular by twentieth -century 
philosophers. We shall begin in this chapter by looking at what psycho-
analysis has said on three topics traditionally reserved for philosophers 
or theologians: questions concerning the nature of civilization, art 
and religion. 
Psychoanalysis, civilization and Marxism 
(The) Freudian ethics? Bearing civilization and its discontents 
Freud's magisterial 1930 "Civilization and Its Discontents" (CD) is 
arguably his most philosophical text, in the several senses of that term. 
No sooner has it begun than Freud has posed the most perplexing 
philosophical question of all, concerning the meaning of human life. 
Like Aristotle, whose Nicomachean Ethics Freud's text darkly doubles, 
Freud agrees that whatever we pose as this question's solution, the pur-
suit of happiness must have a central place. Yet different people seek 
happiness in different ways: from the quests for love, sensuality or 
intoxication, to the cultivation of the arts, piety or ascetic withdrawal. 
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And unlike Aristotle, Freud's diagnosis for the prospects of human 
happiness is singularly grim. Human happiness, Freud sagely remarks, 
does not seem to have been written into the plan of Creation. Reprising 
the ancient philosophers' low estimation of sensual pleasure, Freud 
even notes that our very bodily constitution seems more suited to suf-
fering than enjoyment - since physical pleasure is the result of (prefer-
ably sudden) releases of built-up, painful energy (CD: 76; see Chapter 
1). Human beings are beset by three types of suffering which, Freud 
argues, make life "too hard for us, it brings us too many pains, dis-
appointments, and impossible tasks" (ibid.: 75). The first is our bodies' 
frailty and ultimate mortality. The second is the overwhelming might 
of nature. Freud's third proposed source of our suffering, and the main 
focus of the essay, is the most controversial. This is the suffering occa-
sioned by living with others in civilized societies (ibid.: 76,86). 
Now "civilization': Freud concedes, is the very name for all those 
devices human beings have contrived together to alleviate their natural 
and bodily sufferings. Freud acknowledges the great technological . 
advances of the modern world in this regard. He credits the benefits 
accruing to all from societies' law and order, hygiene, the arts, sciences 
and religion. Nevertheless, Freud proposes that at least three points in 
European history, a widespread wish has made itself evident to reject 
civilization altogether. The first, as Freud controversially contends, was 
the conversion of the warlike Romans to other-worldly Christianity. 
The second (Freud is perhaps thinking here of Rousseau and Roman-
ticism) was Europeans' encounters with the apparently more noble 
"primitives" of the New World. The third, however, is Freud's own time 
of world war, and growing numbers of neurotics - whom psycho-
analysis shows to be living testimony to the inability of many to attain 
even "ordinary unhappiness" in modern societies (CD: 86-8). 
Freud's "Civilization and Its Discontents" in this way comes to pose 
the animating question of modern social theory: why, despite all the 
comforts of modern societies, do many people remain unhappy - per-
haps more unhappy than our forebears? Freud's answer draws upon his 
psychoanalytic account of the drives and their vicissitudes (Chapters 1, 
2 and 4). He reprises an idea present in Hobbes and earlier political 
thought: that for individuals to move from barbarism to civilization, 
each must give up the unlimited liberty to pursue their every whim. 
Justice and the laws, Freud notes, establish the common interest over 
that of the individual. But they do so at a cost: the sacrifice of our 
untamed libidinal drives. The civilizing process, in this way, Freud 
argues, mirrors the education of each human infant, but this means 
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also that it brings with it "changes ... in the familiar instinctual dis-
positions of human beings" (CD: 96). The incest taboo, Freud says, 
represents "the most drastic mutilation which humans' erotic life has 
in all time experienced" (ibid.: 104 [Chapters 2 and 5]). And herein lies 
the rub of Freud's argument. If the "sacrifice of the drives [civilization 
demands] is not compensated for economically;' Freud warns, "one 
can be certain that serious disorders will ensue" (ibid.: 97). 
Civilization deploys a number of means to compensate subjects for 
their founding sacrifice of liberty and enjoyment. Principal among 
these are material benefits, the security of law and order, our libidinal 
identification with ideals, leaders and our fellows, and the beneficent 
((illusions" of religion and the arts (see below). Moreover, for all the 
libidinal sacrifices civilization exerts, Freud argues that it also has a 
powerful instinctual ally: Eros, our sexual drive. Freud places Eros, 
alongside the benefits of common work, at the basis of civilization. 
Men's desire to secure regular access to sexual gratification with 
women, Freud hypothesizes, must have lain at the basis of the most 
basic social institutions: families or kinship groups. This is not to deny 
sexual desire can itself cause social discontents, given the proverbial 
blindness of Cupid to established social norms. Echoing (nearly liter-
ally) Hegel's account of women as "the eternal irony of the com-
munity': Freud notes how the love between family members can 
stand against men giving themselves over to the common good. 
Nevertheless, Freud argues that, this all granted, it still seems plausible 
to imagine a society of contented sexual couples with their families, 
bound together by common interests and shared labour. In such 
a world, Freud implies, we might even entertain Christianity's idealis-
tic precept to "love our neighbour as ourselves" - at least with an 
aim-inhibited, generalized love (agape). However, each time Freud 
approaches such a "contented" possibility in "Civilization and Its 
Discontents': he halts. 
Freud does so initially on near-Aristotelian grounds. Our love is a 
sign that we give preference to the beloved, and take especial care about 
all that affects her happiness - the well-being of her family, children 
and so on. To love everyone, it follows, is to devalue our love, and by 
implication, those upon whom we have conferred it (IV: 102, 109). 
Freud's second reason for saying "No thanks!" to Christianity's "love 
thy neighbour ... " (cf. Zizek 1997: ch. 2), however, projects him 
squarely into the Presocratic orbit of the tragedians. It rests on his later 
account of the death drive in light of which, as Freud writes in a series 
of darkly magnificent passages: 
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Not merely is this stranger in general unworthy of my love; I 
must honestly confess that he has more claim to my hostility 
and hatred ... men are not gentle creatures who want to be 
loved ... they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose 
instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggression. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only 
a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who 
tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit 
his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexu-
ally without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate 
him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo 
homini lupus. (CD: 110, Ill) 
"Civilization and Its Discontents" thus joins "Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle" (see Chapter 4) as a principal statement of Freud's later 
theory of the drives. This theory ultimately pictures not only civiliza-
tion, but the entire universe, as the battleground between Eros - which 
strives to bind things and people together - and Thanatos - which 
strives to render them asunder. Psychoanalysis always acknowledged a 
component of aggressiveness in human sexuality, principally in the 
perversions (Chapter 2). Yet Freud now berates himself for having not 
seen earlier the evidence for a human drive towards non -erotic aggres-
sion, tied to the ego's primitive wish for omnipotence. Such a drive, 
Freud argues, "constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization" 
(CD: 122), guaranteeing "there are difficulties attaching to civilization 
which will not yield to any attempt at reform" (ibid.: 115). 
If civilizations persist, Freud bleakly suggests, they can only do so 
by finding ways (like scapegoating outgroups: Jews, Muslims, illegal 
immigrants and the like) to pacify individuals' innate, asocial aggres-
siveness. Freud closes "Civilization and Its Discontents" by focusing on 
one such measure whose mysterious ways he argues only psychoanaly-
sis has managed to unravel: the turning around of the death drive upon 
individuals' own egos. Animated by fear of losing its carers' love and 
protection, we have seen how the child represses socially illicit drives, in 
their place identifying with its first others. The culmination of this pro-
cess is the formation of the superego, an internalized agency of social 
law that monitors not only the subject's external behaviours, but its 
every wish (see Chapter O. Freud, however, stresses in "Civilization 
and Its Discontents" that the superego, far from being (only) the paci-
fying psychical bearer of social law, typically "torments the sinful 
ego with ... anxiety and is on the watch for opportunities of getting it 
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punished by the external world" (CD: 125). Why is it the most virtuous 
people who are most wracked by guilt about their moral conduct?, 
Freud asks, pointing to a fact exemplified in extremis by obsessional 
neurotics. The only way to explain this, Freud argues, is to posit that 
"every piece of aggression ... the subject gives up is taken over by 
the superego and increases the latter's aggressiveness (against the ego)" 
(CD: 129). 
And with this argument in place, you can see, Freud has his answer 
to why advances in civilization have not delivered us from discontents. 
Au contraire, «the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss 
of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt ... " (ibid.: 
134). 
Dialectics ofdisenchantment: psychoanalysis and 
critical Marxism 
One of Freud's targets in "Civilization and Its Discontents" is Marxism. 
Freud rightly associates Marxism with the fundamentally optimistic 
view that human aggression is the product of social conditions, not 
ahistorical human nature. Freud does not deny that there are and have 
been unjust social arrangements. He chastises socialism for its "youth-
ful" wish of unveiling a wholly peaceable human nature through social 
change alone: 
If we do away with personal rights over material wealth, there 
still remains prerogative in the field of sexual relationships, 
which is bound to become the source of the ... most violent 
hostility among men who in other respects are on an equal 
footing. If we were to ... allow complete freedom of sexual 
life ... we cannot ... easily foresee what new paths civiliza-
tion might take, but ... this indestructible feature of human 
nature [ aggression] will follow it there. . . (CD: 113 -14) 
Given "Civilization and Its Discontents': then, it seems surpnslng 
that Western or "critical" Marxism has been one of the philosophical 
movements most interested in psychoanalysis. In a famous essay, 
Max Horkheimer dismisses Freud's theory of the death drive as the 
latest exemplar of a long lineage of "dark", "bourgeois" philosophical 
anthropology dating from Machiavelli and Luther (Horkheimer 1995: 
104-8). This lineage, Horkheimer argues, theoretically repackages the 
antisocial egoism unleashed by modern market societies as if it were 
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timeless human nature, and "there is no alternative" (Margaret 
Thatcher). Yet the critical Marxists in non-Soviet countries after 1920 
faced an urgent dilemma. This was the dilemma of how to explain the 
"no-show" of the worldwide revolution that earlier Marxisms had pre-
dicted, and the profoundly repressive features of the "really existing» 
Marxist-Leninist states. Thinkers like those in the Frankfurt School 
of Social Research (principally, Fromm, Marcuse and Adorno) turned 
to psychoanalysis in this context to explain the lasting unwillingness 
of the workers of the West to unite under socialism, and the failures of 
Marxist states to deliver the promised, better world. 
Psychoanalysis's influence, for example, is clearly present in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, written by Adorno and Horkheimer in 
exile during World War II. The Dialectic of Enlightenment challenges 
the optimistic idea that modern, enlightened societies have overcome 
((primitive", mythical modes of thinking. The seeds of the modern 
world's global strife, it suggests, were sown as far back as Homeric 
Greece. Homer's Odysseus in The Odyssey, the Dialectic argues, was 
already a kind of proto-modern entrepreneur, winning his release from 
the mythic powers he encounters (the Cyclops) the goddesses and so 
on) by his strategic wits alone. Yet, as Adorno and Horkheimer reprise 
Freud, Odysseus could do this only by sacrificing his own libidinal 
nature. For Adorno and Horkheimer, The Odyssey's vignette of 
Odysseus and the sirens condenses in nuce the discontents of Western 
civilization per sew In order to hear the sirens' mesmeric music (a sub-
lime symbol of lost jouissance) , Odysseus has first to plug the ears of 
his oarsmen - who continue to labour silently below decks, deaf to 
the siren's strains. Simultaneously, Odysseus must tie himself to the 
mast, thereby suppressing his own wishes, in order to attain even a 
small part of the satisfactions lost to him in his enlightened pursuit of 
self-mastery (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 43-80). 
The greatest trauma of the last century for the critical Marxists 
was the working classes' widespread embrace of the fascist regimes in 
interwar Europe. Marcuse's and Adorno's writings on this topic) and on 
the "authoritarian personality': arguably represent the most enduring 
legacy of "Preudo-Marxism') (and are especially resonant in today's 
period of widespread political reaction across the first world). The 
advent of fascism, they argued, showed the historical limitations of 
Freud's account of civilization and its discontents. For what demar-
cated fascist regimes from earlier authoritarian forms of government, 
they observed, was how the fascists employed populist, aesthetic means 
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(such as art, rallies, public spectacles and so on) to encourage individuals 
to act out their Eros by way of collective identification with the leader, 
and prosecute their aggressiveness against designated enemies. Yet this 
"desublimation" of their drives into more primitive outlets did not 
deliver fascist subjects greater freedom or happiness, as Freud's pitting 
of the repression of the drives against their direct satisfaction{s) sug-
gests. On the contrary, the fascists' call for subjects to act out their 
aggression through identification with the leader was highly politically 
repressive. It steered Spain, Italy and Germany towards waging the 
most barbaric war in recorded history (Adorno et al. 1950; Adorno 
1982). 
Marcuse and Adorno, each in his own way, brought insights devel-
oped in understanding European fascism to their analyses, as emigres, 
of postwar America and its developing "culture industry" (Adorno 
1991). Postwar capitalist America, they argued, engendered confor-
mity in subjects not by the repressive operations of executive prerogat-
ive, but by "repressive desublimation": the systemic encouraging of 
people to entertain their sexualized wishes in ways targeted by mar-
keters to animate the next rounds of "consumer demand" (Marcuse 
1972: 57-77). Notably, since 1989, philosopher and cultural critic 
Slavoj Ziiek has written a series of important analyses of the malaises 
of contemporary capitalist subjectivity that adapt this explanatory 
framework by drawing on Lacan's work (see Chapter 5). For Zizek, the 
much-remarked cynicism of contemporary liberal subjects (and much 
poststructuralist theory) about traditional forms of authority is a lure. 
What it conceals, in Zizek's Lacanian re-theorization of the "repressive 
desublimation" motif, is subjects' abiding identification with the status 
quo: an identification sustained by the quasi-transgressive jouissance 
(played to by marketers) of subjects' thinking themselves singular or 
different, able to "see through" the operations of power and so on (esp. 
Zizek 1989; 1994; 1997). 
Psychoanalysis and aesthetics 
Freud on sublimation, creative writing and the uncanny 
One way human beings search for happiness, "Civilization and Its 
Discontents" observes, is through the sublimation of the drives in art 
and culture. Sublimation is raised in "Drives and Their Vicissitudes" 
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but not pursued (see Chapter 2). In "On Narcissism", Freud specified 
that sublimation (as against idealization, which changes the object) is a 
vicissitude that involves diverting the aim of one's "base" drives so they 
are satisfied in activities conducive to the development of civilization 
and culture. The romantic poet, unhappy in love, produces sublime 
words to describe his lost object. In this way, a "finer and higher': 
indeed non-repressive, satisfaction is achieved (CD: 88). Yet, Freud 
reflects, "the weak point of this method [of sublimation through art] is 
that it is ... accessible to only a few people. It presupposes the posses-
sion of special dispositions and gifts ... far from being common to any 
practical degree" (ibid.: 88). 
Psychoanalysis has been shadowed from its beginnings by the ('finer 
and higher" achievements of the arts. Freud's notion of the Oedipus 
complex is indebted to Sophocles, and Shakespeare's Hamlet. Freud 
scarcely writes an essay in which he does not cite his heroes, Schiller and 
Goethe; and he wrote essays on da Vinci, Michelangelo, Dostoevsky, 
other artists and artistic themes. Yet, in "Civilization and Its Discon-
tents') as elsewhere, Freud underscores that psychoanalysis must fall . 
silent before the beauty and power of artists' works, and the question 
of why only certain individuals develop such extraordinary aesthetic 
gifts. 
There is one "bridge" between we ordinary mortals and the minds of 
artistic geniuses about which psychoanalysis can and has spoken at 
length, Freud's "Creative Writing and Daydreaming" contends: child's 
play (Spiel). In their play, Freud argues, children imaginatively create 
substitute worlds, complete with rules that must be followed with the 
greatest seriousness (see Chapter 4). As we grow up, we each largely 
give up our innocent pleasure in play, and temper the wishful produc-
tions of our imagination against the reality principle. Yet psychoanaly-
sis, as we know, maintains that we never wholly renounce our earlier 
modes of satisfaction. They abide in unconscious fantasy and our 
nightly dreams. "Creative Writing and Daydreaming" in fact contains 
one of Freud's most important accounts of the temporal structure of 
fantasy (see Figure 7.1). 
Recall from Chapter 3, how in dreams, the dream wish hails from 
our infancy to reshape the present day's "residues". The manifest con-
tent stages the fulfilment of the past wish in the "text" taken from our 
present concerns (the "day's residues"), collapsing the wish's "optative 
modality': which points to a possible future - "I wish that ... " - into 
the declarative: "It is so ... ': The same structure, Freud argues, explains 
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Past (origin of 
[repressed 1 
wish) resent (time of 
fantasizing) 
Future (setting 
for wish-
fulfilment) 
Figure 7.1 The temporal structure of fantasy in "Creative Writing and 
Daydreaming" (CWD) 
the fairytale wishes of orphan girls to marry a prince, escaping through 
fantasy the drudgery of their present by adapting their ancient wish for 
an all-protecting father, thereby projecting a much brighter future as if 
it were so. 
Creative writers, Freud contends, are people who dream in broad 
daylight, on the page or canvas, reproducing the same kinds of struc-
tures as private fantasies in their works. Yet people's most intimate fan-
tasies are usually repulsive to others, contravening law and propriety. 
How, then, can artists "get away with" publicly staging their own fan-
tasies, often to great acclaim? It is here that Freud places the mysterious 
ars poetica (the art of poetry). The artist is able to soften and disguise 
the personal content of their fantasies by re-presenting them through 
their characters, plots, and in the artistic play of words, stone, paint and 
so on. The techniques the artist uses, Freud suggests, are indeed a kind 
of libidinal bribe. They allow us the audience to indulge our repressed 
fantasies "without self-reproach or shame", as a kind of "incentive 
bonus" "so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure aris-
ing from deeper psychical sources" (CWD: 153). 
Note then how this psychoanalytic model for the understanding of 
artworks tends towards psychologizing them as "only" the expressions 
of their author's particular fantasy lives. Such a model can itself then 
become the stalking horse for the most ignoble wish-fulfilment - the 
desire to relativize or "lower" many of the greatest achievements of 
art and civilization (see «Pscyhoanalysis and religion" below). It is 
worth remarking, then) that in essays such as Freud's analysis of 
"Michelangelo's Moses", Freud himself does not succumb to this 
model. In his intriguing essay on "The Uncanny", Freud also moves 
towards a more compelling psychoanalytic account of the ars poetica -
and of why some artistic presentations have such powerful effects on 
their audiences, whatever their author's motivations. 
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KEY POINT Freud on the uncanny 
The "uncanny" is that feeling, somewhere between terror, deja vu and jubila-
tion, that people describe lias if someone walked over my grave". It is this 
affect that draws people to read and watch the most eerie suspense or terri-
fying horror stories. How does Freud explain it? 
• The "uncanny" (in German unheimlich) condenses two senses of heimlich 
(home-like): both what is most familiar and most hidden. Paraphrasing the 
philosopher Schelling, Freud writes that "everything is unheimlich that 
oughtto have remained secret and hidden but has come to light" (U: 225). 
• In line with liOn Negation", the privative un, Freud argues, is a token that 
repression ls involved in the affect. 
For Freud, the uncanny involves the return of the repressed - what is at Once 
most intimate and alien to us, like the picture of Dorian Gray (Oscar Wilde). 
Uncanny art-objects, Freud argues, contravene a series of oppositions Con-
stitutive of our adult sense of reality, in this way evoking ways of thinking 
familiar, but forgotten, from our childhood: 
• Between reality and our wishes: as in nearly-universal stories about the "evil 
eye", wherein our projected hostility towards others returns as something 
"objective" in the world (see below). 
• Betweenrealityandourpurposive thoughts: as in "meaningful coincidences". 
o Between life and death: as in ghosts and spirits, sure signs that a subject's 
"time is out of joint". 
• Between animate and inanimate things, such as dolls or machines that give 
body to our drives' mindless "compulsion to repeat". 
• Between me and not-me, as in the double, sure harbinger that the individ-
ual's time is up. 
Lacan, the gaze, and the ambivalences of film theory 
Freud's account of the uncanny explains how certain types of artwork 
exert an emotional and disorienting influence upon the viewer: that the 
uncanny experience speaks of an unsettling proximity to what ought to 
remain hidden - the unconscious. In Lacanian terms (Chapter 5), we 
could say that uncanny objects intimate a rupture in subjects' symbolic 
order - and accordingly, the identity of the viewer. While Freud's con-
cept of sublimation attempts to understand what motivates the artist 
to create, Lacan's thoughts on aesthetics follow Freud's account of the 
uncanny into a focus on the viewer's experience of the artwork. 
It is for this reason that Lacanian psychoanalytic theory has enjoyed 
a prominence in cinema studies, particularly since the publication of 
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Laura Mulvey's landmark piece, Visual and Other Pleasures. Mulvey 
and others are concerned to understand the powerful fascination that 
the moving images on our movie screens exert upon us, transfixing us 
without need of the chains that bind the citizens of Plato's cave in the 
Republic. Lacanian theory proposes that our fascination with films 
reflects how filmic images do not simply mimic reality, as Plato's most 
famous criticism of art in the Republic suggests. Rather, Lacanians 
emphasize how the viewer's desire - Of, more precisely, the fantasies 
that provide the unconscious frame for their self-understanding(s) - is 
"caught up" and affected by cinematic representations. A "sublime" 
art-object (Lacan indeed redefined sublimation "beyond" Freud) is 
one that becomes raised, by the ars poetica, to the dignity of the uncon-
scious' lost Thing (Lacan 1992: 112). 
A key basis for Lacan's influence in cinema studies is his concept of 
«the gaze", one of the four examples of object petit a Lacan raises in his 
eleventh seminar) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
(alongside the voice, faeces and breast). As it has been taken up by film 
theory after Mulvey, the gaze is supposed to reflect a hierarchy of power 
relations, whereby the one who "gazes" objectifies and subordinates the 
one( s) seen. For Mulvey, what we see in films is gendered female, 
whereas we, invisible onlookers, are situated as male. The task for a psy-
choanalytically informed criticism is then to problematize this alleged, 
intrinsic sexism of filmic enjoyment, by interrupting our pleasure of 
looking. As Mulvey puts it: "It is said that analysing pleasure, or beauty, 
destroys it. That is the intention of [my argument)" (Mulvey 1989: 16). 
Yet Zizek (2001) and others have pointed out that Mulvey and 
her film-theoretic successors arguably misread Lacan's notion of the 
gaze as objet petit a. (For this reason, Zizek has called for a "return 
to Lacan" in cinema studies.) So what is the gaze for Lacan, and how 
does it affect this aesthetic debate? Contra Mulvey, Lacan's account of 
the gaze reflects his wider psychoanalytic position that any attempt 
at conscious, egoic self-representation involves a fundamental act of 
misrecognition. As we saw in Chapter S, for Lacan, our egoic sense of 
identity is constructed by the alienation of the self in its identification 
with images of others, and its own inverted image in the mirror. This 
imaginary representation of the self tends both to conceal the constitu-
tive role of the symbolic order (language and law) in shaping who we 
are, and to actively thrust out whatever cannot be represented by the 
self's "official" image or "ideal ego'). The objet petit a, for Lacan, is a 
little piece of the Real that is in this way repressed or excluded from the 
ego's imaginary unity and symbolic identifications: Freud's Es or "id': 
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When Lacan raises the gaze as objet petit a in Seminar XI, then, it is to 
underline this "split" nature of our subjectivity. The gaze, Lacan says, 
represents in the visual field the unheimlich embodiment of that piece 
of the self that we repressed and projected outside, which now is 
returning to haunt us in the Real we confront. Like the anatomical 
"blind -spot" or the "evil eye" of superstition, we typically do not see, or 
want to see, anything about the object-gaze. As Zizek puts this idea, 
"When I am looking at an object, the object is always already gazing at 
me, and from a point at which I cannot see it" (Zizek 1991: 35). Yet, 
Lacanians stress, without such a point where "the object is already gaz-
ing at me", there could be no subjectively experienced, coherent field of 
vision (Lacan 1978: 95-7, 105-6). 
Lacan uses art to illustrate this difficult idea of the gaze. Particularly, 
his interest falls on artists' use of perspective. Lacan connects the inven-
tion of perspective by early modern painters such as Leonardo da Vinci 
and Albrecht Durer to philosophy's landmark moment at that time: 
Descartes's cogito C(I think, therefore I am"). Descartes's "first philoso-
phy" sets up the modern subject as "a sort of geometral point" that 
founds all other objects of experience, not to mention Cartesian geo-
metry (Lacan 1978: 85). Similarly, Durer's {(Lucinda» was a device 
devised by that artist to plot a three-dimensional field (including 
objects at various distances) to a two-dimensional plane. Where 
Descartes's mapping of flat space rendered spatiality neutral, uninhab-
itable ("the view from nowhere"), though, Durer et al.'s artistic inven-
tion of perspective reflected the investment of the self in the object 
world (ibid.: 87). Through the ars poetica of perspective, we are drawn 
to share the artist's particular, spatially located point of view when we 
look at the canvas, as if we were there ourselves. 
Where then does the "gaze') appear in all of this? Lacan draws our 
attention to how certain artworks that - very soon after Durer - came 
to utilize devices such as shadow, draped fabric, as well as ((vanitas" to 
remind viewers of the partiality of their "perspective" on the world. 
Lacan singles out ((anamorphosis", the name for artists' deliberate con-
cealment of images by means of the calculated distortion of perspect-
ive. The example Lacan uses is Hans Holbein's famous Ambassadors of 
1533. The painting at first appears to be a typical portrait of two young 
ambassadors, emissaries of the modern world, pictured with all the 
trappings of their worldly accomplishments:· navigation and musical 
instruments, books and other symbols of secular learning. Yet in the 
foreground of the painting there floats an obscure (strangely phallic) 
oblong shape. This object catches the eye, but is curiously unrecogniz-
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able. However, if one takes up another perspective - or "looks awry" at 
it, in Zizek's memorable phrase (Zizek 1991) - the unheimlich Thing 
reveals itself as a leering skull: a memento mori highlighting the vanitas 
of all the ambassadors' modern culture (ibid.: 79-90,92). 
This uncanny object, according to Lacan, is the object-gaze unset-
t1ing Holbein's Ambassadors. It is not pleasurable, in the simple sense of 
"pleasure" indicated by Mulvey et al. Like Holbein's skull, it instead 
evokes the death drive: the destructive potential, which, for Freud, 
underlies and threatens reason and civilization (see "Psychoanalysis, 
civilization, Marxism'~ above). Nor is the gaze what organizes the field 
of vision from outside it, with all the power relations that this implies. 
As against the gaze in Sartre's Being and Nothingness, Lacan's gaze is 
rather what upsets our external "look" from within the frame, remind-
ing us that we are not fully in control of what we see, and that our fears 
and desires structure even this. 
The Lacanian gaze in film theory, we might accordingly say, 
represents film theory's own "blind-spot" with respect to what makes 
viewing, and theorizing about viewing, possible. It is as if film theory 
ironically affirmed the very mastery it set out to critique when it failed 
to recognize the critical potential of its principal Lacanian inheritance. 
Psychoanalysis and religion 
Freud's ambivalence towards God (as) "the father" 
It is only forcing things a little to say that, alongside women, God was 
the single topic that most confounded Freud throughout his theoret-
ical career. Of all the means civilization has at its disposal to sublimate 
the drives, and to console us for the discontents fate visits upon us, reli-
gion is the most powerful and universal. Freud was certainly aware of 
the powerful effects religious representations and rituals have upon the 
human soul. "Civilization and Its Discontents" opens by considering 
a religious critic (Romain Rolland) who asserted that psychoanalysis 
could say nothing concerning the "oceanic" feeling at the base of reli-
gious experience. Freud published four separate writings devoted to 
religion, whose writing spans all his mature life. 
Yet, as his impulse to repeatedly return to religion indicates, Freud 
was never satisfied with his conclusions on this issue. For exegetical 
purposes, Freud's texts on religion can be divided into two currents of 
thought. 
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The "Materialist" account 
The approach to religion in "The Future of an Illusion" (1927) situates 
Freud in a long philosophical tradition: that of philosophical material-
ism. This doctrine suggests that religion is a kind of illusion premised 
on ignorance of nature. For the ancient philosophers Epicurus, 
Democritus and Lucretius, one should undertake philosophy to over-
come such fear. The impulse to religious beliefs, they argued, results 
from the confrontation of pre-philosophic minds with the sublime, 
terrifying and unexpected events ('mother nature" visits upon us. Faced 
with such events, people reach for anthropomorphic (humanizing) 
explanations. They attribute these events to quasi-human deities: for 
instance, the lightning bolts of Zeus, the anger of YHWH and so on. 
Anticipating Freud's account of the timelessness of the unconscious, 
the Roman materialist Lucretius even argued that departed loved ones' 
"second life" in mourners' dreams form the real basis for human 
beings' (seemingly universal) propensity to posit an afterlife. 
In "The Future of an Illusion", Freud agrees that the origins of 
religion lie in human beings' powerlessness before external nature 
and Ananke (natural necessity). But, prefiguring "Civilization and Its 
Discontents", Freud adds to the ancient materialists' list of belief-
promoting natural facts the evil of our fellow human beings. Like the 
ancient materialists, Freud stresses that the "god-making impulse" 
(Nietzsche) arises from anthropomorphizing what would otherwise 
remain wholly beyond human controL If what we fear above all else is 
an invisible god, we can at least (fantasmatically) enter into relations of 
exchange with him: offering prayer and sacrifices to beseech his bless-
ings, and explaining the harshness of fate as justified punishment for 
insufficient piety. Freud, however} gives the ancient materialist critique 
a distinctly psychoanalytic spin. The belief in anthropomorphic gods, 
Freud famously assessed, is "patently infantile" (CD: 86). The way 
believers respond to their powerlessness before natural necessity and 
human evil has as its prototype the powerlessness of the child in the 
first years of its life. Just as children look to their fathers to shield them 
from a world they can neither understand nor controt so the religions 
posit deities modelled, ultimately, on the protective figures of our 
fathers. In the monotheistic formula of "God the Father': Freud sug-
gests, the non-religious source of religious beliefs is unwittingly con-
fessed for everyone with the ears to hear. 
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KEY POINT Freud's account of religion as Hillusion" 
I n 'The Future of an Illusion" Freud understands religion as the result of fear, 
and a compensatory psychological wish for consolation: 
• This is the force of his essay's title: religious ideas, fuelled by our fears, re-
present: "illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent 
wishes of mankind" (FI: 30). 
• Religion is in this way theorized as a kind of collective, social neurosis, "Iike 
the obsessional neurosis of children" (FI: 43). 
• The strength of religion then lies in the consolations these illusions afford 
us against our mortallty, others' evil and the "necessities of fate": 
The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes 
... mhe terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood 
aroused the need for protection ... provided by the father, and 
the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life 
made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this 
time a more powerful one. Thus the benevolent rule of proVi-
dence allays our fears of the dangers of life: the establishment 
of a moral world order ensures the fulfillment of the demands 
for justice which have so often remained unfulfilled in human 
civilization; and the prolongation of earthly existence in a future 
life provides the local and temporal framework in which these 
wish-fulfillments shall take place .. . " (FI: 43) 
The second Freudian account 
In "Totem and Taboo" (TT [1913]), however, Freud developed a more 
original, and arguably more compelling, psychoanalytic account of 
religion. This account understands religion not according to a dialectic 
of fear and consolation, but of guilt and repetition. "Totem and Taboo" 
draws on ethnological ideas in Robertson Smith and Charles Darwin to 
propose a "phylogenetic" ground to religion. In Chapter 2, we saw how 
Freud elevates the Oedipus complex to the pivotal civilizing event in 
every child's life. In the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the father 
acts as a pacifying figure: the ultimate object of the (boy-) child's 
identification, who responds to the child's imagined violence against 
him by "laying down the law", According to "Totem and Taboo", by 
contrast, a real parricide lies at the origin of religion and civilization per 
se. "Totem and Taboo", moreover, introduces a different version of the 
father into Freud's theoretical vocabulary: the father of a "primal 
horde" that allegedly preceded human civilization as we know it. This 
father, far from being the pacifying agent of social law, was an obscene 
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figure enjoying unlimited sexual access to all the women of the horde-
like the leader of a pride of lions. The primal parricide occurred when, 
somehow, the sons banded together against him in a violent attempt to 
bring his social and sexual tyranny to an end. 
KEY POI N T Totemsl taboosl and the "truth N in their suspensions 
In "Totem and Taboo", Freud places not infantile fear, but an originary, 
history-making crime atthe origin of religion. 
• Freud's contention is that this crime, the "truth in religion", engendered a 
gUilt between the sons and its perpetrators. It was this gUilt, not the Eros 
or common labours of "Civilization and Its Discontents", that "Totem and 
Taboo" places at the origin of social laws regulating sexual and kinship 
relations - in a kind of psychoanalytic rewriting of the monotheistic 
notion of original sin. 
• The compelling nature of the human religious impulse is thereby traced 
back to the ongoing need of the sons (and, by inheritance, us all) to make 
reparation for this primal guilt. (Freud also pointed towards such a guilt-
based conception of religion in "Obsessive Actions and Religious 
Practices" [OA 1 907]). 
• According to the same "primitive" thought process at work in Little Hans' 
phobia of horses (Chapter 1), the totem animals of early religions were 
the culturally sanctioned representatives of the primal father. The taboos 
surrounding how people could treat these animals represented "reaction 
formations" against the primal crime, and its now-repressed parricidal 
wish. 
• Yet totem meals - sacred feasts at which tribal members could eat the 
totem animals - represented ritually Circumscribed, exceptional repetitions 
of the primal crime; or returns of the repressed, true origins of religion. 
• Freud suggests that this model of "totem and taboo" is not restricted to 
earlier religions. Christianity gives a uniquely direct form to the repressed 
historical truth of religion, in its central account of the murder of the God-
man (re-enacted symbolically in the Eucharist) which gives rise to the 
"holy spirit" of Christian communities (TT: 146-55). 
Written in the last years of Freud's life (1934-38), the three essays of 
«Moses and Monotheism" (MM) are presented as a particular exem-
plification (Judaism) of the general theory of religion in «Totem and 
Taboo': Yet closer analysis shows that this is not quite so. The alleged 
historical murder of a founding father by his people remains - one 
scandal surrounding this book comes from Freud's hypothesis that 
the historical Jews murdered Moses. Yet Freud pictures the murdered 
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father in "Moses and Monotheism" as an eminently rational, law-
founding figure, unlike the anomie father of the primal horde in 
{(Totem and Tabod~. According to Freud, moreover, the original Moses 
was an Egyptian - the second cause of the often-bitter recriminations 
against Freud's text. 
This Egyptian Moses led the Israelites from exile, Freud hypothe-
sizes, when he was himself ostracized from his native country because 
- no less - of his heretical, monotheistic faith in a single God Aten, 
threatening to Egypt's ruling priestly caste. After this Egyptian Moses 
had led his adopted Hebrews from exile, however, Freud's account fol-
lows the scriptural exegesis of Ernst Sellin to contend that the Hebrews 
turned upon' and killed Moses, rejecting the highly spiritual demands 
of his Egyptian monotheism. How, then, does Freud argue that 
Judaism as we know it emerged, and why does it present such a differ-
ent account of its foundations? Some generations later, Freud argues, 
there emerged among the Hebrews a second "Moses", a Midianite who 
worshipped a jealous, volcano deity, YHWH: the god who says, at 
Exodus 3:14, "I am that I am." Spurred by inherited guilt for the mur-
der of the Egyptian Moses, Freud argues, Judaism emerged out of an 
uneasy synthesis of the highly rational monotheism of the first Moses 
(reprised in the thought of the great prophets) and this Midianite wor-
ship of YHWH. The fateful conflation of the two very different reli-
gious sources, Freud contends, was ultimately facilitated (as in a dream 
condensation) by the linguistic coincidence between the names of the 
two "Moses': The memory of the murder of the first Moses, together 
with his Egyptian identity, was meanwhile "repressed" from all scrip-
ture, with the exception of certain enigmatic passages in Hosea (see esp. 
Reinhard 1999). 
If this much of the content of "Moses and Monotheism" is clear, 
debated more fiercely are Freud's intentions in penning this tenuously 
grounded historical case for the ignoble, foreign and particularistic 
roots of Judaism as almost his last theoretical will and testmnent - and 
at the same time as the Nazi Shoah was taking shape in Europe. 
The returns of the religious 
The inescapable importance psychoanalysis's confrontation with reli-
gion had for the new movement of thought is underscored by its most 
traumatic early moment. This was Freud's break, between 1910 and 1914, 
with his designated psychoanalytic successor Carl Jung, in part because 
Tung believed that psychoanalysis's discovery of the unconscious might 
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provide the basis for a new religiosity. Living in the Europe of the turn 
of the twentieth century (still a widely religious society), Freud could 
not avoid considering psychoanalysis's relations with religion. Several 
of the early analysts, such as his friend Pfister - whose imagined objec-
tions structure "The Future of an Illusion" - were deeply religious. 
Analysands' religious convictions loom large in the Schreber, Wolfman 
and several other of Freud's case studies (Little Hans asked his father 
whether Doctor Freud knew God!). Was psychoanalysis's role to deliver 
people from their religious beliefs, ignore them, or substitute for them? 
Psychoanalysis's confrontation with religion in its way condenses the 
wider philosophical and socia-theoretical issues raised in this chapter, 
and the challenges psychoanalysis poses to accepted modes of thought. 
On one side, psychoanalysis's account(s) of religion - particularly the 
second account, focusing on guilt and reparation - unearths a rational-
ity to religious ideas and practices. In Lacan's work in particular, and 
that of figures such as Rene Girard, religious texts take on a renewed 
dignity and interest in the light of psychoanalysis, as reflections of 
the structuring parameters of human desire (e.g. Lacan 1990: 82-95; 
1992; Girard 1977). As in its challenge to the hubris of the modern, 
Cartesian account of subjectivity, psychoanalysis's account of the reli-
gions in this way overturns earlier, more facile modernist dismissals, 
thus pointing towards a dialogue between modern-secular and theistic 
understandings. 
On the other hand, Freud's religious critics were quick to point 
out how his framing conception of religions as collective neuroses -
especially in "The Future of An Illusion" - seem profoundly reductive. 
As Freud underlines in "Civilization and Its Discontents", religion per se 
is for him a phenomenon of {{mass psychology". He does not counten-
ance the manifold developments of Christian theology, or the Jewish 
and Islamic philosophies of law. The implication is that they could 
amount to no more than so many sophisticated rationalizations of 
religion's ({patently infantile" core. It is true that, in "Moses and 
Monotheism': Freud defends the cultural advance represented by (par-
ticularly Jewish) monotheism, with its prohibition of orgiastic rituals 
and graven images. Freud reads these, with marked pride, as the 
reflections of a higher level of the civilizing sublimation and repression 
of primal drives (Gay 1987; Yerushalmi 1991; Strauss 1997: 285-90). 
Nevertheless, as critics have repeated, Freud's wider position seemingly 
ignores "the noblest utterances of religion" which would point towards 
"a higher conception of human nature, which certainly does not arise 
from lower instinctual demands, but ... from an idealistic realism that 
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can be achieved only with severe difficulties ... " (Pfister, in Meng & 
Freud 1963; 158-9). 
Probably the most fundamental philosophical questions raised by 
Freud's encounter with religion concern the type of account of religion 
Freud presents. This account, as we have seen, traces human beings' 
beliefs in transcendent or sublime deities back to their "all-too-human" 
libidinal sources, and alleged historical origins. Religious beliefs are 
discredited by Freud in so far as they reflect the strength of our earliest 
wishes. Yet, as the political philosopher Leo Strauss has pointed out, 
this type of psychological critique of the motivations for belief in no 
way counts for or against the truth of the contents of the beliefs in ques-
tion. That peopie turn to God out ofUadult" strength or infantile weak-
ness does not affect whether He exists. The infinite transcendence of 
the monotheistic God means that human beings, as finite, can strictly 
never decide this question (Strauss 1997: 301). Equally, the meaning of 
(say) the laws of physics has nothing to do with their "genesis"; how or 
when they were discovered) or what Newton, Einstein, Bohr and the 
like might psychologically have «got out of" formulating them. The 
psychoanalytic account of religion, that is, seems to flirt perilously-
like Freud's account of art (see above) - with what philosophers call the 
"genetic fallacy": erroneously reducing questions about the truth or 
meaning of religious things to their origins. 
Arguably the most profound philosophical reflection on psycho-
analysis and religion is that of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur brings together 
criticisms of Freud with a profound appreciation of psychoanalysis. 
For Ricoeur, as for Freud's friend Pfister, there is truth in Freud's 
critiques of religion. At the very least "analysis can reveal to the reli-
gious man his caricature': and so renew and deepen his quest for truth 
(Ricoeur 1970: 533). Yet Ricoeur joins other critics in noting that 
Freud's texts on the religions are among his most "fragile" or con-
tentious. Tasked with understanding the psychological power of 
religion, Ricoeur notes, Freud evidently felt compelled to revive c<a 
conception he was forced to abandon in his conception of the 
neuroses" - namely, the idea that the repressed "truth of religion" was 
a historical trauma. "We recall that the true interpretation of the 
Oedipus complex was achieved in opposition to the erroneous theory 
of the real seduction of the child by an adult", Ricoeur reflects. Yet in 
Freud's texts on religion: 
The individual Oedipus complex is too brief and too indistinct 
to engender the gods; without an ancestral crime as part of our 
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phylogenetic past, the [religious] longing for the father is 
unintelligible. . . (Ricoeur 1970: 537) 
The price for trying to defend such an "archaeological" claim, as other 
critics agree, is that Freud accepts the most questionable ethnographic 
hypotheses (in "Totem and Taboo") and practises the most forced 
scriptural exegesis in "Moses and Monotheism". 
Why, Ricoeur asks, was Freud drawn to these tenuous straits? In the 
force of religion, Ricoeur proposes, Freud confronted an enigma finally 
"inaccessible to us along psychoanalytic lines" - like, we note, the 
genius of artists (see above). Freud's attempt to reduce religious beliefs 
to these «lines" accordingly forced him, regressively, to "turn his back 
on the demythologizing interpretations which ... deprive [religious] 
myths of any etiological [causal) function" (Ricoeur 1970: 537), as well 
as on what his own clinical work had indicated. Instead, Freud's posi-
tion in "Totem and Taboo" and "Moses and Monotheism" ironically 
mimics those earlier peoples whom moderns suppose believed in the 
"aetiological': historical truth of their myths of origin. 
'What Freud's account of religion misses, Ricoeur charges, is two, 
interrelated things. First, as we have said, Freud denies the possibility-
and thereby the importance - of the progressive transformation or 
"epigeneses" in religious traditions over time. But, asks Ricoeur (and 
we think again of the genetic fallacy): 
What have I understood when I have discovered ... that the 
father figure is the representation of the deity? ... I do not 
know what the father means . .. I did not know what the father 
was until his image had engendered the whole series of his 
derivatives. . . (Ricoeur 1970: 541-2, emphasis added) 
As Freud argued in his clinical treatments of analysands' "primal scene" 
fantasies, that is, so Ricoeur argues that we simply need not maintain 
that the psychological force of religious stories depends primarily on 
the historical truth they allegedly report or distort. What is decisive is 
the meaning subjects attribute to these stories: a meaning that will be 
mediated by the "derivative" retellings of the traditions in which they 
live, and will reflect and speak to their present existential concerns. 
When we pose the question of the meaning of religious symbols, 
Ricoeur claims, we must say that Freud's psychoanalytic account of 
religion occludes their decisive "mythopoetic" or "creative» dimension. 
Freud may well show us how religious stories can and do, truly, give 
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repetitive form to repressed "archaisms» and fearful "idols". But this 
"archaeological" truth for Rieoeur in no way prevents these symbols at 
the same time from having another, forward-looking or "prophetic" 
dimension: one in which these archaic origins are "denied and over-
come" at the same time as they are repeated. Religious symbols, as reli-
gious, for Ricoeur, intimate that there is more to human experience 
than is dreamt of in philosophy, psychoanalysis, let alone Freud's pale 
ethnography. Whatever we might say concerning where religious sym-
bols came from, 
The force of a religious symbol lies in the fact that it ... trans-
forms [a primal scene fantasy] into an instrument of dis-
covery ... it is in and through certain primal scene fantasies 
that man "forms': "interprets': "intends" meanings of another 
order, meanings capable of becoming the signs of the 
sacred. . . (Ricoeur 1970: 540) 
At base, then, confronting Freud's critiques of religions returns us to 
our beginning in this chapter, with "Civilization and Its Discontents" 
and its questions concerning the meaning of human existence, whether 
there is anything irreducibly enigmatic about our condition, or whether, 
as Freud typically proposed (see Chapter 8), a scientific culture informed 
by psychoanalysis could be sufficient for a good life and society. 
Summary 
• Freud's "Civilization and Its Discontents" contends that, while 
living together in law-bound societies yields unquestionable 
benefits, civilization itself is a source of ineradicable ((dis-
contents". For the later Freud, there will always be a quota of 
non-erotic aggression (the death drive) that resists taming by 
civilization. 
• The guilt particularly evident in obsessional neuroses shows 
how the psychological costs of living peaceably with others is the 
redirection of the death drive against the ego - this is why the 
superego, especially of the most moral individuals, always has a 
snarling, excessive core. 
• The sublimation of the drives, which redirects their aims into 
culturally sanctioned practices such as art, is one of the principal 
instruments of civilization. 
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• Artists for Freud dream or "play out" their own - and indirectly 
all our - personal fantasies in their art, using the ars poetica to dis-
guise the personal, offensive content of these wishes. 
• Film theory has used psychoanalysis, and particularly Lacan's 
notion of the gaze, to explain audiences' enjoyment of films. 
Nevertheless, Lacan's "gaze" arguably upsets this programme, for 
it names a strictly uncanny object that confronts audiences with 
the return of the repressed, and reminds them of the finitude or 
partiality of their perspectives - something that implicates them 
in jouissance, rather than masterful self-satisfaction. 
• Freud's encounter with religion is central to psychoanalysis, yet 
deeply ambivalent. Freud argues both that religions console us 
for the fears that attend our finite condition, and that the com-
pelling character of religious beliefs and ritual attests to their 
origins in guilt for a primal, phylogenetic crime - the murder of 
the father of the primal horde. 
• For Freud, monotheism represents the truth of religion, in our 
infantile ambivalence towards the father, in a "purer" form -
indeed, in Christianity, the repressed phylogentic murder of the 
father is represented in the crucifixion. 
• Religious critics such as Pfister, Strauss and Ricoeur have sug-
gested that Freud's attempt to psychoanalytically discredit reli-
gions falls prey to the genetic fallacy, cannot "disprove" the truth 
of religious propositions, and flattens the meaning of these 
propositions, by seeking out their causal, historical and psycho-
logical explanations. In place of the "future of an illusion': they 
propose, Freud erects the ambivalent prospect of an "illusion of 
the future': a wholly rationalized, secular society. 
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Where psychoanalysis has come to be: 
philosophy, science, society and ethics 
Understanding psychoanalysis at the turn of the 
centuries 
Freud withheld publication of The Interpretation of Dreams until 1900. 
His aim was to signal his ambition that psychoanalysis should playa 
decisive role in the new century. From its tenuous beginnings in an elite 
Miinnerbund (or inner circle) of analysts around Freud in Vienna, 
Berlin and London, by the time Freud died in 1939, psychoanalysis had 
become a global movement. Even before the inauguration of the 
International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1910, psychoanaly-
sis's founding postulate of the unconscious had begun capturing the 
imaginations of film-makers, ad-men and the avant-garde. The embrace 
of Freudian ideas by the avant-garde in the first decades of the last cen-
tury inaugurated a wider process that would see psychoanalytic motifs 
saturate popular culture by the 1950s. Despite repression at the hands 
of both Soviets and Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s, clinical psychoanaly-
sis was practised between the wars in the United States, Italy, Holland, 
France, Turkey, Palestine, Argentina, India and Japan. In the United 
States, psychoanalysis was from the 1920s closely integrated into the 
medical establishment. So entrenched a facet of the post-New Deal 
state did it become that by 1941, when the United States entered World 
War II, the Surgeon General's Office required every military doctor to 
know its basic principles. In the 1950s, more than half of the university 
chairs in psychiatry in the new world were held by analysts (Kirsner 
2004: 345). By 1976, as Lacanian psychoanalysis flourished in France 
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and South America, the American Psychoanalytic Association boasted 
27,000 psychoanalysts (Zaretsky 2004: 281). 
Yet at the turn of the twenty-first century, the psychoanalytic 
movement is in widespread decline. The 1980s and 1990s saw a host of 
popular attacks on Freud (so-called "Freud bashing"), and considera-
tions of whether Freud might finally be «dead" (Masson 1984; Crews 
1995; Webster 1995). A 2003 Time Magazine article reported that there 
were only around 5,000 analysands in the United States, roughly only 
two per analyst, and that the mean age of the analysts was 62 (in the 
UK, 66). Psychoanalysis (principally Lacanian) has continued to 
flourish only in France and South America (particularly Argentina) 
(Kirsner 2004: 339-44; 2000). 
Eli Zaretsky, in his Secrets of the Soul (2004), presents an intriguing 
hypothesis to explain the rise and decline of psychoanalysis in the cen-
tury since The Interpretation of Dreams. Psychoanalysis's "golden age" 
until the 1960s corresponded to the «second industrial revolution". 
This revolution, associated with the advent of mass, «Fordisi': produc-
tion and consumer culture, led to a decisive separation of people's work 
lives from home and family. In this context, Freud's discovery of a "per-
sonal" (versus collective) unconscious spoke to a widespread "lived 
sense of disjuncture between the public and the private, the outer and 
the inner, the socio-cultural and the personal" (Zarestky 2004: 6). Its 
more recent decline, by contrast, reflects a third "industrial revolution': 
This revolution dates from the 1960s and the emergence of new social 
movements, such as second-wave feminism and identity politics move-
ments. These movements' politicizations of the private sphere (for 
instance gender roles, see Chapter 6) reflected a debt to psychoanalysis 
- perhaps one reason why "Freud bashing" is such a part of to day's 
"culture wars': particularly in the United States. Yet these new social 
movements also challenged the psychoanalytic focus on the personal 
unconscious. They shifted the focus of public debate and intellectual 
enquiry on to groups, culture and institutions. From around the 
same period, meanwhile, breakthroughs in neuroscience, cognitive 
behavioural psychology and psychiatric drugs have seen the advent of 
shorter, cheaper treatments for mental illness. The psychiatric treat-
ments associated with these changes have been much more successful 
than psychoanalysis in retaining public funding, despite the. worldwide 
rolling back of the welfare states since 1980. 
As we commented in our Introduction, psychoanalysis promised, 
uniquely, to bring together three components. These components span 
the sanctified boundaries in the modern West's intellectual division of 
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labour: psychoanalysis's materialist-biological philosophy of mind 
(Chapters 1, 2); its hermeneutic-interpretive understanding of culture 
(Chapters 3, 7); and its clinical embodiment as an ethical practice in 
self-discovery (see the section "The ends of psychoanalysis': below). As 
a result of the cultural and pharmacological revolutions of recent 
decades, Zaretsky observes that these three components have been 
torn asunder. Psychoanalytic practice has declined, and we shall see 
presently how even many of its friends now question its sufficiency. 
psychoanalytic theory, meanwhile, has largely migrated into the film 
and cultural studies departments in universities (Chapter 7). Here, 
stripped of its clinical clothing, it competes with other philosophical 
and interpretive theories of "discourse" or "representation". In this 
context, an understanding of the philosophical and other criticisms of 
psychoanalysis becomes particularly salient. It behoves us to evaluate 
whether this decline should be celebrated or rejected tout court, or what 
should be salvaged from psychoanalysis's fall. 
Mais qU'est-ce que c'est? Psychoanalysis and science 
Popper et a I.: psychoanalysis is not a science 
Freud's writings on religion (see Chapter 7) underscore his lifelong com-
mitment to the modern scientific Weltanschauung, and what he ironi-
cally called "our God Logos". Freud recognized that psychoanalysis, 
which takes as its objects dreams and the symptoms of the mad, steps 
boldly into territory traditionally reserved for the religious or super-
stitious. Yet from the start, Freud was at pains to distance the talking 
cure from its "one might say, mystical" origins - in Breuer's method 
of hypnotic suggestion (see Introduction). In Chapter 1 of ~'The 
Unconscious': Freud underscores how psychoanalysis's founding the-
oretical postulation of the unconscious is anything but the result of a 
taste for esoterica. When faced with symptoms, slips and dreams, we 
can give up on explaining them, assigning them instead to chance or 
the gods. Or we can argue that these irrational phenomena are ratio-
nally explicable as the products of the human psyche. If we take this 
second, more scientific, option, Freud's proposal is that we have no 
choice but to postulate the existence of the unconscious (Vcs: 167). To 
be sure, we cannot directly see the unconscious. But then, neither can 
physicists unaided see the atoms (subatomic particles, quarks, strings 
and so on) they postulate as the building blocks of nature. Neurotic 
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symptoms and dreams, Freud's claim is, represent "indirect proofs of 
the most cogent kind" for the unconscious (NU: 262). More directly, 
for Freud the validity of psychoanalytic metapsychology can be attested 
by the clinical testimony of analysands, and the curative efficacy of 
clinical psychoanalysis (Vcs: 167). 
Arguably the most important philosophical criticisms of psycho-
analysis challenge its would-be scientific status. While not question-
ing Freud's scientific intentions, analytic philosophers such as Nagel, 
Scriven, Skinner and Popper dispute whether psychoanalysis pro-
ceeds scientifically in gathering and understanding its evidences, direct 
or indirect. Ernest Nagers "Methodological Issues in Psychoanalytic 
Theory" (1959) exemplifies this type of criticism. Nagel, like Freud, 
was deeply committed to the belief that the modern sciences afford 
us a privileged (if not the only) way to truly know the world. For Nagel, 
what singles out genuinely scientific theories such as those of physics 
or chemistry is that their hypotheses make empirically testable pre-
dictions about the way things behave in the natural world. The . 
theory's predictions can be verified by any number of independent 
observers, in controlled experimental conditions. By contrast, Nagel 
observes that clinical psychoanalysis meets none of these conditions. 
The "data" the psychoanalytic clinic produce are irreducibly embedded 
in the singular transferential relationship between each analyst and 
her analysands. A particular analysand's psychoanalysis cannot, by 
its nature, be repeated or verified with just anyone. However ethically 
or otherwise defensible such a procedure might be, Nagel suggests, 
clinical psychoanalysis has no just claim to a scientific status (Nagel 
1959). 
The types of criticisms Nagel raised against psychoanalysis were, 
however, most famously developed by Karl Popper. Popper's intriguing 
philosophy of science maintains that true scientific theories do not seek 
out only confirmations of their predictions. In fact, the epistemological 
problem with religious and superstitious worldviews is that believers 
see everything that occurs as so many confirmations of their beliefs. 
Their belief systems are flexible enough to "explain" whatever tran-
spires - from good harvests, proofs of the gods' favour, to bad harvests, 
equally compelling proofs of their wrath. What distinguishes scientific 
theories, Popper argued, is their openness to "falsification"., A true sci-
ence is a "risky business': It makes hypotheses about events that might 
not occur, and that could be proven wrong. Popper gives the example 
of Einstein's hypothesis about the effects of the force of gravity on 
the behaviour of light. Initially the technologies did not exist to test 
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Einstein's theory. But the theory was exacting enough to make predic-
tions that subsequent photographic developments could have "falsified" 
_ had Einstein's theory not been right (Popper 1962). 
Popper's critique of psychoanalysis is, then, not that it claims to 
explain too little; his concern is that psychoanalytic metapsychology, 
like theologians' metaphysical systems, claims such power that it allows 
practitioners to "predict" any human behaviour. Consider, for example, 
Freud's famous notion of "resistance" to psychoanalysis, which lies at 
the heart of his ((Papers on Technique" (see "The ends of psychoanaly-
sis': below). According to this idea, analysands can be expected to resist 
their analyst's disclosures of the content of these wishes, because their 
unconscious wishes are repressed. Instead, analysands will repeat 
earlier ways of behaviour towards the analyst, "transferring" on to 
her/him their ancient loves or hatreds, based on the "stereotype plates" 
of their childhood relations with parents, siblings, carers (DT: 99-100; 
RRW). But, asks the Popperian, what happens when a given analysand 
rejects their analyst's interpretation of some symptom? Does not the 
notion of resistance license the analyst to see this "resistance" as con-
firmation of the interpretation, so that the analyst is really playing a 
kind of "heads I win, tails you lose" game with analysands? As Freud's 
"On Negation" concludes: 
There is no stronger evidence that we have been successful in 
our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patient 
reacts to it with words "I didn't think that", or ((I didn't (ever) 
think of that". (N: 239) 
We will return to these concerns at the conclusion of this chapter. 
Ricoeur: psychoanalysis is, indeed, not a natural science 
One of the "splinters" into which psychoanalysis has today divided is 
a hermeneutic or interpretive one. Following Freud's psychoanalytic 
interpretations of civilization, religion and art (Chapter 7) into the 
promised land of the humanities and social sciences, academics 
have embraced psychoanalysis as a theory of culture. Paul Ricoeur's 
1965 Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation provides 
the most sophisticated defence of this interpretive repackaging of 
psychoanalysis. 
Philosophical hermeneutics emerged out of Protestant attempts to 
reclaim the true meaning of the "book of books" (sola scriptura) from 
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beneath centuries of Catholic dogma. In the nineteenth century, 
however, thinkers such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey argued that a 
hermeneutic approach should become the basis for those modern 
"human sciences)~ for example history or sociology, for these human 
sciences aim to interpret the products of intentional human actions, as 
well as causally explaining historical events. In Freud and Philosophy, as 
Ricoeur's criticisms of Freud on religion reflect (Chapter 7), Ricoeur 
agrees with Popper, Nagel et al. that psychoanalysis is not a natural sci-
ence. Ricoeur contests that this is the standard against which psycho-
analysis should be judged. Psychoanalysis is based upon the spoken, 
subjective testimony of analysands, Ricoeur stresses - not any experi-
mental facts. Both the "past dramas" analysands recount, and the ana-
lytic process itself, are intersubjective. They involve multiple people, 
whose actions are shaped by the others' responses - as we stressed in 
looking at Klein and Lacan (Chapters 4 and 5). But this is a different 
type of practice from that of conducting physical experiments, where 
the scientist is faced by objects that do not «answer back". Analysands' 
words and actions, Ricoeur contends, should for these reasons be 
understood as "signifiers for the history of [their] desire" (Ricoeur 
1970: 369). They convey the meanings analysands give to their experi-
ences, true or imagined. Analysis is not forensics, police work or 
criminology, as people who lament Freud's 1897 sidelining of the 
"seduction theory" of the neuroses reflect (Masson 1984). Just as one 
might read a book looking for its meanings, Ricoeur echoes Lacan, so 
the testimony of analysands is a type of «text" the analyst is called upon 
to interpret (see Chapter 3): 
[A] nalytic experience unfolds in the field of speech and ... 
within this field, what comes to light is another language, dis-
sociated from common language, and which presents itself to 
be deciphered through its meaningful effects - symptoms, 
dreams, various formulations, etc. (Ricoeur 1970: 366-7) 
How then does Ricoeur account for Freud's continual framing 
of psychoanalysis in the biological language of «drives", "cathexes" 
and «abreaction"? In Habermas's concurring words (see below), 
Ricoeur proposes that Freud was the victim of a "scientistic self-
misunderstanding" (Habermas 1978: 246). Clinical psychoanalysts, 
Ricoeur notes, never encounter such "energetic') phenomena as the 
"drives" except through their "instinctual representatives" in the speech, 
slips, dreams and neuroses of analysands. (And we think here of Freud's 
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"frontier" definition of the drives; see Chapter 2). Freud's ideas, to 
which "energy" is attached or "cathected'~ Ricoeur contends, 
operate at the level of the instinctual representatives and are 
accessible to analysis only in the distortion of meaning ... as 
soon as the economics [of the drives] is separated from its 
rhetorical manifestations [in symptoms, slips, dreams], the 
metapsychology no longer systematises what occurs in the 
analytic dialogue; it engenders a fanciful demonology, if not 
an absurd hydraulics. (Ricoeur 1970: 370-71) 
Neuropsychoanalysis: a new synthesis? 
In the last decade, a third approach - "neuropsychoanalysis" - has 
emerged concerning psychoanalysis's relationship to the sciences. This 
approach is led by a group of neuroscientists including Antonio 
Damasio, Mark Solms and Nobel Laureate Eric Kandel, in the Inter-
national Neuropsychoanalytic Society (NPSA). The neuropsycho-
analysts' argument is that our continuing inability to scientifically 
test Freud's metapsychological hypotheses about the workings of the 
mind does not forever discredit these hypotheses. It potentially reflects 
how far ahead of his times Freud was. Freud always granted his 
metapsychological ideas a provisional status - as ideas that "will pre-
sumablyone day be based on an organic substructure" (ON: 77-9). 
Perhaps, the NPSAs website suggests, that day has now come: 
Freud, in his 1895 "Project for a Scientific Psychology," 
attempted to join the emerging discipline of neuroscience of 
his time. But that was a hundred years ago, when the neuron 
had only just been described ... We have had to wait many 
decades before the sort of data Freud needed finally became 
available. Now ... contemporary neuroscien~e allows for the 
resumption of the search for correlation between the two 
disciples. (Arnold Pfeffer, at http://www.neuro-psa.org. uk) 
Notably, the starting position of the advocates of the "neuropsycho-
analytic turn" is a rejection of all attempts, like Ricoeur's, to hermeneu-
tically reground psychoanalysis. Eric Kandel asserts that this move "has 
hindered psychoanalysis from continuing to grow intellectually" in the 
last three decades (Kandel 1999: 508); for Mark Solms, it has "in-
sulated" psychoanalysis from continuing scientific progress and kudos 
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(Solms 1996: 701). Kandel concurs with Nagel that "although psycho-
analysis has historically been scientific in its aims, it has rarely been so 
in its methods: it has failed over the years to submit its assumptions 
to testable experimentation" (Kandel 1999: 507; 1998: 468-9). Unlike 
both Nagel and Popper, however, Kandel and other neuropsycho_ 
analysts believe that psychoanalytic hypotheses can and should be sub-
mitted to natural-scientific testing. "The failure of psychoanalysis to 
provide objective evidence that it is effective as a therapy can no longer 
be accepted" (Kandel 1999: 523). What then do the neuropsycho_ 
analysts propose for psychoanalysis, to reverse its institutional decline? 
Recall how Klein and Lacan's developments of psychoanalytic theory 
were based on the most advanced scientific observations of infants' 
behaviour, ethology and the social sciences (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Kandel's position is that psychoanalysis, in this vein, should shed its 
present pretences to disciplinary autonomy. It should recognize that 
"if it is to have a future, it lies in the context of empirical psychology, 
abetted by imaging techniques, neuroanatomical methods, and human 
genetics" (Kandel 1998: 468), that is, the most advanced scientific tech-
niques available at the start of the twenty-first century. As Kandel sees 
things, this will involve psychoanalysis in a two-way exchange with 
empirical biology and psychology. On one hand, the key metapsycho-
logical notions should each be tested, and where necessary revised, 
against the data furnished by to day's experimental sciences. As the 
neuropsychoanalyst-philosopher Jim Hopkins concurs: 
[I] f psychoanalytic claims about motivation are correct we 
should be able to relate them to those of other disciplines, such 
as social psychology, developmental psychology, evolutionary 
psychology, and neuroscience. (Hopkins 2004: 1) 
On the other hand, neuropsychoanalysts are aware that, for all the 
recent advances in psychopharmacology, these practical advances have 
forged far ahead of the current theoretical bases of neuroscience. 
Psychoanalysis, Kandel argues, still provides by far "the most coherent 
and intellectually satisfying view of the mind" (Kandel 1999: 505), one 
whose very scope as a theory of personality and mental illness far 
exceeds other materialist philosophies of mind. For this. reason, he 
suggests, psychoanalysis can play an important role in the future of 
neuroscientific research, possibly one "equivalent to the one played 
by Darwin's theory of evolution in relation to molecular genetics'~ as 
Mark Solms concurs - namely, as "a [theoretical] template on which 
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emerging [neuroscientific] details can be coherently arranged" (Solms 
2004: 85). In several works, Solms has indeed sought to corroborate 
several of Freud's metapsychological hypotheses using neuroscientific 
techniques. In his Neuropsychology of Dreams, for instance, Solms 
shows that Freud's hypothesis concerning dreams' function to preserve 
sleep is consistent with the known data concerning the disturbed sleep-
ing patterns of patients with brain lesions that prevent their dreaming 
(Solms 1997). Alongside Karen Kaplan-Solms, Solms has also used 
neurological mapping to corroborate what Freud could only anti-
cipate: a material basis for the functional agencies (ego, superego, id) 
his later metapsychology postulated: 
Recent neurological mapping generally correlates to Freud's 
conception. The core brain-stem and limbic system - respon-
sible for instincts and drives - roughly correspond to Freud's 
id. The central frontal region, which controls selective inhibi-
tion, the dorsal frontal region, which controls self-conscious 
thought, and the posterior cortex, which represents the out-
side world, amount to the ego and the superego. 
(Solms 2004: 85) 
Freud's pharmacy: his sociocultural critics 
Freud's academic refuge during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
the humanities, has its own sizeable contingent of "Freud bashers" - or 
at least those who take a critical stance towards psychoanalysis. From 
post-Marxist French philosophers (Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and 
Guattari) to conservative critics (Carroll, Rieff and Lasch), psycho-
analysis has, broadly speaking, been received in the humanities as kind 
of a pharmakon of modern civilization: both poison and panacea, and 
one that has left a sour aftertaste in the mouths of many. 
The French poststructuralists 
The philosopher Jacques Derrida's relationship to psychoanalysis is 
complex and ambivalent - perhaps even "Oedipal". Derrida differen-
tiates his own "deconstructive" methodology from psychoanalysis, 
which he sees remaining too "dialectical" and "metaphysical": a dis-
course in which the unconscious truth is always to be returned to its 
"rightful place" apres coup (or Nachtraglichkeit), at the end of the 
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analysis. In The Margins of Philosophy, however, Derrida acknowledges 
his debt to Freud's concept of the unconscious (Derrida 1982: 18), and 
elsewhere doffs his cap to Freud and Lacan's legacy to deconstruction. 
Derrida's debt to Freud is clear in his early work, Dissemination. 
Derrida draws here on Freud's elaboration of a "kettle logic" (from The 
Interpretation of Dreams) to unravel the logics whereby philosophers 
defend some of their central notions. "Kettle logic" describes the mutu-
ally contradictory excuses a man Freud cites uses to clear his name from 
returning broken a kettle he had borrowed: he never borrowed it, it was 
already broken when he did, and besides, it was returned intact. The 
«kettle-logic" metaphor is a key element of Derrida's famous critique 
of Plato, Rousseau and Saussure's privileging of speech over writing, 
as closer to the full presence of meaning to the philosophical subjeces 
living intentionality: 
Analogously: 1. Writing is rigorously exterior and inferior to 
living memory and speech, which are therefore undamaged by 
it. 2. Writing is harmful to them because it puts them to sleep 
and infects their very life which would otherwise remain 
intact. 3. Anyway, ifone has resorted to hypomnesia and writ-
ing ... , it is not for their intrinsic value, but because living 
memory is finite, it already has holes in it before writing ever 
comes to leave its traces. Writing has no effect on memory. 
(Derrida 1981: Ill) 
Derrida's best-known contretemps with psychoanalysis is "The 
Purveyor of Truth" (The Post Card), written in response to Lacan's 
seminar on Poe's (Purloined Letter". At first glance, there would seem 
to be ample basis for Derrida to agree with Lacan. We saw in Chapter 5 
how Lacan's commentary on Poe's short story emphasizes the role of 
the signifier, and its location in an intersubjective network of social 
relations, in determining the subject's identity. "Purloined': Lacan 
stresses, means "displaced" [in suffrance] - rather than simply "stolen" 
[ volee] (Lacan 2006: 29). For Lacan, as for Derrida, meaning is pro-
duced throug~ a movement of continual displacement and deferral 
in relation to differences within a linguistic, social structure - a move-
ment Derrida calls differance (with an "a"). 
However, in "The Purveyor of Truth" Derrida is mockingly critical of 
Lacan. He targets psychoanalysis's alleged "imperialism": the tendency 
to find itself wherever psychoanalysis looks. Derrida objects to Lacan's 
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allegedly "Hegelian" tendency to neutralize dyadic ("imaginary") 
tension and ambiguities into a third (,(symbolic") term. For example, 
Derrida challenges the legitimacy of Lacan's resolution of the conflict-
ing duos (the queen and the minister; the minister and Dupin) in the 
story's key scenes into a «symbolic" trio, wherein the "purloined letter" 
-like the castrating operation of language more widely - is the "third" 
term that interrupts individuals' imaginary identifications (since, as we 
recall from Chapter 5, the letter, a symbol of power, disempowers its 
possessor). A second and related instance of "Hegelianism" Derrida 
decries is Lacan's alleged substantialization of the "lack': embodied by 
the unopened letter, as originary cause of desire. According to Derrida, 
this "substantive" lack comes to illegitimately order (and stifle) the play 
of absence and presence which, he argues, produces linguistic meaning: 
[I]t will suffice to change a letter, perhaps even less than a 
letter, in the expression "manque a sa placl' [missing from its 
place], perhaps it will suffice to introduce into this expres-
sion ... an a without an accent mark, in order to make appar-
ent that if the lack has its place [manque a sa place] in this 
atomistic topology of the signifier ... then the existing order 
will not have been upset: the letter will always refind its proper 
place, a circumvented lack ... the letter will be where it always 
will have been, always should have been, intangible and inde-
structible via the detour of a proper, and properly circular, 
itinerary. (Derrida 1987: 425) 
Derrida's critique culminates with his reading of the final line of 
Lacan's Poe seminar. "Thus, it is that what the 'purloined letter; nay, the 
'letter in sufferance: means is that a letter always arrives at its destina-
tion" (Lacan 2006: 46/61). Derrida interprets the letter's eventual 
return to its "destination" here as indicating its teleological predisposi-
tion' as theorized by Lacan. For Derrida, the displacement of the 
letter/signifier that Lacan had previously emphasized is thus ironically 
nullified by this final statement. Emphasizing the extent to which the 
word is always in excess of the subject who speaks/writes it, Derrida 
ponders: if the letter is truly displaced, then could it not also miss its 
destination? Both Barbara Johnson (1988: 248) and Slavoj Zizek (1992: 
10) argue, to the contrary, that, by juxtaposing "displacement" and 
"destination" in the final sentence of the Poe seminar, Lacan simply 
indicates the transference (see below). Accordingly, that the letter 
philosophy, science, society and ethics 181 
always reaches its destination means only that the subject misrecog~ 
nizes itself in the other. ''1'' receive myself from the other in reversed 
form - much like the Queen's letter, which the minister conceals by 
simply turning its envelope inside out. In this context, Lacan conceives 
of the lettees "destination» not as a fixed position to which it must ultim-
ately be delivered, but rather as the (subject) position determined by its 
reception. 
Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, pose objec-
tions to psychoanalysis concerned more with the question of desire 
than of meaning. Foucault, like Derrida, both affirms and criticizes 
psychoanalysis. In The Order of Things (1966) Foucault accords a pri-
vileged position to psychoanalysis ( alongside ethnology) among the 
human sciences. Despite Freud's scientistic ambitions, Foucault sees 
Freud as a tireless questioner of the role of science in human affairs, 
and of the possibility of a truly exhaustive science of humanity, 
Psychoanalysis, Foucault says, serves a much-needed "critical func-
tion" respecting the human sciences: 
[B]y following the same path as the human sciences, but 
with its gaze turned the other way, psychoanalysis moves 
towards the moment ... at which the contents of conscious-
ness articulate themselves, or rather stand gaping, upon man's 
finitude. (Foucault 1970: 374) 
For Foucault, psychoanalysis is distinct from the other human 
sciences (sociology, criminology, economics and so on) because of 
its encounter with human finitude. The concept of the unconscious 
radically decentres human subjectivity, Foucault stresses, such that 
the modern "subject" is less a foundation than an effect of discourses, 
power and knowledges. 
While this understanding of psychoanalysis arguably still haunts the 
first volume of Foucault's famous History of Sexuality (La Volante de 
savoir-literally "the will to knowledge"), La Volonte also critiques psy-
choanalysis. Foucault sets out a two-pronged attack. First, he contends 
that there has been a proliferation of discourses addressing sexuality 
since the eighteenth century, during which sexuality has taken on cul-
turally unprecedented importance as the secret truth of subjects' inner 
selves. Secondly, Foucault challenges the idea, expressed pre-eminently 
by Freud, that sexuality has been socially "repressed", so that in speak-
ing the truth of our sexuality, we speak for freedom against power. 
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.According to the Foucault of La Volante, the Freudian '(talking cure" 
bears a significant resemblance to the confessional of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, many of whose features it adapts. Psychoanalysis 
in this way both exemplifies and conceals the subtle ways in which 
modern medical, social and juridical institutions - far from simply say-
ing "no!" to subjects' sexuality - actively incite subjects to speak con-
cerning their most intimate lives, and documents their testimony for its 
own purposes. Indeed, by arguing that all human drives are ultimately 
both sexual and unconscious, and then clinically prescribing that 
analysands speak their mind to release it, psychoanalysis represents for 
Foucault a wider cultural shift - wherein modern subjects have been 
encouraged by scientific culture to think of themselves as living, desir-
ing animals (versus political subjects or citizens), whose private lives 
and drives are of governmental concern for managing the population, 
diseases, birth rates, productivity, GDPs and so on. 
In Foucault's La Volante de savoir, the Oedipus complex is seen as 
a process through which the family comes to be a conduit of sexual-
ized repression and governmental control. Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari's contemporaneous work, Anti-Oedipus, similarly emphasizes 
the role of "Oedipus" in normalizing desire and subjectivity. Deleuze 
and Guattari draw upon the psychoanalytic battery of concepts in 
order to produce their own philosophy of desire - given that Felix 
Guattari was trained and analysed by Lacan, this is hardly surprising. 
However, their reference to psychoanalytic concepts is marked by a 
displacement of these concepts: where the aim is to reinvest psycho-
analysis with a different, Nietzschean, "force". As Philip Goodchild 
writes, this "attack on psychoanalysis can be regarded as an attempt 
to reform and redirect it from within" (Goodchild 1996: 122). 
KEY POINT "Desire" in Anti-Oedipus and in psychoanalysis 
• For both Deleuze and Guattari, and for Freud, deSire is a sexual or corpor-
eal energy that permeates and produces all relations, whether political, 
social or psychological (ibid.). 
• But where Freudian desire suggests a kind of deprivation or "lack" (sum-
marized by castration, the "non", and the pleasure principle), for Deleuze 
and Guattari desire is affirmative, productive and even wasteful: creating 
from superabundance rather than need (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 28). 
Deleuze and Guattari identify "lack" as an effect (or "countereffect", imply-
ing reactivity) of desire that psychoanalytic theory then retroactively 
posits as its cause. 
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• For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is, rather, heterogeneous and positive: 
Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, 
rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a 
fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. 
Desire and its object are one and the same thing ... Desire is a 
machine, and the object of desire is another machine con-
nected to it ... Lack is a countereffect of desire. . . (Ibid.: 28) 
In Anti-Oedipus, desire is characterized by two movements of 
production (synthesis) and creative "anti-production" (dissolution). 
Deleuze and Guattari call these, respectively, "desiring production" 
and the "body-without-organs" - loosely aligned with Freud's later 
division of the drives into "libido" (or Eros) and the "death drive" 
(Thanatos) (see Chapter 4). Desiring production, like libido, is indus. 
trious. It connects and assembles, creating new forms and occupying 
more and more space. Capitalism is the paradigm of what they call the . 
"desiring machine", as its chief capacity is to incorporate and co-opt 
other forces and bodies, in search of ever-renewed profits. The "body. 
without-organs", on the other hand, tends towards disintegration _ 
providing a limit for desiring production (and capitalism). It is a point 
of stasis and overfullness, wherein new connections are refused and the 
body begins to devolve to its constituent parts. Deleuze and Guattari, 
however, repudiate the strong metaphysical dualism of Freud's theory 
of Eros and Thanatos. For them production and anti-production are 
only different «moments" within one and the same process, expressing 
implicit tendencies of desire, understood as what they call a "plane of 
. " Immanence. 
Deleuze and Guattari's claim that desire is a "plane of immanence" 
means that the field of desire comprises all bodies and their relations 
to one another - there is no transcendent "outside". Desire creates 
«reality" (corporeal, social, psychological) and not only representa .. 
tions (fantasies) and signifiers. Here, however, Deleuze and Guattari 
arguably oversimplify the part of fantasy within psychoanalytic theory: 
as Zizek points out, for Lacan the virtual- fantasy and the symbolic-
provides the means by which reality can appear for us, phenomenolo.; 
gically. Fantasy is how desire gives shape to reality, as well as a specific 
kind of subjectivity (Zizek 2004: 3-9, 94-101). Deleuze and Guattari's 
critique of the subject is another case in point, The subject of psycho", 
analysis is represented as a "fixed" subject, rather than the fragile; 
"split" subject of Freud, Klein or Lacan. While for Lacan the assump" 
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tion of a subject position inaugurates desire, for Deleuze and Guattari 
the subject stifles and represses desire. Drawing on Nietzsche and 
pierre Klossowski, Deleuze and Guattari envisage subjectivity as a will-
to-disintegration, ·or delirium, rather than a neurotic attachment to 
ideality and wholeness (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 4). Klein's notion 
of "part objects" is revaluated in this connection, although Klein is 
duly rebuked for misunderstanding the "logic" of partial objects. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, the relation between the drive and its object does 
not inevitably lead to the integration of the object into a "whole" (ibid.: 
47). Deleuze and Guattari shift the partial object from the realm of fan-
tasy to reality, a I?ove whose libertarian radicality is indicated by their 
elevation of Judge Schreber, the psychotic par excellence (see Chapter 5) 
to a kind of poster-boy for the modus vivendi they valorize. 
Anti-Oedipus renders Schreber as enacting the fecundity and risk 
that Deleuze and Guattari prioritize in desire, but which, they contend, 
psychoanalysis attempts to circumvent. Judge Schreber creates con-
nections and realities, and offers himself up to the productions of 
other "desiring machines" (e.g. God). Through his delirium, Schreber 
decomposes (or decodes) himself, rendering his diverse components 
ready for new compositions. Freud, Klein and Lacan are ill equipped to 
interpret psychosis in such a positive light, Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
because of their commitment to the Oedipal triangle (ibid.: 16). The 
"schizo" represents, for Deleuze and Guattari, a social and subjective 
possibility engendered by its relation to desiring production. It is thus 
irreducible to the clinically designated paranoid schizophrenic whom 
the psychoanalysts attempted to treat. The "schizo" of Anti-Oedipus is 
rather elevated to a romantic site of resistance to capitalism: «decoding 
and recoding" (or displacing) the "socius': as its "surplus product" 
(ibid.: 38). The Freudian clinic in turn participates in the codification 
of capitalist subjects by reinforcing and reproducing its Oedipal man-
date: the neurotic mode of consumption and production amenable to 
capitalist society. 
Therapeutic culture and the decline of the West: Rieff, Carroll, 
Lasch 
Where the French poststructuralists emphasize the complicity of 
the psychoanalytic project with later capitalism, Freud's conservative 
critics are concerned with a different cultural crisis: what Nietzsche 
signalled as Western nihilism, arising from the growth of the "value-
free" sciences and the diminishing role of religion in Western societies. 
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For these theorists, the twentieth century has seen the decline of 
Western "culture" - understood as a symbolic (or extra-empirical) sys~ 
tern that directs the self outward, towards a higher purpose and a com-
munity of others. For these theorists, psychoanalysis plays a critical role 
in this shift, offering insight about, but also contributing to, the demise 
of culture. 
In Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, Philip Rieff famously character-
izes contemporary humanity as "psychological man" - arising at the 
end of a progression from «political man" of ancient times, through 
"religious man" of Judaeo-Christianity, and the relatively impover-
ished "economic man)) of the Enlightenment. Psychological man 
adheres closely to Nietzsche's designation of the "last man': concerned 
solely with his own comfort. Freud's studies of neurosis offer valuable 
insights into the present crisis in culture because, according to Rieff, 
human beings without a transcendent purpose become trapped in 
their own narcissism. Freud's own part in humanity's "devolution" was 
then to legitimate ('self-concern as the highest science" (Rieff 1979: 
355). Furthermore, with his generalizing account of neurosis, Freud for 
Rieff succeeded in levelling out or "democratizing" human existence. 
KEY POI N T The democratization of the human soul, according 
to Rieff 
1. Freud levels humanity by positing the thesis that so-called JJnormal" 
people are already "abnormal/I, in that coping involves becoming 
neurotic. 
2. In order to illustrate this thesis, Freud takes a noble and tragic myth (of 
Oedipus) from the Greeks and renders it ordinary: 
[T]he unique crime of the tragic hero becomes an intention in 
every heart, and in the most ordinary of plots, the history of 
every family ... The aristocratic bias of the "heroic" myth is 
replaced, in Freud, by the democratic bias of the "scientific" 
myth. (Rieff 1979: 354) 
3. By means of the psychoanalytic ethiC, whereby "everyone must be a con-
fessant, everyone must aspire to be a confessor" (ibid.: 355), Freud levels 
differences in the hierarchy between doctor and patient. The clinic is thus 
democratized. 
As Freudianism becomes more ubiquitous in contemporary culture, 
the clinic can be seen, Rieff argues, as a microcosm of society in general: 
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"the hospital is succeeding the Church and the parliament as the 
archetypal institution of Western culture)' (ibid.). Rieff's The Triumph 
of the Therapeutic (1966) argues that the primary value of culture is 
now to administer "therapy" to an animal that constitutes itself as sick 
and suffering. 
Lasch and Carroll (a student of Rieffs) continue Rieff's critique 
of culture. For Lasch, the ('crisis" facing contemporary American 
culture is a crisis of confidence: a malaise confronting it after the 
1960s and military defeat in Vietnam. A culture of narcissism and 
self-improvement has succeeded a Republican culture of political 
involvement, Lasch laments. In late-twentieth-century America, people 
feel disempowered and exhausted. In this context, psychoanalytic 
analyses afford unique insight into American society. In particular, 
Freud's clinical account of narcissism constitutes a «storehouse of 
ideas" (Lasch 1979: 34) that can inform strategies for diagnosing and 
treating cultural malaise. 
John Carroll is more critical than Lasch of Freud's part in the per-
ceived decline of Western culture - especially in Freud's account of reli-
gion as a projection of the "father" into the metaphysical sphere (see 
Chapter 7). This exemplifies, according to Carroll, a self-annihilating 
tendency in all humanisms, which can find nothing of value outside of 
the human ("all-too-human"). For Carroll, humanism is ultimately 
unable to respond to questions traditionally dealt with by religion: 
principally, questions of the meaning and value of human existence. 
Having rejected any notion of transcendence, humanist modes of 
enquiry must then ultimately trivialize their own object of investiga-
tion. Humanity is belittled by its privileging of reason over faith, and -
as in Rieff - a concomitant turn from the public sphere to the private 
self. For Carroll, after Freud's account of civilization in terms of the 
Oedipus complex, we can find '(no difference between Napoleon and 
Christ" as "both were 'father figures'" (Carroll 2004: 216); and God 
has been replaced by "the unconscious" (ibid.: 217), so we all carry 
a piece of the divine within us. Humanism has set humanity adrift 
in a relativistic sea of conflicting values - or, more dangerously, no 
value - according to Carroll; and we need to recognize that Freud, an 
"influential prophet of nihilism", has played his own unconscious 
part in this "colossal wreck" (ibid.: 1). 
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The ends of psychoanalysis: psychoanalysis and ethics 
Habermas's reframing of psychoanalysis - as a practice 
We mentioned Zaretsky's idea that psychoanalysis as a movement of 
modern thought uniquely promises to unite a materialistic account of 
mind, an interpretive understanding of culture, with an ethical practice 
of self-transformation. Throughout Understanding Psychoanalysis, we 
have stressed the clinical origin and end of psychoanalytic theory. 
Everything turns on the remarkable prospect of a talking cure for the 
neuroses. Freud's oeuvre accordingly contains not only his meta-
psychological papers, and the intriguing writings on civilization, 
religion and art that we examined in Chapter 7. It also includes the 
case studies (Hans, the Ratman, Dora and others). At the same time 
Freud was developing his vital metapsychological papers (1911-15), 
moreover, he wrote a series of important "Papers on Technique': in 
which he reflects theoretically on what transpires between analysts 
and analysands in clinical sessions. 
Given this "primacy of the therapeutical" to psychoanalysis, it is 
remarkable that so many of the criticisms of psychoanalysis we have 
examined do not engage more extensively with psychoanalytic prac-
tice. Or, if they do, they do so only to gauge its comparability to some 
other type of activity: whether a natural-scientific experiment, reading 
a text, or going to confession. Reflecting this tendency, even friends to 
psychoanalysis's cause such as Eric Kandel have proposed that psycho-
analysis should forego its basis in clinical practice if it is to rejoin 
the scientific Weltanschauung (Kandel 1999: 506). In this context, 
Frankfurt School theorist Jiirgen Habermas's critique of psychoanaly-
sis in his Knowledge and Human Interests is particularly interesting. 
For Habermas, psychoanalysis is above all a type of practice - less 
something one knows, than something one does. 
Working in a tradition of "Freudo-Marxism" more recently contin-
ued by Zizek (see Chapter 7), Habermas's Knowledge and Human 
Interests (1978) compares clinical psychoanalysis's activity of uncover-
ing analysands' repressed wishes with Marxist ideology critique, with 
its aim to uncover political systems' "repressed" truth(s) (cf. Zizek 
1989). Like Ricoeur, Habermas rejects Freud's attempts to explain what 
occurs in the psychoanalytic clinic through his biological account 
of energies "cathected" to repressed ideas; and "abreacted') when truly 
interpreted. If this were all that was in play, Habermas notes, a true 
hypnotic anamnesis would be sufficient for a cure, and Freud need 
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never have invented psychoanalysis. By rejecting hypnosis for the talk-
ing cure, Habermas stresses that Freud was embracing a practice in 
which what is therapeutically decisive is not the "objective" truth of an 
interpretation alone, but the analysand's own, "conscious appropria-
tion" of this truth (Habermas 1978: 247-51). 
In line with Ricoeur and Lacan, Habermas understands analysands' 
symptoms as "split -off symbols ... [whose] connection with public 
language ... has gone underground" (ibid.: 257). Why do these "split-
off" symbols repeat? According to Habermas's Hegelian formulation, 
what psychoanalysis posits is that, when a subjecfs wishes are repressed 
into the id, they take on a quasi-natural, causal status, like "the causal-
ity of fate" expressed in the oracle that pronounced Oedipus' doom in 
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannis (ibid.: 271). For this reason, Habermas 
stresses that the psychoanalyst ethically must not approach the anal-
ysand like a natural scientist approaches his objects, aiming only to 
enumerate, objectively, their unconscious thoughts. Such a scientific 
approach can only enforce the subject's sense that their repressed drives 
are an alien It. The analyst must instead adapt the "general interpre-
tations" of Freudian metapsychology - the theories of the drives, 
Oedipus complex, symptom formation and so on - to the particular 
language of each analysand. For if the analysand is to overcome her 
self-alienation, she must actively reconceive her symptoms as a "her-
meneutically understandable meaning structure': rather than the 
fatal incomprehensible "destinings" of an overpowering, malign Other 
(Habermas 1972: 272). If an analysis is to work, that is, the analysand 
must literally come to "make sense': for herself, out of her previously 
senseless symptoms. Psychoanalytic interpretations, Habermas con-
tends, are "interpretive suggestions for a story the patient cannot [yet] 
tell)) (ibid.: 260), rather than predictions of their behaviour. Their 
aim is to bring the analysand to the point where she can, as a subject, 
avow her repressed wishes as her own. And this, suggests Habermas's 
account, is where a Popperian criticism of psychoanalytic interpreta-
tions falls short (see above). For even if an analysand does resist and 
say "no!" to an interpretation, the falsifying standard is the effect this 
interpretation has upon her, and whether it facilitates her expanded 
self-comprehension. Sometimes an analysand's "no" to an interpreta-
tion means that it has truly missed the mark. Yet often, an analysand's 
responding associations will belie their initial resistance, forcing them 
to confront its falsity (ibid.: 266-9). 
The elegance of Habermas's argument is that it allows us to explain 
both why natural-scientific and hermeneutic accounts of psychoanalysis 
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have plausibility, but each falls short. The natural-scientific paradigm 
(Freud, Nagel, Popper, Solms, Kandel) responds to how symptoms, 
dreams and so on appear to neurotic subjects: as objective, causal 
determinants of behaviour. The hermeneutic stress on their meanings, 
by contrast (as in Ricoeur) answers to the aim of the psychoanalytic 
clinic: to symbolize the fatal, ((split -off" representatives of the drives. 
What is decisive for Habermas, however, is the process of subjective 
transformation psychoanalysis involves, between the two epistemolog-
ical stations. The specific nature of this process is captured in Freud's 
injunction for psychoanalysis, that "where the id was, there I shall 
come to be" (Wo Es war, soU Ich werden). Psychoanalysis, Habermas 
proposes) is a paradigm instance of a practice of enlightenment: an 
activity of critical self-reflection which, by resignifying the id as part of 
the I, transforms the I that undertakes the activity. 
You must be having me on! Grunbaum's (critique of) suggestion 
Habermas's valorization of clinical psychoanalysis as a practice of 
emandpatory self-reflection highlights the ethical register to psycho-
analysis. The psychoanalytic analysand, confronting the truth of her 
desire, transforms her ethos or character. Psychoanalysis is closer to a 
practically grounded theory than a preformed science which would 
then be clinically "applied". Yet the clinical footing on which Habermas 
recentres debates on psychoanalysis's claims is hardly less controversial 
than the other fields in which psychoanalysis has been criticized. 
Indeed, whether critics assess psychoanalysis as an "Oedipal" attempt 
to corral desire, an unscientific mysticism or quasi -scientific brand of 
navel-gazing, one thing they share is a deep distrust of its institutional-
ized clinical forms. A 2002 Marketing Report commissioned by the 
American Psychoanalytic Society highlighted the ways institutional 
psychoanalysis is invariably conceived by non-analysts around the 
world: 
1. Arrogance, elitism, hauteur ... sense of esoteric knowledge, 
authoritarianism, internecine conflict, lack of openness, inability 
to listen, insularity ... 
2. Closed approaches, belief in psychoanalysis based on faith 
instead of evidence (at Kirsner 2004: 340). 
Freud's defence in the 1920s of the possibility of ('lay analysis" was 
the corollary of his conviction that a psychoanalyst can only become 
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qualified by themselves undergoing analysis. To acquire any body of 
knowledge, medicinal or metapsychological, was not sufficient (QLA). 
This professional recommendation was motivated by Freud's ethical 
concern that to analyse others, analysts should be able to recognize and 
temper their own propensities to "transfer" unconscious wishes and 
identifications on to analysands. From the outside, however, this way of 
training analysts has invited comparisons of psychoanalytic institu-
tions with religious sects, presided over by their own esoteric rites of 
passage. From the inside, it can and has encouraged sectarianism, a clo-
sure to external verification and conflicting opinions, and the defensive 
invocation of Freud's (Klein's, Lacan's and others') name(s) in lieu of 
argued validity claims. On such grounds, notably, one of Eric Kandel's 
principal prescriptions for any viable "future of psychoanalysis" is for a 
large-scale, independent investigation of the conduct of psychoanalytic 
institutes, with serious reforms to be considered (Kandel, 1999: 522). 
Published in 1984, as new psychopharmacological medicines and 
therapies proliferated, Adolf Grunbaum's The Foundations of Psycho-
analysis was intended to end debates concerning psychoanalysis's sci-
entific, or ethical, legitimacy. Grunbaum, like Popper or Nagel, takes 
Freud's claim that psychoanalysis is a natural science very seriously, 
and for this reason criticizes Ricoeur and Habermas. Where Grunbaum 
differs from Popper is that he argues that psychoanalytic theory did 
generate falsifiable, risky predictions concerning human behaviour. 
For Grunbaum, psychoanalysis is indeed not only falsifiable; it has been 
falsified (Grunbaum 1994: 12-13). 
Underlying Freud's metapsychology, Grunbaum argues, are two 
core contentions. He calls these the "tally argument" and "the neces-
sary condition thesis". The "tally argument" asserts that only psycho-
analysis can yield insights that "tally" truly with the unconscious. The 
'(necessary condition thesis': which clinically takes all, asserts that only 
psychoanalysis can cure neurotic symptoms. The link between the two 
theses is Freud's claim that symptoms can only be "abreacted" if the 
analyst's interpretation "tallies" truthfully with the unconscious wishes 
of the analysand. Grunbaum's criticism of Freud can be framed by 
looking at his criticism of Freud's interpretation of an analysand's 
failure to recall a long-known Latin sentence: "exoriare aliquis nostris 
ex ossibur ultor" C'would that someone arise from our bones as an 
avenger"). The young man wanted to express his anger about the anti-
Semitism his people continued to bear. However, at the spur of the 
moment, he could not recall the "aliquis". In the course of his free asso-
ciations, the young man expressed his anxiety that he might have made 
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his Italian girlfriend pregnant - a situation which meant that "aliquis" 
might, indeed, arise from his actions, It was this repressed thought, says 
Freud, that caused his parapraxis, 
In his response to this example, Grunbaum concedes that there is a 
thematic or semantic connection between the thought "I wish some-
one would arise, , ," and the young man's memory of his illicit liaison. 
However, Grunbaum's point is to distinguish between such a thematic 
connection and the type of causal connection Freud wants between the 
repressed thought and the forgetting of «aliquis": 
There is no justification for drawing a causal connection 
between the fear of pregnancy and the memory lapse merely 
on the basis of the thematic connection between the content of 
the repressed wish and the desire expressed by the Latin phrase 
... thematic affinity is not evidence for a causal connection. 
(Grunbaum 1994: 24, 8-9) 
Indeed, Grunbaum notes that, if one "free-associates" on any idea for 
long enough, its thematic connections with innumerable other ideas 
will emerge (ibid.: 25). The attribution of causal efficacy to anyone 
such connection, Grunbaum suggests, is thus as inevitably arbitrary as 
it is based on a categorical confusion. 
How then does Grunbaum account for the apparent successes 
friends claim for psychoanalytic treatment, and the type of confirma-
tion through self-transformation Habermas defends? Grunbaum's 
argument is that, while Freud never backed down on his "tallyargu-
ment" concerning the truth of psychoanalytic metapsychology, he did 
abandon the decisive "necessary condition thesis", In later works, Freud 
accepts that analysands may achieve a "cure through love", outside the 
clinic, and wrestled with the prospect that the «talking cure" might 
become «interminable" (ATI; Grunbaum 1994: 16-17). Grunbaum 
cites comparative surveys, such as Malan's, or Prioleau, Murdoch and 
Brody's, between psychoanalytic analysands and the out-patients from 
other treatments. What these analyses show, Grunbaum claims, is that 
psychoanalysis is no more statistically effective than "treatment" 
through placebos (Grunbaum 1994: 17-18). Whatever apparendy 
beneficent effects psychoanalysis does produce, Grunbaum concludes, 
must arise only from psychoanalysis's own, placebo-like mobilization 
of analysand's suggestibility (ibid.: 18-20). In clinical analysis, "the 
search for insight is only a treatment ritual serving to strengthen the 
patient's therapeutic expectations': Far from being the emancipatory, 
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truth-yielding activity envisaged by Habermas and others, that is, clin-
ical psychoanalysis more closely approximates an elaborate confidence 
trick, presided over by the "suggestive, intimidating influence of the 
analyst" (ibid.: 24). 
Revisiting the Symposium, in the clinic: working through the 
transference 
Habermas's and Grunbaum's views on psychoanalysis thus seem to 
agree on no more than that the proof of psychoanalysis's worth lies in 
its clinical practice. Yet, when we read their texts alongside Freud's 
"Papers on Technique': Habermas's and Grunbaum's accounts of clini-
cal practice share an important blind spot. The blind spot concerns 
what Grunbaum calls "suggestion", and presents as decisive evidence 
that clinical psychoanalysis has no distinctive therapeutic value. The 
problem is that what Grunbaum levels against psychoanalysis as 
"suggestion': far from being something whose therapeutic impor-
tance psychoanalysis denies, is what Freud's papers on technique call 
transference, and accord to it central importance (DT; RRW; TL). 
We noted in Chapter 2 that, pressed to defend his conception of 
sexuality, Freud turned for legitimacy to Plato's "expanded" notion 
of Eros. For Plato, the philia (or love) involved in all philosophy is an 
elevated species of Eros. It is through Eros, says Diotima in the 
Symposium, that we are drawn to seek the Truth. Yet just so, in another 
of the manifold shocks that attended the birth of psychoanalysis (see 
Introduction), it soon emerged that analysands undergoing psycho-
analysis tend, almost «automatically", to fall in love with the analyst 
whose knowledge they suppose will liberate them from their malaises. 
Breuer literally fled rather than confront transference love when it 
appeared in Anna 0 (see Chapter 2). Freud, by contrast, proposes that 
psychoanalysts must openly confront the ethical and other temptations 
it lays at analysts' feet, and turn it to therapeutic ends (DT; TL). 
The decisive thing that Grunbaum's criticism of psychoanalysis 
misses is Freud's repeated stress that the transference is a form of re-
sistance to psychoanalysis. Rather than remembering his repressed 
wishes, shaped by his earliest relations with figures oflove and author-
ity, the analysand transfers them on to the analyst. Then he repeats the 
modes of conduct associated with the repressed wishes, "acting ouf' 
the truth of his desire so as not to have to consciously work it through 
- trying to seduce the analyst or complaining she never listens, showing 
up late for sessions, and so on (RRW). Freud's prescription is that the 
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analyst must above all not play along with these repeated actings out 
that constitute what Freud calls the "transference neurosis". This is one 
reason why psychoanalysis is always conducted with the analysts seated 
behind the reclining analysand. In this way, as Lacan noted, they are 
less able to be seduced or intimated by the analysands' looks, expres-
sions, or body language (Lacan 1993: 241). Rather than buying into the 
way the analysand is addressing him - in anger or with love, and so on 
- Freud's argument is that the analyst should maintain a near-Stoic 
equanimity. This equanimity has often been spoofed in films showing 
psychoanalysts at work. Yet its function is serious. By not responding to 
the "actings out" of analysands (and in this way - despite Grunbaum-
not exploiting the transference), it allows the analysand to come to see, 
in the unmotivated emptiness of her repetitions, the extent to which 
their behaviour is structured by motives that can hail only from within 
themselves, rather than the analyst and world that they accuse. 
So this is the key thing that Habermas's and Grunbaum's accounts of 
the psychoanalytic clinic miss. The transferentiallove for the analyst is 
truly based on an illusion - Grunbaum is right about this. Yet, if one is 
to achieve the type of self-transformation the end of analysis promises 
(whose epistemological dimensions Habermas theorizes), a subject 
must "work through" the transference, rather than accede to its lure -
this is where Grunbaum gets it wrong. Although illusory, that is, the 
analysand's transferential illusion that the analyst knows the Truth is 
necessary. Like the proverbial ladder one must climb but can then kick 
away, without it, the analysand would never associate freely concerning 
her own intimate thoughts and affairs. The path to self-transformative 
truth, for psychoanalysis, is paved with this error. Yet at the end of the 
affair, analysands will above all not have come to see the world "through 
their analyst's eyes". The end of psychoanalysis, on the contrary, is 
much closer to their realizing - in a process that can be very painful, or 
even "depressive" (Klein) - that even the "intimidating" analyst cannot 
relieve them of the task of retrospectively owning the unconscious 
wishes and beliefs whose vicissitudes have oppressed them. 
In Lacan's unpublished seminar on transference, in this light, he 
focuses upon the seemingly fractious, comic close of Plato's Symposium, 
rather than the "elevating", earlier accounts of Eros to which Freud 
recurred. In this part of Plato's dialogue, the petulant demagogue 
Alcibiades drunkenly crashes the dramatized party, and proceeds to 
tell all the story of his love for Socrates. Socrates is the only man in 
all Athens who has refused his sexual advances, and for this reason 
has become an obsession for him. Socrates is enigmatic, vexing and 
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physically ugly. Yet when Socrates speaks, his words are more seductive 
than the music of the satyr Marsyas, as if Socrates held within himself 
hidden treasures and truths of incomparable virtue. How, though, does 
Socrates respond to this shameless transferential declaration of his 
lover and pupil, with all the potentials for "suggestion" it affords him? 
Lacan says: as a psychoanalyst ought. Socrates flatly refuses to accede to 
the elevated position to which Alcibiades' star-struck testimony assigns 
him. Rather, Socrates suggests, if Alcibiades «sees in me" such sublime 
things as he desires, he must be mistaken, for in truth, Socrates is 
('nothing': The true locus of the truth Alcibiades seeks, Socrates thereby 
suggests, can only lie in Alcibiades' own wishes, and it is with his 
own psyche, not Socrates', that he should concern himself (cf. SSD: 
699-700/835-6). 
Conclusion: overcoming Oedipus, and Freud 
This juncture, at the end of analysis and the beginnings of philosophy, 
marks the conclusion of our journey in Understanding Psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalysis begins the twenty-first century beleaguered from 
several sides. Outflanked in the academic humanities by new forms of 
cultural theory, chastened by sociopolitical critiques of its implication 
in social control or cultural decline, psychoanalysis is challenged as 
a therapy by the advent of cognitive behavioural therapy and new 
medications. Meanwhile, "Freud bashers" mass at the gates, declaiming 
Freud)s, Klein)s, Lacan's and others' personal lives, organizational 
charisma and clinical practice. In this context, the neuropsychoanalytic 
turn of the last decade can seem the only path available for psycho-
analysis, even if it loses its clinical soul thereby. 
In "The Shrink Is In;' in New Republic (Lear 1995), psychoanalyst 
and philosopher Jonathan Lear has proffered a different, philosophical 
defence of psychoanalysis with which we can close here. Lear's article 
turns around Sophocles' Oedipus tragedy, which Freud placed at the 
heart of psychoanalysis. As we saw in Chapter 2 (and as Rieff com-
plains), the traditional psychoanalytic reading of Oedipus Tyrannis sees 
the hero as unwittingly acting out each of our infantile sexual, aggres-
sive wishes. Lear picks up on a different register of Sophocles' tragedy. 
Oedipus is the man who, returning to Thebes, solves the riddle of the 
Sphinx which had oppressed its people. He is thus a man whose power 
is based on his surpassing intellect, confident to the point of hubris that 
he knows all there is to know. Yet Sophocles' drama stages Oedipus' 
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gradual coming to see, like an analysand, that for all his knowledge he 
has been ignorant concerning the significance of his own deeds. By 
aligning psychoanalysis with the Oedipal tragedy, Lear argues, psycho-
analysis as originated by Freud is accordingly a unique thing. It is both 
a reprisal of the ancient, mythic and religious traditions that remind us 
of the finitude of the human condition, and a distinctly modern move-
ment of thought that defends the possibility of our reflectively coming 
to terms with this finitude - and making this achievement the basis of 
an ethical life. What we risk if we accede too simply to «Freud bashing", 
Lear argues - or, we could add, if we accede to a wholly objectified, neu-
roscientific view of the psyche - is repeating the hubris of Oedipus: 
closing our eyes to the enigmatic realities of our own sexuality, aggres-
sion and subjectivity that psychoanalysis calls us to confront, instead 
striking out, in truly Oedipal fashion, at Freud, a flawed man long dead. 
Psychoanalysis cannot halt the rising plague of depression, attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder, borderline and eating disorders across 
first-world nations. Nor can it solve the riddle of those collective 
pathologies emerging today, named "fundamentalisms': which vio-
lently trouble our Oedipal hubris. Yet psychoanalytic theory would 
still draw us, invaluably, to reflect upon what inhumanity might lie 
repressed behind the short -sighted hopes that all this could be wished 
or medicated away. In a time of such widespread discontents of civil-
ization, its elementary clinical and ethical commitment to the mean-
ingfulness of human suffering and to the healing powers of speech, too, 
remains as salutary as ever. 
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Chronology of life and events 
1856 
1877 
1886 
1892 
1893-95 
24 July 1895 
1897 
1900 
1901 
1905 
1906 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911-15 
1913 
Sigmund Freud is born at Freiberg in Moravia on 6 May. 
Freud's first publications on anatomy and physiology. 
Freud marries Martha Bernays. Sets up private practice in Vienna 
for patients suffering from nervous illnesses. 
Breuer's treatment of Anna 0 (Bertha Pappenheim) using hypnotic 
method. 
The publication of Freud's first "psychoanalytic" writings on 
hysteria (although he does not coin the term until 1896). 
Freud's dream ofIrma's Injection. In a letter to Fliess, Freud com-
ments that one day the event will be commemorated by a plaque: 
In this house on July 24th, 1895, the Secret of Dreams was revealed to 
Dr. Freud. 
Freud's self-analysis leads to his abandonment of the seduction 
theory of the neuroses, and the theory of the Oedipus complex. 
The publication of The Interpretation of Dreams; Freud's treatment 
of Dora. 
Freud publishes The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 
Jacques Lacan born. 
The publication of Three Essays on Sexuality. 
Jung becomes adherent of psychoanalysis. 
The first international meeting of psychoanalysts at Salzburg. 
Little Hans and Ratman case studies; Freud, accompanied by J ung 
and others, delivers Clark Lectures introducing psychoanalysis to 
America. 
Formation of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IP A). 
Freud's analysis of Schreber's Memoirs on My Nervous Illness 
appears in 1911; Freud writes «Papers on Technique". 
Ernest Jones inaugurates the British Psychoanalytical Society. 
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1914 
1914-18 
1915 
1919 
1920 
1923 
1926 
1927 
1929 
1930 
1933 
1936 
1938 
1939 
1939-45 
1944 
1946 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
The publication of Freud's "On Narcissism" confirms Freud's 
break with Jung, and begins trajectory towards his later theory of 
the ego, and the later metapsychology; Freud writes the Wolfman 
case history (not published until 1918 ). 
WorldWarI 
Freud writes twelve "metapsychological papers", of which only five 
have survived. 
Melanie Klein begins analysing children in Budapest. 
The publication of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" introduces the 
notion of the "death drive" into psychoanalysis. 
"The Ego and the Id" is published, consolidating the later metapsy-
chology of ego, superego and id. 
Klein moves from Berlin to London, on the invitation of Ernest 
Jones, and joins the British Psychoanalytical Society a year later. 
Publication of The Future of an Illusion. 
Klein analyses "Little Dick", publishing her findings a year later. 
Publication of Civilization and Its Discontents. Freud is awarded the 
Goethe Prize by the City of Frankfurt. 
Hitler comes to power in Germany. Freud's books are burned in 
Berlin. 
Freud writes the three essays comprising "Moses and Monotheism" 
as Europe lurches towards war. 
Jacques Lacan delivers a version of "The Mirror Stage as Formative 
of the J" at the International Congress of Psychoanalysis (he re-
delivers a later version of the paper at the same Congress in 1949). 
Karen Horney publishes Feminine Psychology. 
Hitler takes Austria in the Anschluss and Freud goes into exile in 
London. 
War begins on 1 September. Freud dies of cancer on 3 September. 
World War II. Psychoanalysis's importance is underlined by 
American military physicians being required to know its basics after 
the United States enters the war in Decembet 1941. 
Helene Deutsch publishes volume I of The Psychology of Women 
(volume II appears the following year). 
Wilfred Bion begins analysis with Melanie Klein. 
Lacan begins his year-long seminars in Paris, which he will continue 
until the year before his death. 
Ronald Fairbairn publishes Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. 
Lacan delivers his "Rome Discourse", "On the Function and Field 
of Speech in Psychoanalysis", at the Rome Congress of the Institute 
of Psychology at the University of Rome. First year in which Lacan's 
annual seminar is recorded for later publication. 
First anti-psychotic medication, Chlorprozamine, is approved for 
psychiatric use in the United States. 
Albert Ellis coins the term "rational behaviour therapy", the 
antecedent of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). 
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1959 Philip Rieff publishes Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. 
1962 Lacan is expelled from the IP A. 
1963 Lacan forms the Ecole Freudienne de Paris (EFP). 
1966 The publication of Lacan's Bcrits. 
Paul Ricoeur's Philosophical Interpretation of Freud is published. 
1967 Bion publishes Second Thoughts. 
1971 Donald Winnicott publishes Playing and Reality. 
1972 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari publish Anti-Oedipus. 
1974 Luce Irigaray publishes Speculum of the Other Woman. 
Juliet Mitchell publishes Psychoanalysis and Feminism. 
1976 The American Psychoanalytic Association boasts 27,000 psycho-
analysts: psychoanalysis is at the peak of its institutional success. 
1980 Lacan unilaterally dissolves the EFP, forming the Ecole for «La 
Cause Freudienne". David Burns publishes Feeling Good: The New 
Mood Therapy, which begins to popularize CBT in the United 
States. 
Sarah Kofman publishes The Enigma of Woman. 
1981 Death ofJacques Lacan on 9 September. 
1984 Publication of Adolf Grunbaum' s The Philosophical Foundations of 
Psychoanalysis, and Jeffrey Masson's The Assault on Truth: Freud's 
Suppression of the Seduction Theory: beginnings of "Freud bashing", 
and popular decline of psychoanalysis. 
1988 Prozae is sold on the US market, inaugurating the age of anti-
depressants and growing predominance of psychiatric treatments 
of mental illness. 
1997 Mark Solrns publishes The Neuropsychology of Dreams. 
2000 One hundredth anniversary of Freud's Interpretation o/Dreams. 
Formation in July of NPSA (The International Neuropsycho-
analysis Society). 
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Questions for discussion and revision 
one Where it was: Freud's biology of the mind 
1. What are the systems posited by Freud in Project for a Scientific Psychology, 
and what are their functions? 
2. What is the "pleasure principle"? And what is its relation to the "reality 
principle"? 
3. Outline the differences between perception, memory and motility, accord-
ing to Freud. 
4. What is the "libido"? 
5. What is/are the chieffunction(s) and characteristic(s) ofthe ego for Freud? 
6. Can repression deal successfully with inappropriate wishes? If so, then how? 
If not, then why not? 
7. What is the "id"? What is its relation to the ego? 
8. What is the superego in relation to the ego and the id? 
9. What defines "mental health" for Freud? Describe in these terms the con-
ditions that lead to mental ill health. 
10. What are the varieties of mental illness, according to Freud? What are the 
characteristics of each type? 
two Sexuality and its vicissitudes 
1. Do you find Freud's emphasis upon sexuality as the root of behaviour and 
culture plausible? Why/why not? 
2. What are the grounds Freud provides for accepting his sexuality hypothesis? 
3. Describe Freud's account, and dichotomy, of "perversion". What is the 
place of the perversions in Freud's greater theory of sexuality? 
4. Do you agree with Freud that mental illness and the development of sexual-
ity in the individual are connected? 
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5. What are the four characteristics of the drive, as described by Freud in 
"Drives and Their Vicissitudes"? 
6. What are the "vicissitudes" of the drive? 
7. Freud understands activities like thumb-sucking to be autoerotic and sexual. 
Why? Are you convinced by his explanation? 
8. What differentiates human sexuality from sex between other animals, for 
Freud? 
9. What are the principal features of the Oedipus complex, according to 
Freud? What do you think about this theory? . 
10. What is Freud's explanation for why some men desire only women whom 
they cannot love? 
three To slip, perchance to dream: Freud on the unconscious 
1. Do you think there is a fundamental tension between Freud's biological 
and linguistic (topographical) accounts of the unconscious? Or are these 
accounts complementary? Discuss. 
2. Describe the two functions of the psyche's mnemic apparatus. 
3. Explain the difference between the systems preconscious and unconscious, 
and how these two systems interact with one another (use examples). 
4. What is the basis of all dreams, according to Freud? Do you agree, and 
why/why not? 
5. Why do nightmares appear to contradict Freud's account of dreams? And 
how does Freud explain this (apparent) discrepancy? Do you find this 
explanation convincing? 
6. What is the difference between the "latent" and "manifest" contents of 
dreams? How do the latent and manifest contents interact in the weaving 
together of a dream? 
7. Freud refers to dreams as "picture puzzles" or "rebuses". What is meant by 
this analogy? 
8. What is the purpose of "secondary revision" of dreams? 
9. What is the difference between the latent contents of the dream and the 
"dream wish"? Do you find the concept of the dream wish compelling? 
10. Explain the mechanisms of condensation and displacement. 
four Precarious love: Kleinian object relations theory 
1. What are the main principles of Klein's "play technique"? Do you think 
her adaptation of psychoanalysis for children is continuous with Freudian 
clinical practice? 
2. Enumerate the key differences between the "schizoid" and "depressive" 
positions. Do you agree with the object relations theorists' contention that 
everyone must pass through both of these positions to become a mature, 
balanced individual? 
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3. According to Klein, schizophrenia represents a regression to the schizoid 
position, and depression (melancholia) to the depressive position. Do you 
agree with this way of framing mental illness? 
4. What are the key disagreements between Klein and other Freudians respect-
ing the Oedipus complex? Are you more sympathetic with Klein, or her 
opponents, in this regard? 
5. Do you think that Klein's depiction of the child's fantasy life is credible? 
What do you make of the "good" and "bad" breast? 
6. What is the "good-enough" mother? 
7. What is the function of "transitional objects"? Do you think that 
Winnicott's theory has merit? 
8. What does Wilfred Bion mean by "containment"? 
9. Describe Bion's theory of communication, and relate it to Klein's under-
standing of «good" and "bad" objects. 
10. What are Fairbairn's objections to Freud? Do you agree? Why/why not? 
five Jacques Lacan: rereading Freud to the letter 
1. How, and why, does Lacan position himself as a "return" to Freud? 
2. What is meant by Lacan's phrase "the unconscious is structured like a 
language"? Discuss. 
3. What does Lacan's refrain that desire is always "desire of the other" tell us 
about his concept of the subject? 
4. What is the significance for the psyche of human children's prolonged 
dependence upon adults, according to Lacan? 
5. How does Lacan reinterpret the Oedipus complex? What do you think is the 
import of this reinterpretation? 
6. What is the difference between the "real", the "imaginary" and the "sym-
bolic" fathers? What is the significance of this difference? 
7. What does Lacan mean by saying that "the Father is always a dead father"? 
8. What is the objet petit a? And what is its relation to fantasy? 
9. Lacan employs the insights of linguistic structuralism to Freudian psycho-
analysis. What are the important features he utilizes, and how does he do so? 
10. What does a '(master signifier" do? 
six What does woman want? Feminism and psychoanalysis 
1. Explain how 'psychoanalysis might provide useful tools for feminist 
research. 
2. Do you think that, on balance, Helene Deutsch's psychoanalytic theories 
about women are productive for feminism? Why/why not? 
3. Evaluate Karen Horney's equation of the little boy's perspective and that 
of the psychoanalyst. Do you think she is correct, and what would the 
significance of this equivalence be, if she were? 
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4. Do you think Karen Horney's analysis of penis-envy as just one kind of envy 
has merit? And what of her analysis of men's envy of women's reproductive 
capacity? 
S. The existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir opposed psychoanalysis. 
Why? 
6. Why have feminists such as Kate Millett understood Freud to be an arch-
sexist? 
7. How does Juliet Mitchell respond to feminists such as Millett regarding the 
sex/gender distinction? How does psychoanalysis figure in this response? 
8. What role is played by the Oedipus complex, according to Mitchell? And 
what is the family's significance within capitalist society? 
9. Explain how Luce Irigaray represents her own relation to Freud. Is it an all-
out rejection) or an appropriation of psychoanalytic theory? 
10. What are the key points of Sarah Kofman's criticisms of Freudian 
psychoanalysis? 
seven Freud as philosopher? Civilization, art and religion 
1. Briefly describe the key features of Freud's account of civilization. Do you 
think it is a compelling account? Why/why not? 
2. What is the significance of the incest taboo for Freud's understanding of 
society? 
3. Max Horkheimer is critical of the concept of the death drive. Why? 
4. Adorno and Horkbeimer employ psychoanalysis to the task of compre-
hending the rise of fascism. What is their basic thesis? 
S. What is the relation of "play" and creativity, according to Freud? 
6. Recount what the "uncanny" means for Freud. What has the uncanny to do 
with works of art? 
7. What is the meaning of the" gaze" for Lacan? 
8. According to Lacan, what is "anamorphosis", and what does it indicate 
about subjectivity? 
9. Distinguish Freud's different currents of thought regarding religion. Do you 
agree with one more than others? 
10. Summarize the objections to Freud's account of religion proffered by 
Pfister, Strauss and Ricoeur. What is your opinion regarding these different 
approaches to religion? 
eight Where psychoanalysis has come to be: philosophy, 
science, society and ethics 
1. Briefly summarize the scientific grounds for criticism of Freudianism, 
according to Nagel and Popper. What are the chief differences between their 
respective objections? 
2. How does Paul Ricoeur respond to objections that psychoanalysis is not a 
science? 
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3. What is "neuropsychoanalysis"? Do you think neuropsychoanalysis might 
achieve what Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology" had promised? 
4. How is psychoanalysis like other sciences, and how is it unlike them? Do you 
think it is in psychoanalysis's best interest to pursue its connection to the 
natural sciences? Or do you find the alignment with hermeneutics more 
convincing? 
5. The insights of poststructuralist theory can broadly be seen as both critical 
of, and as extending upon, psychoanalysis. How does each of the follOwing 
negotiate their theoretical relation to Freud and Lacan: Derrida? Foucault? 
Deleuze and Guattari? 
6. Philip Rieff suggests that Freud "democratizes" the clinic, and that this has 
knock -on effects for society. Summarize his argument for this claim. Do you 
agree? 
7. Summarize Jiirgen Habermas's response to Popper. 
8. Summarize Adolf Grunbaum's objections to psychoanalysis. Do you agree 
with these objections? Why/why not? 
9. How do Grunbaums's objections tally with those of Nagel and Popper? 
10. What is the role of the transference for psychoanalytic practice? Do you 
think that the transference renders psychoanalysis's status problematic? Or 
is the transference an important element to the enquiry into what it is to be 
human? Discuss. 
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Guide to further reading 
Full bibliographical details appear in the Bibliography. 
Freud 
There is a wealth ofliterature on nearly all aspects of Freud's work. The best intro-
duction to Freud is still Freud himself. Arguably the best collection of Freud's 
metapsychological writings is A. Freud (ed.) The Essentials of Psycho-Analysis 
(1986). The Essential Freud (1995), Peter Gay (ed.), is also an authoritative collec-
tion. Freud wrote several classical introductions to psychoanalysis, notably "The 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" and the "New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis". The five Clark Lectures Freud delivered on his arrival in the 
United States in 1909 are also a very clear presentation of key elements of psycho-
analysis (see Freud 1962). Richard Wollheim's Freud (1971) is a locus classicus in 
secondary literature on Freud. Jonathan Lear has also written several very good 
philosophical introductions to Freud (1990, 2005). Freud for Beginners by Richard 
Appignanesi (1979) is surprisingly good, given the format. Frank J. Sullaway 
(1979) provides a very good biographical account of Freud's life and work. Freud's 
Footnotes (Leader 2000) is an intriguing collection of essays examining many 
nuances in Freud's theoretical work. Readers specifically interested in the relation-
ship between psychoanalysis and philosophy should consult Analytic Freud: 
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Levine 2000) and Freud Among the Philosophers 
(Levy 1996). 
Klein and object relations theory 
The best starting-point for exploring Kleinian theory is The Selected Melanie Klein 
(Mitchell 1987). Other authoritative texts on Klein and object relations theory 
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include: Melanie Klein (Segal 1992); Melanie Klein Today (Spillius 1988); Reading 
Melanie Klein (Stonebridge & Phillips 1988); A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought 
(Hinshelwood 1989); and Reshaping the Psychoanalytic Domain (Hughes 1989). 
More recent works include The Poetics of Psychoanalysis: In the Wake of Klein 
(Jacobus 2005); and Other Banalities: Melanie Klein Revisited (Mills 2006). For 
an account of object relations theory's contribution to art theory, see Freud's 
Art: Psychoanalysis Retold (Sayers 2007). For a discussion of the relation between 
Klein and Freud, see The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45 (King & Steiner 1991); 
and on the relation between Klein and Lacan, see The Klein-Lacan Dialogues 
(Burgoyne & Sullivan 1999). To learn more about the importance of the death 
drive to objects relations theory, see Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and 
Modernist Melancholia (Sanchez-Pardo 2003). There is a growing interest in object 
relations theory in the humanities, particularly to explain sociological phenomena 
such as racial prejudice and nationalism, notable examples being Why War?-
Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein (Rose 1993); and Melanie 
Klein and Critical Social Theory (Alford 1989). Information about Klein and 
Kleinian studies can also be found at the Melanie Klein Trust website, 
http://www.melanie-klein-trust.org.uk!. 
Lacan 
Lacan had a notoriously low regard for written publication, and the one collection 
of writings he did publish, the Bcrits, is very difficult. This text has however recently 
been very well retranslated in complete form (Fink et al. 2006). Several of Lacan's 
seminars (numbers I, II, III, VII, XI, XII and XX) have been translated into English 
in editions established and authorized by Lacan's literary executor, Jacques-Alain 
Miller. Lacan's third seminar (1993) is arguably the clearest and most incisive 
of Lacan's seminars for newcomers, particularly his key notions of the symbolic, 
the paternal signifier and the imaginary. Students are also recommended Lacan's 
first published seminar (l988a). Arguably the best systematic introduction to 
Lacanian theory and clinical practice is Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psycho-
analysis: Theory and Technique (Fink 1997). The Lacanian Subject (Fink 1995) is also 
highly recommended, but more advanced. BetlVeen Philosophy <& Psychoanalysis 
(Samuels 1993), Return to Freud (Weber 1991), and Freud as Philosopher (Boothby 
2001) are each good, book-length examinations of Lacan's thought. An Introduc-
tory Dictionary of Lac ani an Psychoanalysis (Evans 1996) is a helpful compendium. 
"Lacan and the Discourse of the Other" (Wilden 1981) is a good essay-length study 
of Lacan's relationship to structuralism and the French sociological tradition. 
Matthew Sharpe's "Lacan, Jacques» in The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (at 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lllacweb.htm) is a more advanced, and longer, analysis by 
the author than Chapter 5 here. Much of the recent interest in Lacan's work, out-
side clinical circles, has been generated by Slavoj Zizek's work. Several of Zizek's 
books are explicitly devoted to introducing readers to Lacanian theory by way of 
examining aspects of popular culture (see especially 1992 and 2001). Interested 
readers are also directed towards http://www.lacan.com. a website devoted to 
Lacanian theory and analysis. 
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Feminism 
There are a number of good books addre8%ing psychoanalysis and feminism, and 
recent interest particularly in Freud's position on «woman». The best of these 
include VVhy Do Women Love Men and Not Their Mothers? (Hamon 2000); Gender 
and Envy (Burke 1998); Feminism and Its Discontents (Buhle 1998); and Female 
Sexuality: The Early Psychoanalytic Controversies (Grigg et al. 1999). For a survey of 
views specifically on Freud's case study of Dora, see In Dora's Case (Bernheimer 
& Kahane 1985). For a thorough treatment of early women psychoanalysts see 
Mothering Psychoanalysis (Sayers 1991). There have been several publications deal-
ing with French feminism and psychoanalysis, most notably Sexual Subversions 
(Grosz 1989); Feminism and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter's Seduction (Gallop 
1982); Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (Whitford 1994); and Yielding 
Gender (Deutscher 1997). Other significant feminist engagements with psycho-
analysis, of which space did not permit coverage in this volume, include Judith 
Butler's The Psychic Life of Power; Nancy Chodorow's The Reproduction of 
Mothering; and Helene Cixous's "Castration or Decapitation!" 
Civilization, art and religion 
Freud's writings on civilization, art and religion have been collected in several 
edited volumes. These include Civilization, Society and Religion (1985), Civil-
ization, War and Death (1939) and On Creativity and the Unconscious (1958). For 
Freud's thoughts on art and aesthetics, readers can consult Art and Psychoanalysis 
(Adams 1993). For Kleinian understandings of art, there is Psychoanalysis and Art: 
Kleinian Perspectives (Gosso 2004), which includes an essay by Klein. For material 
on Lacan's readings of, and debts to, literature and the arts, see Jacques Lacan: 
Psychoanalysis and the Subject of Literature (Rabate 200 1); and Lacan and 
Literature: Purloined Pretexts (Stoltzfus 1996). Psycho-analysis and Faith (Meng, 
Freud et aI. 1963) provides fascinating insights into Freud's ambivalence concern-
ing religion, and his extraordinary friendship with Oskar Pfister. Psychoanalysis 
and Religious Experience (Meissner 1984) and Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 
Twenty First Century (Black 2006) both provide a good critical introduction to 
Freud's, and subsequent, psychoanalytic approaches to religion. Freud's Moses 
(Yerushalmi 1991) provides a remarkable introduction to the vexed topic of 
Freud's relations to Judaism, alongside Peter Gay's Godless Jew (1987). For excel-
lent examinations of Lac an on religion, see Kenneth Reinhard (1999, 2005). J urgen 
Braungardt (1999) is also highly recommended. 
Science, society and ethics 
On the history of the psychoanalytic movement, students are encouraged to 
consult Ernest Jones's classic The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (1953-57), 
Secrets of the Soul (Zaretsky 2004), and Fin-de-Siecle Vienna (Schorske 1980). For a 
critical appraisal of psychoanalysis in the American milieu, see Unfree Associations 
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(Kirsner 2000). Key texts in the 1980s and 1990s Freud debates include TheAssault 
on Truth (Masson 1984), Why Freud Was Wrong (Webster 1995), The Memory 
Wars (Crews 1995) and Killing Freud (Dufresne 2003). On Freud and science, 
Adolf Grunbaum's The Foundations of Psychoanalysis is an important text. For 
good essay collections on this topic, see Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and 
Philosophy (Hook 1959) and Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science (Clark & Wright 
1988). Lacan and Science (Glynos & Stravrakakis 2002) is a good, but advanced, 
collection of essays. Mark Solms's "Freud Returns" is the best introduction to the 
contemporary neuropsychoanalytic movement. Anthony Elliot (1992, 1996, 1998) 
has written several important analyses of the way psychoanalysis has intervened 
in, and been critiqued by, social theorists. Philip Rieffs The Triumph of the 
Therapeutic remains a locus classicus, as does Christopher Lasch's The Culture of 
Narcissism. On psychoanalysis, as a therapy, and philosophy, readers are recom~ 
mended TherapeuticAction (Lear 2003). 
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